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Preface
Listen, my girl: Before it was not the same. We can not compare. Before
it was a life, and now, it is another life.
This thesis is the evidence that I did not follow this advice of my eldest
informant, Mustfa.
There have been times when I regretted ignoring his advice; times when
I fully agreed with him that the project of comparing "before" and "now"
and their implications for the lives of the Tunisians was indeed impossible.
Still, I evidently have not been able to give up the project - in between
the moments of despair it just seemed too good an ide a to be wasted.
Whether it was worth the effort is up to the reader to decide.
A number of persons and institutions have in different ways made the
work with the thesis possible, and should be mentioned as contrbutors to
the completed product:
First of all, I would like to thank my informants, and all the others who
assisted me during my fieldwork in Tunisia. Without their support, the
project would have been impossible to realize.
I would furthermore like to thank my advisors at the Department of
Sociology, Kristin Tornes and Olav Korsnes, for valuable guidanee in my
work with the thesis.
The Chr. Michelsen Institute has kindly provided me with working-
conditions during the period I have been writing the thesis. I would
paricularly like to thank the staff at the CMI-programme "Gender Relations
in a Comparative Perspective": The researchers Tone Bleie and Gisela
Geisler, as well as my fellow students connected to the programme, have
been of tremendous help and inspiration.
I would also like to thank NAVF, who made the fieldwork economically
possible, and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, who provided
me with a very fruitful stay at their library in Uppsala.
A particular thanks to my husband, who has always been an available
source of both information and support throughout the period I have been
working on the thesis.
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1. Introduction
Situated in the heart of North Africa, Tunisia is geographically and
culturally a part of the Arab World. Still, Tunisia is today in many ways a
non-typical Arab country. Since independence in 1956, the state has
undergone a thorough proeess of social structural change, that has been
markedly inspired by Western liberal ideas of social organization. Central
elements of the society have as aresult been significantly changed. An
increase in access to formal education, a growing geographical and social
mobility, and a considerable success of the national population control
programs, are among the factors that have changed the society in general,
and the structures and functions of the family and the local community -
cornerstones of Arab-Muslim social organization - in particular, since
independence.
The objective of this study is to examine consequences of this post-
colonial structural change for Tunisians who experience it in their daily
lives. The basic point of departure is the assumption that such a thorough
change in social structures willlead to changes in the lives of those who
are exposed to it. In order to test this assumption, changes both in people's
practice, thought, and also self-perception - or identity - will be objects
of examination.
When dealing with identity in a Tunisian context, it is impossible to pass
the country's Arab-Muslim inheritance entirely without mention. This
cultural inheritance holds a significant position in the Tunisians' minds;
recent political events have illustrated that in spite of Tunisia's post-
colonial development away from a traditional Arab- Muslim society, people
are still Arabs and Muslims to themselves, as well as Tunisians.
Over the last fifteen years, Tunisia has experienced the rise of a
considerable Islamist movement. This movement reflects a general tendency
of increasing religious fundamentalism that today characterizes most of the
Arab World. The rise of fundamentalism in Tunisia should parly be
understood as a reaction against the "Westernization" of the society, and
thus as a search for a Muslim identity , after the long period of Western
influence that first started with the colonization.
The Islamist revival is, however, a rather recent phenomenon that is
significant within particular sections of the Tunisian population only. The
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idea of an Arab Nation is another central factor of identification, that more
than the Islamism characterizes the population in general. This idea has also
a longer history among the Tunisians. Still, its influence is today as clear
as ever: The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the following American presenee
in Saudi Arabia, took place during the field-work period of this study.
People's reactions to these events were strong testimonies of the nature and
intens it y of the Arab identity, as it exists among the Tunisians today.
Both the Arab Nation and Islam are what one may call Htrans-national"
aspects of the Tunisians ' identity. These aspects are significant for the
majority of the Tunisians ' self-understanding, and their existence should be
kept in mind. The focus of this thesis is, however, on entirely other and
more localleveIs. It focuses on social universes that traditionally have been
of fundamental importanee for both social life and identity-formation in
Tunisia: The local community, and paricularly the family-group.
Because of the significant importanee of these social universes in the
Tunisian society, they will be objects of considerable interest in this thesis.
Firstly, they are the universes examined in the theoretical analysis of the
social point of departure of the post-colonial social change. Secondly, they
also constitute main arenas for the analysis of the Tunisians ' social life
today.
This study will thus deal with post-colonial social structural change as it
appears in people's practices on the arenas of the local community and the
family-group. In the same way it will examine the change in people's
conceptions of the meaning and importanee of their interaction on these
arenas. It will also focus on identity as it is created, expressed, and changed
in the spheres of these traditionally significant social arenas.
A central characteristic of the post-colonial social change is the decrease
in the importanee of these social universes in the liv es of the Tunisians.
Particularly for the post-colonial generations, there is a tendency of change
away from the local community and the family-group as the fundamental
social universes, towards an increased importanee of new universes, that
have appeared as consequences of the post-colonial structural change. This
thesis will also examine the nature of this shift in social universes for the
young generations, and its implications for their practices, and thoughts,
and also for their sense of identity.
As this study has been conducted within clear limits both as to scope and
time, limitations of the rather extensive theme presented above have been
necessary.
Certain aspects of the post -colonial change in social structures have
therefore, because of their large impact on social change in general and
because of their particular relevanee for the topics of interest to this study,
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been chosen as representative of the general structural changes in Tunisia
after independence. These aspects will be discussed in chapter two, as parts
of the historical background for the study.
The family-group and the local community have already been presented
as social arenas of fundamental importanee for the traditional Tunisian
social organization, and therefore as the social universes of examination in
the theoretical analysis of the social point of departure of the post-colonial
changes. This analysis will, as a part of the general theoretical framework
of the thesis, be presented in chapter three.
Certain limitations and operationalizations have also been guiding the
practical implementation of the study. Because the local social community
figures as a main field of interest, it has been natural to concentrate the
research around one such community. A small town, situated in the North-
Eastern corner of Tunisia, has been chosen as the physical setting of the
study.
The nature of the information required for the analysis has furthermore
made me opt for data-collection based on extensive interviews with a rather
limited number of informants. In addition, the fact that the main object of
the study is to examine change over time has made a sample of informants
based on several generations areasonable choice. The fact that the nature
and function of the family-group is a main field of interest has made me
concentrate on informants of both genders, who mainly belong to the same
families. The methodological approach to the study will be presented and
discussed in chapter four.
The second part of the thesis contains presentations of the information
about practices, thoughts and senses of identity provided by the individuals
who appear as informants in the study. It furthermore contains discussions
of this information, seen in relation to the principles of the traditional
Tunisian social organization presented in chapter three, and the post-
colonial changes in social structures presented in chapter two.
This second par of the thesis is organized according to main themes of
the interviews, and treats topics like marage, physical reproduction, formal
education, occupation, and the informants' relations to the family-group, the
local community, and the national-Ievel society. Throughout the
presentations and discussions, the focus is on changes in practices, ways of
thinking, and senses of identity between the generations of Tunisians that
the informants represent.
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2. Historical background1
2.1 The colonial period
When Tunisia formally declared its independence from Franee in 1956, the
country was left with the enormous task of creating a nation state from the
remains of the colonial rule. The preconditions for accomplishing this task
were, however, in many ways more favourable in Tunisia than in other
newly de-colonized North-African states. Several factors contributed to this
favourable situation:
The type of colonization that Tunisia was exposed to, had relatively
limited effects on the pre-colonial social organization of the country. First
of all, Tunisia was colonized for a relatively short period of time, from
1882 to 1956. Secondly, Tunisia was never actually a colony; the country's
formal status was that of a French protectorate. This distinetion was
furthermore not merely of a formal charaeter, it also had significant
practical effects: The plan for Tunisia was one of "private colonization" -
the French state's interference was kept low, while private enterprises were
encouraged to take whatever advantage they could of their country's control
of the area. As this strategy for colonization turned out to be rather
unsuccessful, the last period of the protectorate saw a considerable rise in
formal interference from the colonial power; still, the French presenee never
constituted more than seven per cent of the total population, and the period
of the protectorate had relatively limited effects on Tunisian sociallife.
Pre-colonial Tunisia had by the last half of the nineteenth century
reached a relatively advanced stage of state-building; administrative control
of the country through the transformation of the hinterlands, or Bled al-Siba
- "Land of Insolence", into Bled al-Makhzen - "Government Land", had
for some time been a concern for the central administration (Anderson,
1986). When Franee occupied the area in the early 1880's, it found a
country equipped with relatively well-developed administrative structures.
The data presented in this chapter are extracted from the following sources: Anderson
L., 1986; Gallagher C.F., 1968; Hudson M.C., 1977; Anderson J.N.D., 1958; Information
Report, 1988; Sutton K., 1980; FerchIou S., 1989; Office National, 1989; Ministry of
Culture and Information, 1989; Republique Tunisienne, 1962; Republique Tunisienne,
1977; Republique Tunisienne, 1984; Republique Tunisienne, 1987.
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Probably as a consequence of France's low ambitions of formal
involvement in Tunisia it based the colonial administration on these existing
strctures, rather than developing new ones paricularly designed for the
needs of the colonial power. As a result, the discontinuity caused by the
introduction of the new rulers was moderate in large parts of the country;
the existing power-strctures of the provinces stayed largely unchanged. At
the time of independence, Tunisia possessed a state administration that was
well suited to the tas k of administrating an independent state. In this way,
the colonial power continued the proeess of state-building started in pre-
colonial Tunisia. Tunisia's colonial experience may therefore be
characterized as moderate, and even to some degree constructive, if seen
from a state-building point of view. (ibid.)
Another factor that facilitated the creation of a stable, post -colonial state,
was the ethnical and religious homogeneity that characterizes Tunisian
society. Unlike its neighbouring countries, Tunisia has no Berber population
of any significance. More than ninety per cent of the inhabitants are Sunnite
Muslims; the main religious minorities, Jews and Christians, only constitute
a few per cent of the population. At independence, the formation of the
new state was thus not complicated by ethnical or religious unrest and
rivalry. Since Tunisia has a rather long history as a political unit, the
definition of the new state as such created little controversy.
One of Tunisia's most significant assets at the time of independence was,
however, the existence of a major, mass-based political party with more
than thirty years of political experience; the Neo-Destourian Party.
Habib Bourgiba, the party's creator and leader, had recognized the
importanee ofbroad popular support; as a consequence, the Neo-Destourian
Party's activities before independence were characterized by pragmatism
rather than ideology. The party' s actual ideological base - nationalistic,
secular liberalism - was not a central feature of its practical policy, which
aimed at including as many groups of the population as possible in the base
of pary sympathizers. The party approached this aim through the creation
of a nationwide network of clientelist structures, based on provincial core
party-members' practical support to the local population.
This practical, clientelist strategy turned out successfully for the Party.
It furthermore had significant consequences for the national political
situation at the time of independence: First of all, it resulted in a shift of
provincial power from traditional patrons to patrons of the "modern"
political and economic sectors, a development that came to facilitate
significantly the implementation of the new post-colonial reforms.
Secondly, it resulted in a general decentralization of power from the
Capital, Tunis, to the provincial centres. Finally, the strategy's success
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secured the Neo-Destourian party considerable legitimacy within most
sections of the Tunisian population - a support that later became essential
for the party's ab il it y to consolidate the new post-colonial regime's position
during the first crucial decade after the independence.
The nationallevel of organizational structures in Tunisia escaped
colonialism with a relative minimum of discontinuity. To an even L arg er
extent, this was also the case for the social organization of the provincial
local communities. The larger parts of the Tunisian population experienced
rather moderate changes in their practical daily lives as a consequence of
the colonization; the general tendency was one of stability. Major
characteristics of the provinciallife were thus preserved: Geographical and
social mobility remained low, illiteracy remained high; agriculture remained
the dominating sector of the economy. And local every-day social life
continued until independence to be based on principles that had been
dominant for centuries.
2.2 The post-colonial period
Tunisia gained independence in 1956. From the beginning, the Neo-
Destourian Pary stood out as the sole realistic candidate for the task of
governng the new state, due to its broad popular support, its long political
experience, and its extensive nation-wide clientelist network. In addition,
the party's charismatic leader, Habib Bourgiba, personally played a central
role for the legitimacy of the party. He enjoyed a considerable popularity
within the Tunisian population; on his return from French detention in
1956, he was celebrated as the liberation personified and welcomed as the
new Tunisia' s Grand Father. When Tunisia became a republie in 1957, he
was the evident candidate for the presidency - a position he was to hold
for decades.
Once in power, the Neo-Destourian Party set out to realIze its ambitious
and controversial plans for Tunisia: Its transformation into a modern,
secular nation state, based on a combination of a "modern" interpretation
of Muslim principles and Western liberal ideas. The Party' s interpretation
of liberalism did not, however, include the democratie elements; until the
eighties, Tunisia remained an authoritaran one-pary state.
The new law of personal status introduced by the new regime in 1957
indicated the radical nature of the intended changes: As the first Arab state
it prohibited both polygamy, and the Muslim law of divorce, or repudiation.
Through the successful implementation of these and other changes in the
civil legislation, the government took a significant step towards the
secularization of the state while it consolidated the regime's position. More
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than three decades later, Tunisia has still remained the Arab country that
most diverges from the Sharia - the Islamic law - in legislation.
A regime' s implementation of social reforms of such a fundamental
character clearly requires both a considerable practical political power and
a large extent of legitimacy. The Neo-Destourian government had both, as
a result of the party's activities during the late colonial period.
The young state had a long way to go to reach the aim of a modern,
"developed" nation, however: In 1953, less than 17 per cent of the children
of primar school age were actually engaged in any formal kind of
education - secondary schools were as good as non-existent. In 1956, only
15.3 per cent of the population were literate; 25.5 per cent of the men, and
4 per cent of the women. 39.8 per cent of the women between 15 and 19
years of age were mared. The agricultural sector employed eight times as
many people as the industrial sector, and 67 per cent of the population lived
in rural areas.
The new regime' s model for economic development was based on liberal
principles, but with significant state involvement. The expansion of the state
sector was thus from the beginning a task of high priority. From 1955 to
1960, the number of Muslim state employees rose from 12,000 to 80,000.
This was partly a result of the replacement of French officiaIs, partly of a
general growth in the public sector. Official positions were to a large
degree used as awards to party members; this expansion served to
strengthen the clientelist system of the Neo-Destourian party. (Anderson,
1986)
Development of the educational sector was another area of high priori ty.
Already by 1958, 38 per cent of the children of primary school-age were
attending school; 56 per cent of the boys, and 20 per cent of the girls. The
female paricipation may seem low; in a society where girls, until the
independence, had lived in almost total confinement, it is actually quite
remarkable, and points towards another of the regime' s main priorities; the
emancipation of women through their increased participation in all spheres
of public life.
By 1960, Tunisia had passed the first crucial phase of consolidation; the
country had a new constitution, rivalry both within and outside the ruling
party had been settled, the regime was widely recognized as the legitimate
rulers of the new state, and the first development programmes were already
in place.
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2.2.1 The sixties
The seriousness of the efforts directed toward true modemization,
which involve freeing the whole society from the stagnant side of
traditional life and the bonds of the past, emerges in all undertakings:
the sweeping legal changes dealing with the family , the emancipation
of women, new attitudes towards religion, very rapid educational
progress, and moderation both in internal and social reconstruction and
in foreign affairs. The most notable factor appears to have been the
abilty to combine change with stabilty in shifting dosages but without
excess in any single direction (Gallagher 1968, p.8).
The sixties were to become the experimental period of Tunisia's post-
colonial history. The Neo-Destourian pary went through a significant
radicalization early in the decade; the liberal principles were to a large
extent replaced with socialist ones. One of the results of this political turn
was a vast program of collectivization, initiated in 1964. Most sectors of
economy were involved, but the consequences for the agricultural sector
were paricularly large.
The hopes for this decade were high: The government estimated an
annual growth-rate of 6 per cent. Full primary school-enrolment was
furthermore expected to be reached by 1966. This was also the decade of
the first program of population control. In 1962, the Tunisian population
had reached the number of 4,332,200, and in 1961, the average number of
children per woman was 7.1. The ambition was to diminish the growth rate
significantly through female sterilisation and distribution of contraceptives.
In addition, the legal age of marage for girls was risen from 15 to 17 in
1964 and free access to abortion for mared women was granted in 1967.
These hopes were only partially meL. The actual annual growth rate
turne d out to be 3.3 per cent - a highly respectable rate, compared to
other African de-colonized countries, but still little more than half of the
estimated growth. Full primary school enrolment was not achieved; by
1964, 92 per cent of the children had enroled, but as late as 1968, only 77
per cent of the children of primary school age were actually attending
school - 94 per cent of the boys, and 59 per cent of the girls - which
indicates a high rate of early drop-outs, particularly for girls. Still, the
percentage of married women under twenty had dropped to 18.5 per cent.
Again, compared to other countries in similar situations, the achievements
were quite remarkable, but still insufficient to meet the expectations for the
decade.
The population control program also turne d out to be only partially
successful. By 1968, one third of the target number of users of
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contraceptives was reached, with the result that only 3.6 per cent of the
marred, fertil e women used contraception. In addition, a significant
reduction of infant mortality took place in the later years of the decade, as
a result of the development of the health-sector - from 211.3 per thousand
children less than five years of age in the period 1963-67, to 161.9 in the
period 1968-72. This achievement to some degree came to counter-weight
the total effect of the population control programme.
The program of collectivization furthermore proved to be a failure. It met
considerable opposition among the population; in a society where private
property, particularly farland, had been the main base of wealth and status
for centuries, people were less than happy to have to work what used to be
their own land for modest wages. The fact that the proportion of the rural
population by 1966 had decreased to 63 per cent may be seen in connection
with the implementation of this program.
This resistance did not result in any significant organized political
opposition, however; the Neo-Destourian Party - in the sixties called the
Neo-Destourian Socialist Pary - remained the only political alternative
throughout the decade. The continued legitimacy of the regime combined
with its firm repression of all organized political oppositional activity
contributed to this lack of competitors on the political arena.
By the end of the sixties, the general failure of the socialist experiment
to realize the aims set for the decade led to a turn in the regime's political
line. The program of collectivization was called off, and the properties were
returned to the previous owners. The Prime Minister in charge of it was
arested, Bourgìba declared his great disappointment in him, and claimed
his innocence in the former' s unpopular policies. He thereby established a
position of his own that he was to keep for the rest of his presidency, as a
king-like figure, above the practical policies of his regime.
2.2.2 The seventies
"Harmony, balance, cohesion, tolerance, contentment" - these are the
words which spring to the mind of one who, having completed a long and
diffcult voyage through Arab polities, finally comes to rest in Tunisia
(Hudson 1977, p.377).
The seventies saw a return to the liberal principles that initially had been
the ideological base of the Neo-Destourian Party. The economy was opened
to foreign investments and national private initiativ es were encouraged.
Development of the tourist sector became a main priority. The state
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remained heavily involved in the economy, however; throughout the
decade, its share of the total activity never fell below 50 per cent.
The turn away from socialism also implied a shift in the social policy of
the government. The country's economy had proved unable to prov ide the
intended rapid improvement of the living conditions for the whole
population. The regime thus had to choose between a continued policy of
general improvement, which implied a significant reduction of the desired
pace of development, or a policy of economic growth based on liberal
principles, which implied that concerns for the welfare of significant groups
of the population had to be given up. The choice fell on the last strategy,
and the new, liberal social policy came to benefit particularly the provincial
entrepreneurs, that had been the core group of support for the Neo-
Destourian Party from the beginning. The regime thus continued and
broadened its former successful strategy of clientelism-based support into
the seventies.
In spite of the significant policy shifts, the development of the social
sectors of high priority continued to show rather stable results during this
period. By 1975,47.5 per cent of the Tunisian population lived in the urban
are as of the country. The illiteracy had been reduced to 55 per cent of the
population 42.3 per cent for men, and 67.9 per cent for women. Still, by
1976, the aim of full primary school enlistment was not yet achieved; only
42.9 per cent of the total number of enrolments were girls.
This disparty shows that there still were girls deprived of formal
education. At the same time, however, the fact that girls accounted for 36.2
per cent of the secondar school enrolments, indicates that higher education
also for girls had become a priori ty at least within some sections of the
population by the mid-seventies.
Concerning population control, improvement continued to be modest.
During the period from 1966 to 1975, the annual population growth-rate
was 2.3 per cent a rather low rate, as compared to those of other North-
African countries at the time. By 1973, the birth rate was down to 3.8 per
cent, and the continued programmes of family planning had by 1975 led to
a situation where 10 per cent of the marred, fertil e female population used
contraception.
For the first half of the seventies, the results of the shift back to
liberalism in economic policy were highly satisfactory. From 1970 to 1976
the Gross Domestie Product grew by nine per cent. At the same time,
however, the economic differences within the population also grew. When
the economy in 1977 faced the beginning of a period of decline that was
to continue into the eighties, the result was significant political opposition
to the regime. The trade unions were a major force in the opposition in
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itself an indicator of success for the objective of industrializing the country.
In 1977 Tunisia also experienced its first general strike - several more
were to come. A new base of protest came to the fore in the seventies: The
Islamic fundamentalist movement entered the political arena. It was the first
political force of any significance to question the political regime as such.
By the end of the decade, close to a third of the Tunisian population was
living below the World Bank's poverty-line. The official unemployment
rate was twelve per cent - the real rate was probably much higher.
230,000 Tunisian cItizens were registered as working abroad - also a
modest estimate, but still equal to the part of the population occupied in the
industri al sector. The former certain way to personal prosperity and upward
social mobility, academic training, began to fail, and for the first time, there
was significant unemployment also within the educated groups of the
population.
2.2.3 The eighties
Chaos in the domestic policy of the countr, rising intolerance, insecurity,
social tensions, a stagnating economy, laxity, suspicion, erosion of
Tunisia's image and loss of her prestige on the international scene, an old
and ailng President of the republic surrounded by a small group of
favourites concerned mainly with the pursuit of their own interests: such
was the situation in my country on the Eve of the 7th of November 1987,
a situation which threatened to plunge the country in to civil war and lead
its economy to bankruptcy (Ambassador of Tunisia in Ankara M. Frini,
in SESRTCIC 1988, p.5).
Until the eighties, the liberal ide als of the post-colonial regime had been
restricted to the economic sector. Politically, Tunisia was an authoritarian
one-party state, and opposition to the ruling Neo-Destourian party was met
with firm repression. As the political opposition grew during the seventies,
this situation became increasingly problematic. The continued refusal to
permit competing parties caused considerable disapproval within the
population, particularly among the members of the growing educated
middle class.
In 1980, the Prime Minister of the seventies, Hedi Nouira, was replaced
by the more liberal Mohammed M'Zali. Under him, Tunisia experienced
the first careful attempts of democratization. In 1981, Tunisia had the first
free elections in its post-colonial history. As the regime by then had
recognized only one other political party but their own, and as the Neo
Destourian Party did not give up its old habit of manipulating the elections,
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the practical effect of the reform was rather limited. All the same, this was
to become the first step in a fumbling and unstable proeess of
democratization. Two more paries were recognized in 1983, and with the
three that were recognized in 1988, Tunisia had by the end of the decade
seven legal political paries.
Being anti -constitutional, the fundamentalist movement has remained
illegal until today. Still, it grew in size and importanee throughout the
eighties. The effects of this movement, combined with the general
disapproval of the political and economic conditions in the population,
created a major national political crisis by the end of the decade. President
Bourgiba had by this time passed eighty; he had lost his former firm grip
on the country's politics, and was guided by advisors of varying quality.
After the brief liberalization of the early eighties, the regime again met
the political opposition with repression. Imprisoning leaders from both the
trade-unions, the political parties in opposition, and the fundamentalist
movement, and repressing all political demonstrations with considerable
force, it maximized the crisis rather than solving it.
By 1987, the situation had become critical, with nation-wide strikes, both
among workers and students, several incidents where members of the
opposition were killed by the police, and fundamentalist bomb-attacks on
tourist-hotels in mid-season. Tunisia faced larger political problems than
ever before in its short history while the regime's legitimacy and strength
was at an absolute low point. On 7 November 1987, the old and senile
Bourgiba was removed from his permanent presidency - he had himself
elected president for life in 1974. The coup was led by a group within the
Neo-Destourian Party, and it took place without any use of violence.
In his early fifties, the new president Ben Ali did not belong to the
generation of politicians who had earned their reputation during the fight
for independence. A convinced liberal, he fitted into the Neo-Destourian
political tradition; still, his interpretation of the Party's ideology also to
some extent included the democratic aspects of it. In fact, one of his
ambitions at the take-over was claimed to be a thorough democratization
of the country' s political system. There was also the task of recovering the
national economy, which had been in decline ever since the late seventies.
In spite of all the problems the new president had to face, he took over
a countr that had been through a considerable change since its
independence, and that compared to other developing countries had come
far in the proeess of social reform and modernization:
By the end of the eighties, the population was approaching eight million,
twice the population at independence. The annual population growth rate
was as low as 2.4 per cent, however. The average life-expectancy was 65.7
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years for men, and 66.9 years for women. 38.8 per cent of the population
was less than fifteen years of age, an eight per cent reduction since 1966.
49.8 per cent of the maried, fertle women practised some kind of
contraception.
In 1988, only 4.3 per cent of the girls under twenty were married; at the
same time, the female proportion of the pupils in primary school had
reached 45 per cent. In secondary school, 44 per cent of the pupils were
girls, and they also constituted 37.8 per cent of the university students. As
early as in 1984, 21.9 per cent of the female population was engaged in
paid labour, as against 5.6 per cent in 1966. At the same time, however, as
much as 17 per cent of the population between ten and fourteen years were
illiterate.
By the end of the decade, well over fifty per cent of the population was
living in urban areas; still, rural-urban migration remained relatively low,
3.9 per cent in the period 1979-84. In 1984, 72 per cent of the households
were electrified, as against 15 per cent in 1954.
And in 1987, 75 per cent of the households had running water, 68 per cent
more than at independence.
The Tunisia that in 1987 experienced the first change of president since
independence, was thus quite different from the society that welcomed
Bourgiba back from French detention in 1956.
The optimism that first characterized public opinion after the change of
president soon faded away, along with the broken promises of the new
government. Considerable reforms, both economic and political, have
actually taken place since 1987. The difficult economic situation, together
with the conservative attitude and general rigidity of the huge Neo-
Destourian state bureaucracy, has, however, served to reduce the practical
effects of these reforms.
Depending heavily on the tourist industry both for supplies of foreign
currency, and for the domestie job market, the Tunisian economy is today
wide open to international influence. The European economIc depression
of the late eighties, as well as political incidents like the Gulf war, has had
a negative influence on the state's financial situation during the last years.
Today, the most striking feature of political life in Tunisia is the
fundamentalist movement. Since it first appeared in the seventies, it has
grown to become one of the more significant in the Arab World. In May
1991, a fundamentalist coup-attempt was exposed. By then in its last phase
of preparations, it would probably have had a rather good chanee of
success, if realized. Even though the movement has considerable support,
the supporters are to a large extent to be found in particular sections of the
population - among students, most of whom are facing an uncertain
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occupational future, and others who have suffered under the neglect of the
regime since the turn in social policy of the early seventies. The
fundamentalism may therefore be seen as a political movement of protest
against the late post-colonial Neo-Destourian regime.
The rise of a powerful religious fundamentalist movement in a country
that has been through such a vast proeess of modernization as Tunisia may
seem unexpected. In fact, the rapid social change of the post-colonial period
may be a main factor behind this development. From the beginning a top-
down affair, the rapid proeess of modernization has given the population
little time to adjust itself to the new kind of society. The rise of
fundamentalism in Tunisia may therefore also be seen as a result of the
need of the people to retrieve their roots and cultural identity .
Still, the fact remains that post-colonial Tunisia is the Arab country that
has experienced the most significant social change away from a traditional
Arab- Muslim society, towards a model of social organization similar to the
Western one. Whether this development will continue in the future, or
whether the fundamentalist forces will gain in influence, remains to be
seen.
2.3 Regional differences
One central feature of the Tunisian society, remarkable for a country of tbis
moderate size, is only vaguely suggested above: The considerable
differences in living conditions between the geographical regions of the
country. The present significant geographicallines of division correspond
to a large extent to the historie al ones separating the hinterlands Bled al-
Siba and the government-controlled areas, Bled al-Makhzen. The fact that
the Bled al-Siba during the last century was made available for taxation,
and thus lost its traditional political autonomy, does not seem to have
implied that it became fully integrated in the social organization of Tunisia.
The fact is that even today, these are as stand out as hinterlands, through
their low participation in the various sectors of "new" Tunisia. Their
average level of education is lower, their participation in institutionalized
politicallife is lower, their economic situation is worse than in the rest of
the country. Their resistance towards integration and modernization is well
known, as is the fact that the areas are centres of non-institutionalized
political movements of protest. This situation may indicate both a general
neglect of the areas on the part of the post-colonial regime, and an active
reluctance among the people in these areas to accept their status as
integrated parts of the Tunisian state.
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While the Bled al-Makhzen included most of the coastal areas of Eastern
Tunisia, the Bled al-Siba roughly covered the innermost Western parts of
Tunisia. In order to get a picture of the present differences between the
areas, one may for instanee examine the rates of illiteracy among children,
and the practice of contraception in some of the Tunisian regions:
Urban Boys
Urban Girls
Rural Boys
Rural Girls
Table 2.1
Rate of illiteracy among children 10-14 years of age in some
Tunisian regions 1984 (in per cent)
Dist. North- Centre- South-
Tunis East West West
3.6 3.0 6.3 2.9
7.3 5.5 15.1 11.2
8.3 14.7 19.7 12.7
21.9 34.1 57.9 37.6
Average
3,4
7,5
15,1
44,3
Source: Recensement General de la Population et de l Habitat vol.3 Republique Tunisienne
Ministere du Plan 1984 p.60-64
Any contr. 63.9
Modern 51.5
contr.
Table 2.2
Rate of mared, fertil e women practising contraception in
some Tunisian regions. 1988 (in per cent)
D.Tunis N.- C.- South Average Rural Urban
East West
57.1 31.5 41.4 49.8
41.3 27.3 32.6 40.4
34.6
30.1
60.5
47.6
Source: Enquête Démographique et de Santé en Tunisie 1988 Office National de la Famile
et de la Population, Tunis, Tunisia, and Institute for Resource Development/Macro Systems
Inc. Colombia, Marland USA 1989 p.70
We see that there are significant regional differences in Tunisia both
concerning illiteracy among children, and practice of contraception. Even
within regions, the differences may be considerable. The rate of iiiiteraCy
in the particular North-Eastern Gouvernorat of Nabeul, to which the town
of this study belongs, for instance, differs to some degree from the general
15
situation in the region: While the illiteracy of urban children of both
genders is approximately the same as for all the North-East, 3.2 per cent for
boys and 5.5 per cent for girls, the rates for rural children are significantly
lower; 11.3 per cent of the boys, and 26.4 per cent of the rural girls were
illiterate in this Gouvernorat in 1984.
These figures reveal significant regional differences concerning topics
that are central to this study. Therefore, the study does not aim at producing
results that can be applied to all Tunisia; the objective is rather to provide
an analysis of the situation in one socially and geographically clearly
defined group of Tunisians.
The study will have relevanee for the entire Tunisian society, however.
More than that, it should be able to contrbute to the understanding of the
social organization and social mechanisms that are prominent in most parts
of North Africa. Tunisia shares the Arab-Muslim cultural tradition of all
this area. Even if the social changes of the post-colonial period have had
significant impact on the lives of the Tunisians, the Arab- Muslim principles
continue to be important elements in small-scale social life. The post-
colonial social development may have weakened the actual impact of these
principles more than it has changed them qualitatively. The future will
show whether the importanee of these principles will be further weakened,
or whether they will continue to constitute the basic values of the society.
2.4 Summing up
Tunisia's colonial period, as well as its post-colonial period, has been
characterized by relative political continuity and lack of conflicts, as
compared to the recent history of the other North African states. This had
several consequences for the present situation in the country:
First of all, the post-colonial political regime has enjoyed considerable
legitimacy in the population since independence, again as compared to the
situation in other North African countries. The recent rise of the
fundamentalist movement has changed this picture, however.
Secondly, the stable political situation during the first decades after
independence made it feasible for the Neo-Destourian regime to implement
a radical project of modernization. Some of the major achievements of the
social reforms, like the introduction of compulsory school, the legislative
changes concerning family and civillife, the access to birth-control, and the
general improvement of people's material situation, had a profound
influence on the common Tunisian's daily life. The ac tu al degree of
influence seems to vary between the regions of Tunisia; it is, however,
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clear that all parts of the country have experienced considerable social
change during the post -colonial period.
One may assume that the actual nature of the impact of this social
change will vary between the different generations of Tunisians who have
experienced the post-colonial period, dep ending on the stage in their lives
at independence. The generations born after independence may have
adjusted to the changes relatively easily, both because they have no other
experiences than the post-colonial one, and because they to a large extent
have had access to the social institutions representing modern society, like
the educational system. The generations born before independence, by
contrast, have to a much larger degree had to adjust to the changes without
benefiting from them personally; for instanee they experienced an increased
alphabetization of society, while themselves remaining illiterate.
It is therefore also reasonable to assume that the ac tu al degree of
modernization of the individual Tunisian's life as a result of the general
modernization of society will vary significantly. While the generations born
during the colonial period, due to their personal lack of access to the
modern facilities of society, probably have continued to lead their lives
mue h in accordance with traditional principles, the post-colonial generations
have had a larger possibility to integrate aspects of the modernization in
their personallives. One may thus expect to find considerable generational
variation both in way of living and in mentality within the Tunisian
population.
Due to the still considerable proportion of Tunisians born before
independence, one may assume that on small-scale sociallevels, traditional
Arab-Muslim principles continue to affect sociallife. The next chapter will
examine the actual nature of some of these Arab- Muslim principles for
social organization in more detail, and present theoretical aspects of social
change of importanee to the analysis presented in this thesis.
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3. Theoretical framework
3.1 Some fundamental principles of traditionai2 North-
African social orgaDization
Treating "traditional North-African society" as a homogenous social and
cultural entity is a dubious thing to do. On the one hand, North-Africa
consists of a multitude of societies, all with their own paricular
characteristics. As we saw in the previous chapter, not even "traditional
Tunisia" can be regarded as a socially and culturally homogenous area. On
the other hand, there are signiflcant similarities in the traditional social
organization of the entire Mediterranean area, Southern Europe included.
This has been pointed out in a number of social science-studies, and it
makes treating North-Africa alone as a cultural macro-unit less than self-
evident (see f.ex. Tillion, 1983).
For the sake of a perspicuous presentation of some essential principles
for an understanding of any North-African society stillleft with traces of
its cultural tradition, I still flnd it convenient to use this somewhat dubious
concept. The following discussion should, however, be read as a
conventional presentation of certain aspects of a system of social
organization, rather than as an authentic description of any particular
society that has existed in time and space.
I will concentrate the discussion on two principles that above others
characterize the traditional North-African societies: The kinship-group as
fundamental social and moral unit, and the strct division of this unit, as
well as the whole society, according to gender.
2
"Traditional" is in tros thesis not to be understood as denoting a static, paricular kind
of society, practice, or way of thinking, but as a set of principles characterized by a
paricular logic. The "traditional" societies, practices, or ways of tronkng are thus
thought of as being in processes of change, but witron this "traditional" framework of
meaning and logic.
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3.1.1 The kinship-group
Patrlinear descent is the principle according to which the significant
kinship-relations are traditionally defined in North-African societies. A
woman's kinship-affiliation will thus be decided by her relationship to men,
as the kinship-affiliation of a man is decided by his relationship to other
men.
An individual's patrlinear kinship-group constitutes a base of
fundamental importanee throughout the life-course, both concerning
practical organization of the daily life, and the individual's understanding
of his or her general purpose in life. Membership in a kinship-group implies
imperativ e obligations and responsibilities, as well as undeniable security
and support. The patrilinear kinship-group is a main factor of identification;
to the individual member itself, and to the social community. The principle
of patrlinear kinship influences most aspects of social life:
The typical composition of a traditional North-A frie an household reflects
the influence of the principle of kinship on the practical social
organization: Sharing a dar - house - is a couple, their adult sons, and
possibly grand-sons; each with their own wife and children. A kinship-
gro up will, however, most often include a number of households; the
principle ofmutualloyalty and support reaches beyond the walls of the dar,
and has in theory no physicallimits.
The traditional concept of the ideal union of mariage reflects the moral
and ideological influence of the principle of kinship: Endogamous
marages are in general regarded as superior to exogamous mariages, and
of the endogamous, the union of patrilinear parallel-cousins is the ideal
type. Therefore, in an ideal mariage, the bride will not change kinship-
affiliation, nor household as a result of the marriage. The patrilinear
kinship-relations are conceived of as intimate and exclusive to such an
extent that ideally , no outsider should ever be included in its unit y (Tillion
1983).
The patrilinear cousin-mariage should, however, be understood as an
ideal type, rather than a description of actual mariage-practices; exogamous
mariages have been, and still are, much more common than endogamous
ones in most North-African societies. In such cases, the bride will,
particularly after having given birth, change family-affiliation from her
natal family to her conjugal family. In the same way, her children will be
regarded as members of their father's family. The maried woman's loyalty
is expected to shift to her conjugal family after marriage, and she will be
regarded as a representative of her in-laws rather than her natal family.
Thus, while a man belongs to the same family all his life, a woman will as
a res ult of an exogamous marrage change family-belonging.
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The patrilinear kinship-group may in a traditional North-African context
be characterized as the most significant social unit in the sense that
individual members of a gro up will tend to perceive themselves, and at the
same time be perceived by others, as parts of a kinship-unit, rather than as
individual actors with kinship-relations. Based on his experiences from
Kabylia in Algeria, the French anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu characterizes
the traditional Kabylian Berber-society, for instance, as "..a society in
which the individual exists only through the group, the respect and the love
of the group" (Bourdieu 1965 p.220).
The kinship-group constitutes the fundamental form of a "collective seir',
or "us", as opposed to "significant others" in a social system of relative
conceptions of HUS" and "others", depending on the context: As a member
of a household, the rest of the kinship-group may be the Hothers", while as
a member of the kinship group, the village may be the Hothers". Faced with
a total stranger, the whole village may represent the "us". In any case, the
protection of the i ntegri t y of the significant "us" involved will be a main
concern (ibid). It is thus a social system characterized by relativity in
identification and detachment, but where the patrilinear kinship-group
constitutes the most significant and permanent composition of a collective
self.
3.1.2 The gendered society
At the same time as the patrilinear kinship-group is conceived of as the
fundamental social, moral and practical unit, its duality with reg ard to
gender-composition constitute an equally fundamental line of division
within it. This line furthermore penetrates the whole society, and divides it
into female and male spheres, as well as female and male arenas.3
This gender-segregation implies a general conception of individuals as
gendered to such an extent that gender-neutral criteria for human conduct
have practicaiiY ceased to exist; the ideas of "the good woman" and "the
good man" may be characterized as complementary, rather than similar
(ibid).
Such an extent of complementarity according to gender is made possible
by the relative lack of the ide a of individuals as autonomous social beings.
3 "Arena" is here understood as physical space, as location for interaction, while "sphere"
is understood in relation to the symbolic division of the society into male and female.
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In order to constitute ameaningful social person,4 a woman is dependent
on the female roles and statuses the kinship-group provides her with, as
daughter, wife, and mother. In the same way, a man becomes ameaningful
social person through his male roles and statuses as son and father. The
woman and man thus represent complementar values, and depend on each
other in order to constitute a practical and social meaningful entity. The
male qualities are, however, regarded as superior to the female, in the same
way as the men are regarded as superior to the women.
This fundamental social and moral dichotomy of male and female is
reflected in a number of corresponding dichotomies, relating to most
aspects of life, and expressing the overall gendered conception of mankind
and society. In the following, some of these dichotomies will be examined
closer:
Outside vs. inside
This dichotomy refers to the physical division of the society according to
gender , into male and female arenas. The "inside" is the female arena, in
practice referring to the dar the house of a household. The construetion of
a traditional dar - rooms built around an enclosed court yard - makes it
possible to be physically outside, and still, per definition, "inside", within
the four walls of the house. The "inside" is the women's world. Most of
their lives are spent in this arena: as children, together with their mothers,
as young women waiting in seclusion to get married, and as wives and
mothers - then possibly in another dar, as a result of marriage.
A woman as a rule leaves the "inside" only in order to enter the "inside"
of an other dar, and when she does, she is veiled to the extent that she
obtains total individual anonymity , she is only recognizable as a woman.
The traditional veil may thus be seen as a symbolie extension of the
"inside". In rural areas, women may work on the land if their labour is
needed. Still, the seclusion of women within the dar remains the ideal, both
morally and socially, an ideal to be let down only when economic
conditions make it impossible to conform to it (Abu Sahra, 1982).
The men spend the better part of their lives on the male arena of
"outside". As a rule, they return to their home only for meals and sleep. A
man who spends too much time "inside" is regarded with suspicion, and his
behaviour is defined as unmanly. The "outside" includes the streets, shops,
the market, and the cafes; arenas of men's interaction with other men. A
4
"Person" is here understood as "a socially defined being, with a number of statuses
(rights and duties in relation to others) that put him/her in certain positions vis-à-vis
others in the society" (Tesli 1990 p.461 -62 - my trans.).
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male child meets the "outside" for the first time at an early age; with time,
he gradually changes arena, until he as a young boy has become an
integrated part of the men' s world. While women are veiled beyond
individual recognition when entering the "outside" , the men perform there
without disguise; most of their time is furthermore expected to be invested
in the "outside" appearance.
Public vs. private
The dichotomy of public and private is closely related to the one mentioned
above, but refers to the gender-divided cultural spheres of men and women.
As discussed earlier, both women and men are regarded mainly as
representatives of their kinship-group. At the same time, the women are
essentially performers on the "inside" arena, an arena that is associated with
the intimacy and privacy of the group.
The women are thus the representatives of the kinship-group for the
kinship-group. Through their daily interaction with the other women of
their household, as well as with the women of the other households of the
kinship-group, they serve as intermediaries between the different sub-units,
and as strategists in the planning and execution of "family-business". The
women are thus the "executive leaders" of the daily running of the house-
hold and the kinship-group in general. They are the every-day maintainers
of the intra-group relations; it is their business to be occupied with the
topics that concern the group on an every-day basis. The women's culture
is a domestic, private culture.
The men, by contrast, are the representatives of the kinship-group to the
"outside" world. Their culture is characterized by formal relations with the
"significant (male) others". While the women are occupied almost
exclusively with domestic and private tasks in their interaction, family
relations are considered to be an unsuitable topic for discussion in the male
world. The men are to deal with political matters, with trade, monetary-
transactions, and religion. The male culture is a public culture.
Production vs. reproduction
This dichotomy relates to the funclional aspects of the gender-segregated
society. In the same way as the women's lives physically are lived "inside",
and the fem ale culture is private and domestic, the female functions are
related to the family-sphere, and are performed on the "inside" arena,
throughout the life-course. The main function of the women is as
reproducers of the kinship-group; physic ally , through childbearing, morally,
through the upbringing and socialization of the children according to the
principles for proper group-members, and practically, as the responsible for
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the food-preparation. A woman's significant functions and roles are thus all
inseparably related to her membership in a household and a kinship-group.
A woman's status will depend on her performanee of her functions,
particularly her physical reproductivity. Her functions, her control, and thus
her power, are correlated with the number of her offspring. The female
functions and statuses may thus be said to be cumulative in nature, reaching
a high-point when a woman resides as the mother-in-law of her sons'
wives, and as a paternal grand-mother. The fem ale status-hierarchy is,
however, primarily relevant to the women. A woman's status is created by
women, and for women; it provides a position primarly within the fem ale
sphere, and on the female arenas.
The men's main functions are as producers and providers. The male
functions are thus also closely related to men's roles as members of a
family and a kinship-group, but unlike women, the men's functions lead
them away from the arena of the family , the "inside". The men's family-
related functions are primarily conducted "outside".
A man's occupationallife is thus important: in his relation to the family,
as provider, and in his relation to the public, male sphere, within which he
does his work. Since the occupationallife is so essential to men' s totallife,
the male life-course is not cumulative to the same degree as the fem ale life-
course. Old age and physical inability to work may put a stop to the
occupational career, thus causing a significant role-loss at the end of the
life-course. Still, like the women, a man also achieves status in the male
hierarchy through his reproductivity and general position within his kinship-
group; this male status is, like the women's, of a cumulative character.
The main functions of both women and men are defined by and related
to their family- and kinship-membership; the female functions are, however,
inseparably connected to the private family sphere, and the "inside" arena,
while the male functions take place within the public sphere, and on the
"outside" arena.
Patrilinear kinship and gender are thus the essentIal and interlocking
principles according to which the traditional North-African society are
organized. The nature of this organization implies divisions of the social
universe into complementary spheres and arenas; the lines of division are
furthermore extensive, and influence most aspects of the society. Hs
implications for the physical, cultural and functional aspects of social life
have been briefly discussed above.
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In a society characterized by this kind of social organization, the gender-
and kinship-characteristics of an individual will necessarily imply a number
of limitations and restrctions on the individual's life. In order for such a
strctly regulated social system to be maintained, one may assume that there
will be a higher ide a behind it; a value-system that gives meaning to the
individuals' adaption to the rules. The last dichotomy that will be discussed
here, reflects this basic value-system of the traditional North-African
societies.
3.1.3 Honour VS. shame
The dichotomy of honour and shame reflects the fundamental value-system
that giv es meaning to the traditional North-African social organization. This
value-system deserves the characterization "fundamental" both because of
its importance, and because of its scope: It holds a position as the
imperative value, superior to all competing values, and it is at the same
time integrating all significant principles of the social organization,
including gender and kinship, in its system.
The relations between honour and shame constitute a complex set of
norms and principles; the fact that these norms and principles are partly
categorical, partly relative in nature, adds to the complexity. It is exactly
the importanee and ex tent of this value-system that of ten make it appear
ambiguous to an outsider; its imperative nature provides it with a sacred
status beyond discussion, or even reflection. The norms and principles
related to it have to a large ex tent obtained a character of intuitive, self-
evident knowledge (Bourdieu 1965).
The nature of the relation between the dichotomy of male and female on
the one side, and honour and shame on the other side, is not the least
ambiguous of the relations within this value-system. This ambiguity is also
reflected in the diverging interpretations of the relations that are to be found
in the considerable amount of analyses that have been conducted on the
logic of honour and shame - a classical topic in social science-studies of
the Mediterranean societies.
In her study of aMoroccan village, the Swedish anthropologist Eva
Evers-Rosander states that "Shame is linked to a woman's respectability,
just as honour is an integral part of a man's reputation." (Evers Rosander
1991 p.13-14). She understands shame as a female value, while relating
honour to the male value-system. Other studies do, however, suggest that
this interpretation is too one-dimensional. The definition of these relations
provided by Bourdieu in his study of traditional Kabylian Berber-society,
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may provide a more accurate basis for an understanding of the mechanisms
of honour and shame as they will appear in this study:
Fig.3.1
The relations of honour
NIF
Point of honour
(honour in so far as I am
attached to it)
Capable of defending
h'urma, public
-- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - -- - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - - ~- - - - -- - - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - - -- - - - -- - - - --
H'URMA or ESSER
Esteem, honour, glory, respectability, is
acquired, conquered and defended before other people
H'URMA - H' ARAM
H onour
(honour in so far as it is
attached to me)
Capable of being lost,
sacred and secret
"
Source: Bourdieu 1965 p.218.
This figure sheds light on a fact that is essential for an understanding of the
mechanisms of ho no ur and shame: The dichotomous concepts are in fact
neither strictly feminine, nor strictly masculine; they are above all collective
in nature. In Bourdieu' s words:
Jf h' urma is identified with the sacred of the Hleft hand", that is to say
essentially with what is feminine, nif is pre-eminently the manly virtue.
The opposition between these two aspects of sacredness, like the
opposition between h' aram and nif does not in any way exc1ude their
complementary nature. It is indeed the respect for the sacred of the "right
hand", for the name and good repute of the agnatic family , which
motivate the riposte to any offenee against the sacred of the "left hand"
(Bourdieu 1965 p.219-220).
In order to grasp the full meaning of the concepts of honour and shame in
North-African societies, one will have to relate them to the overall
collective nature of the social organization. The collective honour of the
patrilinear kinship-group represents the ultimate value and at the same time
the ultimate end in the collective's relations with society. The above
mentioned dichotomies of female and male space, culture and function,
adapted to the gendered rules for conduct, should be understood as parts of
a group's strategy to preserve - and, if possible, increase - the collective
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honour of the kinship-group. The preservation of the collective honour of
the patrlinear kinship-group thus stands out as the ultimate and sacred
value that gives meaning and direction to the individual's sociallife. Or,
according to Bourdieu: "The duty of defending what is sacred is imposed
upon one as a categorical imperative" (ibid p.220).
The general division of the group and the society into gendered spheres
is, however, also present in the concept of collective honour. The fem ale
sphere of honour is associated with the female members of the group, their
arena, "inside", and their culture and functions. This sphere of the collective
honour is furthermore associated with values like passivity, vulnerability ,
and secrecy. On the other hand there is the male sphere of honour,
associated with the male arena, "outside" , and the male interaction that
takes place there. It is furthermore associated with values like activity ,
conquest, and publicity. Together, these two "honours" constitute the
collective honour of the group; the complementarity of the genders is thus
a fundamental principle also in the relations of honour and shame.
But still, what is the point in being honourable? Of what use is the
honour of the group to its members, that makes it so important to them to
avoid shame?
3.1.4 Some general characteristics of traditional North-African
societies
Returning to the model of honour presented above, we see that the
collective honour also implies "esteem, glory, respectability" - in other
words, social status. In a small-scale society of a tribe or a village - the
typical traditional North-African society - social and political life is
strongly based on face-to-face interaction. The weight of the words and acts
of an individual will depend on the position he or she holds in the
community. Since the individuals are perceived as representatives of
kinship-groups rather than as autonomous actors, it will be the collective
status of the group the individual represents that determine evaluation of his
performance.
The protection of the collective honour of a group will thus be a
precondition for the defence of the group's position in the community. At
the same time, it will be meaningful to the individual to defend and protect
the honour, and thus the social status, of the group he or she represents.
The interest of the kinship-group, maintenance of the collective honour,
thus becomes superior to the interest of the individual member. The interest
of the group becomes the interest of the individual, because he for the
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"others", as well as for himself, has little significant social existence other
than as a par of the group, and because he will draw on the collective
honour of ms group when claiming a position in the social and political
life.
Honour is not the only element that constitutes a group's social status.
It is, however, the dominant one, in the sense that it will serve as a
principle of evaluation of the other elements. Material wealth, for instance,
may lead to an improved social status, but only if the economic capital is
transformed into symbolie capital,5 through investment in objects that are
morally "right" according to the rules for honourable behaviour. Money
spent on hospitality, on celebrations of mariages and other significant
occasions for the group' s exhibition of its quali ti es to the social
surroundings, and money spent on the pilgrimage to Mecca and the
contributions to the poor prescribed by religion, will tend to pay off in
symbolie capital, which in turn willlead to respectability, increased honour,
and improved or renewed social status - values that again will produee
favourable conditions for further increase of economic capital.
Adaption to the religious rules is also a central element of honour and
social status. The traditional North-Afrcan societies are commonly, and
rightly, associated with Muslim culture and values. However, the group-
oriented, gender-segregated, and honour-shame directed principles for social
life described above are of pre-Muslim origin (Evers Rosander 1991). A
number of theories have been developed in order to explain the rise of such
a particular social system; the French anthropologist Germaine Tillion, for
example, argues that its source is to be found in the ancient transformation
of the Mediterranean areas into the first agricultural civilizations in the
world (Tillion 1983).
Still, the North-African societies have existed within a Muslim cultural
context for more than a thousand years. During this period, the pre-Muslim
values have merged with the Muslim ones to the extent that they appear in
popular religious interpretation as prescriptions of Islam. Concepts that,
5 Based on his Kabyle studies, Bourdieu argues that in such societies, the economic capita!
wil have an intermediate character, the symbolie capital "in the form of the prestige and
renown of a family and a name" (p. L 79) to which it may be transformed representing
the conscious end. This is so, he argues, because the inefficiency and low yield of the
labour makes a purely material evaluation of the outcome an insufficient incentive; the
symbolie capital thus adds a higher, immaterial meaning to the labour.
The fact that symbolic capital through its impact on social and business relations again
wil tend to generate economic capita!, and thus in reality may be seen as a strategy to
increased material wealth, is thus "forgotten", as the immaterial output has been given
status as a nobler end (Bourdieu 1977).
27
strictly speaking, have no intrinsic connection, have come to bear the same
meaning. Thus, the secular, pre-Muslim moral "good" has merged with the
religious, Muslim "good". In the same way, shameful behaviour - that is,
secular morally bad behaviour - has become identical with religious "bad"
behaviour. Secular morals are thus equated with the morals of Islam, and
the religion is held up as the legitimator of the entire moral system. It is
therefore doubtful whether the religious background of the North-African
societies possesses the key to an understanding of the existence of their
particular kind of social and moral system. An examination of the general
characteristics of the societies in question may be more useful in order to
get an ideaabout the conditions under which such systems may occur:
The typical traditional North-Afrcan societies are small-scale societies
of tribes or villages. In addition to theirmodest size, that makes face-to-
face interaction the dominant form of sociallife, several other qualities will
characterize such societies: They will be homogenous with regard to
industries and ways of living. Whether nomadic tribes or agricultural
villages, the greater part of the population will be occupied with similar
activities, and thus make similar experiences. Such societies will
furthermore be stable with regard to social composition, social mobility,
and general ways of living. Continuity rather than change will be a main
characteristic. Relative isolation from the outside world and external
influences wiU furthermore be a dominant phenomenon. There will be a
low degree of geographical mobility, in the sense that there will be little
permanent individual movement between communities.
The design of the moral and social system described above clearly suits
this kind of societies. First of all, the dose face-to face kind of interaction
opens for an extent of social control that will be a precondition for the
strong other-directedness that characterizes these societies. At the same
time, it provides an intensity in punishments and awards of individual
performanee that makes social control hard to ignore. Secondly, the
homogeneity of their social composition makes the "others'" evaluation of
individual performanee acceptable and relevant. As they experience the
same kind of reality as the individual, they constitute a credible court of
judges. Thirdly, the stability of the society corresponds to the stability of
the moral system - a system that clearly awards conformity rather than
innovation, and thus is basically conservative in nature. And finally, the
relative physical and cultural isolation provides a central precondition for
the maintenance of such social and moral systems: The community in
which an individual exists should be unique to the individual to such an
extent that he or she finds it neceSSarY and at the same time worthwhile to
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accept the limitations on individuallife that the community imposes. It
should be the only social reality available to the individuaL.
Bourdieu has the following reflection on the relationship between the
social system and the moral system of this kind of societies:
Perhaps the conclusion is that the important position accorded to the
sentiment of honour is. a characteristic of "primary" societies in which the
relationship with others, through its intens it y, intimacy and continuity,
takes precedence over the relationship one has with oneself; in which the
individual learns the truth about himself through the intermediary of
others; and in which the being and the truth about a person are identical
with the being and the truth that others acknowledge in him (Bourdieu
1965, p.212).
Here the attention is drawn also to another aspect of the traditional N orth-
African social life, an aspect that will be the last topic of this discussion:
The meaning of identity in such societies.
3.1.5 The meaning of identity
Based on his studies in Morocco, Clifford Geertz in the article "From the
Native's Point of View" argues that the categorization of individuals
according to kinship-belonging, or any of the relative significant "us'es"
mentioned earlier, actually gives room to an extensive individual creation
of public personality. This is so, he argues, because this type of
categorization (which he calls "nisba-type") implies that only an identifying
framework around the interaction is provided; the filling-in of the frame is
left to the individual actors:
Nisba-type categorization leads, paradoxically, to a hyperindividualism in
public relationships, because by providing only a vaeant sketch, and that
shifting, of who the actors are - Yazghis, Adlunis, Buhadiwis, (family
names) or whatever - it leaves the rest, that is, almost everything, to be
filled in by the process of interaction itself. What makes the mosaic work
is the confidence that one can be as totally pragmatic, adaptive,
opportunistic, and generally ad hoc in one's relations with others - a fox
among foxes, a crocodile among crocodiles - as one wants without any
risk of losing one's sense of who one is. Seltbood is never in danger
because, outside the immediacies of procreation and prayer, only the
coordinates are asserted (Geertz 1976, p.234).
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For a study of public interaction as such, this is probably an accurate
argument. It should, however, be clear from the discussion above that this
interpretation becomes somewhat problematic when placed in a larger
context:
First of all, it should be evident that this argument will apply to only half
of the population, namely the men. "Hyperindividualism" is hardly a
suitable characteristic of the women's rare performances in the public
arena; as we have seen, their physical appearance veils all personal
characteristics but the one ascribed to them through their gender.
"Individual personality" in relation to significant others thus seems to be a
par of the male roles, rather than a fundamental and self-evident aspect of
any individual being. Instead of indicating a society characterized by
hyperindividualism, this actually seems to suggest the opposite, namely a
society in which the individuals are subject to a superior force so
significant that it can deprive half the population of a publicly expressed
individual personality.
This force has been discussed above - the interest of the collective, or,
more specifically, the patrilinear kinship-group. We have seen that it
constitutes the primary principle guiding individual social performanees,
both in the sense that it defines the relations between the individual
members of a group, and their relations to the "others", and in the sense
that it represents the fundamental value towards which the individual
members' performances in the defined relations are directed. In other
words, it constitutes a fundamental value that conditions the individual's
rationality, and guides the choices between alternative ways of performance.
This may give the impression that the inter-personal relations within the
group and between the group and the "others" are both static and totally
pre-determined; they are not. These relations will first of all change with
the changes in roles and statuses of the individuals invol ved. Thus the
relation between a father and son, for instance, will change as a result of
the son's marriage and fatherhood, in the same way as the son's relations
to the "others" will change as a result of his new status and role. Secondly,
the individuals will, within limits, have choices between alternative
strategies of interaction. These choices will evidently have significant
effects on the social relations. The individual's identity as defined by others
will thus be in a constant proeess of relative change throughout the
individuallife-course, but at any time within the absolute limits set by the
superior factors of identity; the individual's group-belonging, and gender.
First and foremost it is the kinship-group that defines who you are; and
your gender that defines how you act to be who you are.
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The fundamental individual identity is thus defined by group-belonging
and gender. Within the limits of this definition, the identity is constantly
negotiated, adjusted and confirmed through interaction. The definitions set
by kinship and gender may in turn be seen as functions of the moral code,
valuing the protection of the group's collective honour above all other
values.
The individual may thus be characterized as a secondary existence, and
at the same time agendered existence, that is given social form, meaning
and purpose through belonging to the collective that constitutes the
significant "us". It is, however, the collective of significant "others" that
constitute the ultimate arbiter, that evaluates and defines the quality and
nature of the individual social existence, and transforms it into social status.
The influence of the significant others' evaluation and definition of an
individual is, however, not restricted merely to the spheres and arenas of
social interaction; it also profoundly affects the individual's self-
understanding, Bourdieu argues:
The point of honour is the basis of the moral code of an individual who
sees himself always through the eyes of others, who has need of others
for his existence, because the image he has of himself is indistinguishable
from that presented to him by other people. "Man is man through men;
God alone", the proverb mns, "is God through himself' (Bourdieu 1965
p.211).
The individual' s self-concept is conditioned by the way it is conceived by
the significant others; it exists for itself as through the eyes of the social
surroundings. The individual's personal being and social being thus
overlaps, the one making little sense without the other. His or her social
being will, furthermore, as a logical consequence of the general gendered
division of the traditional North-African societies, be evaluated and
confirm ed primarly by other individuals of the same gender - "Man is
man through men" - and he will be so in the male, public sphere of the
"outside". In the same way, women will be women for women, in the
female, private sphere of the "inside".
We are thus dealing with a concept of identity that is fundamentally
group-related, gender-related, and other-dependent, implying that an
individual's identity will be fundamentally collective and gendered in
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nature, and that it will be formed and defined by the "others" rather than
by the individual itself.6
"Social identity" and "identity" will thus overlap to the ex tent that there
will be Httle significant practical distinetion between the concepts. More
significant distinetions will probably be those caused by group-belonging
and gender .
This is the background for the interpretation of identity that will
constitute the conceptual point of deparure for this study' s analysis of
social identity. The concepts of "identity" and "socia! identity" will thus be
given the same meaning, and should be understood in relation to the other-
dependent identity discussed above. The emphasis will be put on the
gender- and group-dependent aspects of identity.
The principal object of this study is, however, to examine a possible
change in social identity. The change is furthermore assumed to turn away
from this "traditional" sense of identity, towards an increasingly individual
and less gender-dependent sense of identity. This "modern" concept of
identity will, when applied, be called "individual identity".
3.2 Theory of social reproduction and change
In the previous section, some general principles characteristic for the
traditional North-African societies, and the effect of these principles on the
social organization in general, and on the concept of identity in particular,
were examined.
I will now turn to the question of how such social environments - or
any social environment - is reproduced, and how they may change. The
discussion will be based on Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice, and on the
theory of change that it implies.
3.2.1 Habitus, structures, and practice
According to the 1983 edition of Routledge's Latin Dietionary , "habitus"
means "condition, state, habit; attire, dress; feature, appearance; disposition,
feeling" - a concept with a wide meaning, obviously.
6 This is not an attempt to deny the existence of an inner, psychological kind of individual
identity. It is, however, a suggestion that any such identity wil hold a clearly secondar
position to the other-dependent identity, and that it wil have a modest function in the
proeess of categorizing and defining individual members of the society.
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Bourdieu's concept of "habitus" - the concept around which his theory
of practice is constructed - is of a still wider, but more structured
meaning. It embraces the meanings ascribed to it by the Routledge's
definition, but as fragments of a larger contextual system:
The structures constItutive of a paricular type of environment (e.g. the
material conditions of existence characteristic of a dass condition)
produces habitus, systems of durable. transposable dispositions. structured
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as
principles of the generation and structuring of practices and
representations which can be objectively "regulated" and "regular" without
in any way bein g the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted
to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an
express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and. being all
this. collectively orchestrated without being the product of the
orchestrating action of a conductor (Bourdieu 1977 p.72).
In this way Bourdieu introduces his discussion of habitus. In order to get
a dearer idea about its meaning, it may be useful to decompose it
somewhat:
Habitus is the "data-base" of knowledge that conditions human action,
interaction, and socIal existence, in "a particular type of environment",
"environment" here meaning any stable group of people with a common
social reality and history, such as a dass, or a small-scale community, like
a village, or a tribe.
Habitus is furthermore made up of "structured structures" - structures
organized into durable systems of principles. The habitus contains objective
strctures, which define the limits of the reality of the social environment,
and thus the limits of social life within it. It also contains cognitive and
motivating structures, which define what is valuable and what is not in the
environment, and thus give human action and interaction meaning, direction
and aims. The structures are structured through previous collective
experiences; they are products of the environments collective history.
At the same time as the structures are structured, they are "predisposed
to function as structuring structures" - meaning that as the structures are
preconditions for action and interaction, they will structure action and
interaction, and thus at the same time be reproduced through action and
interaction.
In spite of the fundamental functions of these structures, or rather,
exactly because of their fundamental importance. they are invisible to the
actors which act according to them. The habitus is an intuitive kind of
historically generated knowledge, internalized in the actors to such an
33
extent that they will be unconscious of its existence. Habitus is thus
"history turned into nature, Le. denied as such" (ibid. p.78).
As a consequence, this know ledge, so essential for the social existence
of all members of the group, is not to be thought and learned in any
explicit way - obviously, as nobody is aware of its existence. It is thus
reproduced in time - transmitted to new generations of the group -
through practice, and observation of practice.
This implies that abstraet ideas, like the idea of male and female, will be
leart and internalized paralleI to the knowledge of male and female
practice - the idea of what a man is is le arnt through observation of what
men do.
It furthermore implies that the degree of reproduction of habitus will be
high; as the knowledge is notexplicit, it can not be the object of
discussion, or even reflection, with the result that it can not be changed as
a res ult of conscious human will or intention.
Habitus thus contains the internalized structural framework that makes
social life both possible (objective strctures), sensible (cognitive and
motivating structures), and stable (reproduction through practice).
Habitus has, however, no determining power on social action and
interaction, and social practices can neither be deduced from the objective
structures, nor the circumstances that produced them:
The habitus, the durably installed generative principle of regulated
improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularties
immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative
principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective
potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating
structures making up the habitus. It follows that these practices cannot be
directly deduced either from the objective conditions, defined as the
instantaneous sum of the stimuli which may appear to have directly
triggered them, or from the conditions which produced the durable
principle of their production. These practices can be accounted for only
by relating the objective structure defining the social conditions of the
production of the habitus which engendered them to the conditions in
which this habitus is operating, that is, to the conjuncture which, short of
a radical transformation, represents a particular state of this structure (ibid.
p.78).
On an individual actor's level, this means that the collective's habitus
internalized in him, together with his own previous experiences with
practice, will condition his practice in the sense that it will define the
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situations of practice and their possible outcomes, without determining the
actual outcome.
The habitus thus defines the possible situations of practice the individual
may face, I.e. the actor's possible alternative ways of acting, as well as it
defines the priorities of the individual in the actual situation, I.e. the actor's
normative evaluation of the possible alternatives, but the choice between
pre-defined alternatives, and the choice of strateg y to realize the chosen
alternative, is left to the actor.
This is a description of a situation where "you want what you can, and
you can what you want" - a situation of relative freedom of choice,
limited by the habitus within which definition of real it y the choice takes
place.
There will thus be room for human rationality in practice, but the
rationality will be guided by the actor's internalized knowledge of the
objective and the cognitive and motivating strctures that will be
preconditions for any action and interaction, and of which the actor has no
freedom of choice. Thus, habitus will have a defining rather than
determining effect on practice.
3.2.2 Social change
In the discussion above on the reproductive capacity of the habitus, its
ability to recreate the structures of the past into the future stands out as one
of its main features. Or, in Bourdieu's words: "The habitus, the product of
history, produces individual and collective practices, and hence history, in
accordance with the schemes engendered by history" (ibid. p.82).
Explaining social stability on the background of the theory of practice is
thus not the problem. Turning to the question of social change, by contrast,
we have so far seen little evidence of how this may come about.
We may, however, assume that as it is the habitus that defines the social
reality, and as the knowledge contained in habitus is internalized and
"invisible", and thus beyond discourse and reflection, a precondition for
change may be that the invisible become visible, and thus questionable.
This implicit knowledge may become explicit if it is confronted with a
habitus of a different nature.
In his discussion of generation conflicts, Bourdieu implicitly treats this
more general problem:
This is why generational conflicts oppose not age-classes separated by
natural properties, but habitus which have been produced by different
modes of generation, that is, by conditions of existence which, in
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imposing different definitions of the impossible, the possible, and the
probable, cause one gro up to experience as natural or reasonable practices
or aspirations which another group finds unthinkable or scandalous, and
vice versa (ibid. p.78).
It is thus "habitus which have be en produced by different ... conditions of
existence" that is the source of generation conflicts, so-called "habitus-
conflicts". But, what is the source of different conditions of existence,
conditions that again will be generated in the habitus?
The source may be changes in theobjective structures. The introduction
of a compulsory school-system in an environment that has previously had
no kind of formal education, for instance, may result in a change in the
collective habitus.
As the habitus is produced and reproduced through practice, any change
in the objective structures may not necessarily change it. Only when the
structural changes produee new pre-defined alternative ways of practice,
and only when these new alternativ es are found valuable, and therefore
chosen as strategies of action and interaction, will the practice acquire new
shape and content, that in turn may be absorbed by the habitus. The
existence of a system of formal education as such will have lIttle influence
on the habitus unless people actually find it worthwhile to make use of it.
There is, however, yet another obstacle to change in the habitus; as
Bourdieu points out:
as a result of the hysteresis effect necessarily implied in the logic of the
constitution of habitus, practices are always liable to incur negative
sanctions when the environment with which they are actually confronted
is too distant from that to which they are objectively fitted (ibid. p.78).
This implies that the more radical a change in practice is, the more intense
the negative sanctions from the environment will tend to be.
"Radical" may here refer to the mere extent of the change, as compared
to the existing practices. The experienced radicality of a change in practice
will, however, also dep end on the nature of the practice that is challenged.
If this practice reflects a principle that is of fundamental importanee to the
environment, (such as the principle of honour and shame in the traditional
North-African societies), even a small change may be met with massive
sanctions, as it will represent a fundamental threat to the environment.
The intensity of the sanctions against a change of practice will depend
on the degree to which it will be adjustable to the existing principles of the
environment. In other words, it will depend on the degree to which it is
experienced as corresponding to the existing cognitive and motivating
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structures. Sanctions against school-attendance in a traditional North-
Afrcan society, in which formal education has been unknown, is a function
of the way this change in practice is thought to be related to the
fundamental principles of the society, such as the principle of honour and
shame.
In any case, the new alternativ es of action caused by changes in the
objective structures will have to be chosen as strategies of practice by a
sufficiently large number of actors for the impact of the changed practice
to become significant enough to have an influence on the habitus - the
history of the group - or significant enough to resist the effects of the
negative sanctions they may be met with. If only two of the children of a
village are sent to school, the effect of this practice will be so insignificant
and deviant compared to that of the others, that a sanctioning from the
environment will hardly be necessary. In the same way, if only two
children are kept home from school, the effect of the sanctions of the
family that refuses to adapt to the new practice, expressed through their
refusal of school-attendance for their children, will hardly be able to change
this practice.
If, however, the changes in the objective structures lead to collective new
practices, and if the extent of the change in the practice is sufficiently
significant, this change in practice will result in a change in the
reproduction of habitus, which means a change in habitus, which means
change in the collective history, which means change in the collective
perception of the world; what it is, and how it works. As Bourdieu put it
in the phrase quoted earlier, it will lead to new "definitions of the
impossible, the possible, and the probable". And, one may add, the
valuable.
In the end, as the meaning of abstraet ideas is learnt through observation
in practice, it may also lead to change in the actors' understanding of each
other, and in the actors' understanding of themselves - in other words, to
change in (social) identity.
Within this theoretical framework, consequences of the Tunisian post-
colonial structural changes for the practice, thought, and identity of
different generations of Tunisian men and women will be analyzed.
On the basis of Bourdieu's theory of practice, it is reasonable to assume
that the post-colonial structural changes will have affected the different
generations of Tunisians differently, and that it will have resulted in
different generational practices, and possibly also in different generational
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habituses, that in turn may be expressed in different generational senses of
identity.
In a society where the family-group traditionally constitutes a
fundamental unit, one may furthermore assume that a situation of profound,
lasting social change easily will res ult in generational conflicts within
families. The nature and ex tent of such conflicts, as well as strategies
applied by different generations in order to cope with them, will also be
examined.
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4. Methodological framework
4.1 Choice of approach
Ever since my first contact with Tunisian society, one thing has puzzled
and impressed me more than anything else: The tremendous social change
that has taken place since independence in 1956, and the Tunisians ' ability
to cope with it. Out of this puzzlement and admiration rose the questions
that this thesis is concentrating on: What are the consequences of such a
rapid social change for people's practices, and for their conceptualizations
of themselves and their social universe - what are the effects of this
change on their sense of identity?
There are several possible strategies to answering this question. The
question initially arose as a result of contact with Tunisians struggling with
the effects of the social change on their daily lives; asking these people was
an intuitively obvious thing to do. After a more serious consideration of the
task I had in mind, I came to the conclusion that data-collection based on
interviews might indeed be a fertile approach to the actual problem. At the
same time, my earlier experiences suggested that the topics could not be
dealt with in a direct manner; questions like Hhow would you describe your
base of social identity as you experience it" would probably yield meagre
results. The problem would have to be approached indirectly, through an
analysis of indicators of both thought and identity, and the change in them.
Knowledge of people's way of thinking would be necessary as well as
information about their way of acting. Interviews focusing on people' s own
evaluations of their reality , as well as their actual life-courses and the
factors influencing them, might thus provide an appropriate base of
information.
The object of my interest was not so much practice, thought, and identity
in itself, as it was the anticipated change in it. The time-perspective was
therefore an essential component of the strategy of data-collection. In order
to provide such a perspective, information about people's life-situation and
ways of thinking at different points of time would be required. A
prospective approach to data-collection was, due to the limited time-
perspective of the project, not feasible. Retrospective interviews seemed to
be an acceptable alternative. Hence I decided to interview three generations
of adult Tunisians. In order to add a family-group perspective to the study,
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it furthermore seemed natural to choose as informants individuals who were
related to each other by kins hip. 7
As discussed in the previous chapter, Arab societies are generally known
to have a tradition of rather strict gender-segregation; Tunisia adheres to
this tradition. It is therefore reasonable to assume that gender will influence
significantly the Tunisians' life-experiences, and thereby their base of
identity. In order to get a picture of the significance of gender for identity-
formation, I decided to have both genders equally represented among my
informants.
As argued in chapter two, one of the most central characteristics of the
post-colonial social transformation in Tunisia was the introduction of a
compulsory school-system. While most Tunisians born before the
independence are illiterate, those born after 1956 are generally at least able
to read and write; a relatively large proportion of the post-colonial
generations have furthermore received academictraining. Several significant
changes in life-situation seem to be related to higher education; occupation
within the "modern" sectors of economy and increased geographical
mobility are some of them. As both higher education in itself and its wider
consequences may be assumed to cause changes of some significance in an
individual' s base of identity, as well as in his or her practices and ways of
thinking, I decided to include young Tunisians of both high and low
education in my group of informants.
These demands to the group of informants seemed appropriate for the
task of studying an anticipated change in practice, thought, and identity in
post-colonial Tunisia. At the same time, information covering the life-
stories of three generations, represented by informants of both genders and
of different levels of education, would obviously constitute a complex base
of analysis. An analytical framework for further work on the project was
thus needed. For reasons that will be discussed below, the so-called "life-
course approach" was found to offer such a framework.
4.1.1 Characteristics of the life-course approach
A fundamental principle of the life-course approach is its historie al
perspective. It is processual in nature; its principal aim is to analyze
change, or stability , over time. The basic assumption is that there is:
7 Due to the high number of children in most Tunisian familes, there are normally
considerable differences of age within the generations. "Generation" is thus here defined
in terms of the informants' relations to each other, as grandparents, parents and children,
rather than in terms of birth-date and age.
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a connection between individual development and social change. The core
of the argument is that a change takes place in human behaviour from
birth to death. This happens as a result of an interplay between biological,
cultural, social, historical and evolutionar influences and their placing in
the individuals, the group's or the cohorts lives (Skrede and Tornes
1983,p.12 my trans.).
The connection between two social spheres holds a particularly fundamental
position within the approach: The development of individual or aggregate
life-courses, that take place within the possibilities and restraints of the
social structures surrounding them. The ultimate focus of the approach is
on the inter-relations between life-courses and social structures, and their
development over time. In order to analyze these inter-relations, knowledge
of the individual or aggregate life-course as well as of the social structures
is required. "Life-course" may be defined as:
the main activities, roles and events which an individual or a group
eng age in during a longer time-span (Skrede and Tornes 1983, p.9 my
trans.).
Life-courses are approached through the timing and appearance of central
events, marking phases within them. They may be studied from several
angles, depending on whether the study has a time- or a theme-focus. The
substantial assumption is that changes in timing or appearance of events in
aggregates of life-courses may serve as indicators of structural changes in
the society in which the life-courses take place. Life-courses may therefore
be seen as representative of the historie al period in which they take place;
they provide information exceeding the personal experiences of the
individuals in question.
The individual is, however, not to be understood merelyas a carier of
trends in time. Life is influenced by choosing between available
alternatives. The variety of life-courses within a birth-cohort, for example,
may thus be as relevant an object of study as the similarities. The nature
of the field of study, as well as the theoretical approach and personal
attitudes of the researcher, will influence whether the individual is regarded
mainly as an actor in its own life, or in terms of a carrier of values and
priorities laid down by the social surroundings.
The principle of change - and stability - as a process in time is
fundamental to the approach. On the one hand, the individual development
is seen as a biological and social proeess, limited only by birth and death.
On the other hand, the social structures are seen as in constant reproduction
41
or change in time. The individual and the social time-dimensions develop
in paralleI, and are inter-related.
Thus, the background for stability or change in both the history of an
individuallife-course, and in the history of the society in which it takes
place, is to be found in both of the historIcal dimensions, and an analysis
of the nature of their inter-relations can reveal this background. The life-
course approach provides an analytic framework for such an analysis. It
does, however, more than that - it also provides a framework for
comparative analyses; of different individuallife-courses, or the life-courses
of different aggregates of individuals, or the effect of different historie al
periods on human life-courses.
It should be evident that the actual research-designs suitable for
answering such different kinds of questions will vary considerably.
Research-strategic considerations will be decisive for the design that may
be advantageous in each case. Due to the nature of the research-project in
question here, I have opted for a design based on a non-aggregate kind of
life-course analysis:
Studies of individual life-courses are generally rather different in
character from studies of aggregates of life-courses. As a rule, the
individual is studied at a non-aggregate level when detail ed accounts of
each life-course are considered desirable, and when information about the
individuals' covert as well as overt behaviour is required (Boocock, 1978).
Like analyses of aggregates, studies of individuallife-courses may focus on
change over time, or variation within a period. The typical method of data-
collection for such studies is the interview; of ten in-depth-interviews of an
open, unstructured nature (Sørensen and Sørensen, 1984). Due to the
priority of detailed and varied information about the individuallife-courses,
the total num ber of individuals studied is normally relatively restricted. It
may be claimed that this can cause a problem of representativity; the
special qualities of extensive interviews, combined with the possibility of
drawing on other sources of information, like statistics, for an evaluation
of some of the individuals' experiences as compared to those of the groups
with which they are associated, may reduce this problem. The main
argument in favour of such research-designs is, however, to be found
exactly in the idea behind the life-course approach: Life-courses are
representative of the period to which they belong, and their characteristics
indicate the effects of the inter-relations between the social dimensions
significant to their development; life-courses contain information exceeding
individual experiences.
As the approach requires information about the development in different
social dimensions, the access to relevant information will often depend on
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different kinds of sources. The use of several methods of data-collection is
thus a common characteristic of most kinds of life-course studies.
From the discussion above it should be evident that the life-course
approach both allows and often requires rather advanced analytical designs.
The ability to combine and analyze a complex of dimensions of time and
society, and thereby the nature of their inter-relations, is a central
characteristic of the approach, and also its main advantage. It is thus also
well suited as an analytical framework for the multi-category approach that
is applied in this study.
4.2 The data-collection
4.2.1 C hoice of sample
Two inter-related questions were tied to the task of defining a geographical
and social universe for the study of change in practice, thought and identity
in post-colonial Tunisia: First of all, what number of informants would I
realistically be able to deal with, and how should they be selected, given
the size and nature of my project? Secondly, and depending on the answer
to the first question, what kind of universe would it be relevant to define?
Two families of informants seemed to be a realistie basis for data-
collection, given that they were relatively comprehensive with reg ard to the
above defined categories of both genders, three generations, and different
levels of education. As the local community was a social universe of
significant relevanee to the study, it was furthermore natural to concentrate
the research on one such community.
My previous experiences with the Tunisian society originated mainly
from the local community of a small North-East Tunisian town that I
choose to call "Bled".8 My relationship with this particular town singled
it out as a favourable setting for the field-work: As the daughter-in-law of
one of the local families, I already had an established and integrated role
in the community, a position I could expect would open doors that
otherwise would have been closed to me. I already had an extensive social
network there, ready to assist me with my project. In addition, much of the
introductory work of a student of a culture other than his or her own had
already been done during my previous stays. In short, I knew the
environment I would be facing, how to fit in and function.
8
The name of the town, its inhabitants, and the family-names and first-names of the
informants are replaced with fictitious ones.
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One paricular group of the inhabitants of Bled was particularly well
suited for the purpose of the study: the local Beldiyin middle class.9
Several factors made this social group interesting: First of all, in Tunisia,
a student can hardly manage without economic support from the family .
The family , s approval is thus still to a large degree a necessity for young
people who wants to study. A certain leve! of material wealth is required
for a family in order to have the opportunity of allowing their children to
have a higher education.lO As the North-Eastern region of Tunisia is one
of the wealthier regions of the country, most of the middle class in Bled are
in such an economic position. Access to and effects of higher education are
main topics of interest in this study; these factors were thus important to
incorporate in the sample of informants.
Secondly, while the Tunisian upper classes and the higher middle classes
generally are considerably "Westernized" with respect to their li fest yle and
priorities, the provincial middle class has still preserved much of the
"traditional" Tunisian values in their ways of living. It would be necessary
for me to have access to information about these values. Thirdly, in the
families of the Beldiyin middle class it is common to fin d a varying level
of education among the members of the youngest adult generation. Finding
suitable families of informants would therefore be possible.
My family-in-law belong to this local Beldiyin middle class. We already
knew each other well, and they were familiar with my generally quite
disturbing personal characteristics - blonde hair and strange tongue. I had
been living in their household on several occasions before, and was also
going to stay with them during the fieldwork; this provided me with a
special opportunity to learn about the family and the relations between its
members. In addition, the family filled the formal demands of a suitable
informant-family in most central respects, and the members were positive
to my project and willing to assist me with information. The family thus
stood out as a particularly well suited group of informants. I therefore had
a rather favourable base to work from; during the field-work, I realized how
good it actually was. Of all the informants, my in-laws proved to be the
more positive and informative. I am convinced that their previous
9 "Middle class" is here defined in terms of both occupation and material wealth.
Occupationally, the middle class includes self-employed people, like farers, craftsmen,
and tradesmen. Material wealth is measured in terms of possession of a colour-TV,
refrigerator, and phone. The class-membership of a family is decided according to the
occupation and wealth of the male of the sec ond generation of the infonnant-familes.
10 "Higher education" is here defined as education of any duration on university-IeveL.
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experience with me - even though in a different role - was the main
reason for the constructive results.
The choice of the other family of informants was influenced by several
concerns: In order to draw on my favourable position as a member of a
local family , this relationship should be known to the family . While filling
the criteria defined above, it would also be preferable that it was different
from the other family in some respects, in order to get a picture of some
of the variations within the universe of Beldiyin middle-class families. One
of the traditionally highly regarded families of the town seemed suitable;
the families will be introduced in more detail later.
An unforeseen problem turned up during the proeess of seleeting
informants: Due to the often considerable difference of age between
husbands and wives in the elder generations, finding suitable families with
men of the eldest generation proved to be difficult. One of the reasons why
the sec ond informant- fam il y was selected, was in fact the presenee of a live
grand-father. However, he became so ill during my stay that an interview
was impossible. The other informant-family has no man of the eldest
generation still alive. In order to find a solution - however unsatisfactory
- to this problem, the group of informants was supplemented with two
male members of a third family . They were chosen according to the same
criteria as stated above.
I thus opted for a research-strategy that is quite the opposite of the
classical, positivist ideal of objectivity and neutrality. My objective was to
collect as much reliable and valid information as possible11 through direct
communication with individuals belonging to a rather closed, small-scale
social community, organized according to kinship, and relating to persons
according to their family-background. With this aim in mind, I found that
being a daughter-in-law in such a community would provide better results
than being a "nobody". Initially this was an attitude mue h guided by
intuition; after having completed the fieldwork, I found that it was true.
4.2.2 The structure of the interviews
For two reasons I decided to use a rather structured guide for the
interviews: It would secure a minimum of basis for comparisons of the
different categories of informants. In addition, the fact that an interpreter
11 "The decisive activity of a researcher in the field is to collect good data" (my trans.)
(Hamersley and Atkinson 1987, p~6).
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would be required for the interviews made some kind of written instructions
desirable.
The guide was organized according to the life-course events and phases
chosen to be the main topics of the interviews: Mariage, reproduction,
education, professional life, and migration. These topics seemed to cover
most central aspects of the lives of the informants, and could also be
expected to provide a picture of significant differences between their lives;
the topics seemed suitable for a comparative analysis of this nature.
A central characteristic of the interviews is the weight that is put on the
informants' own evaluations of their lives as compared to those of the
others, and also their own ideas about the reasons for the differences. For
the younger informants, who had not yet come very far in their own life-
course, hopes and expectations for their future lives, as well as the
experiences they so far had gained, were seen as important.
Questions concerning the mentioned life-course events and phases
constituted the main part of the interviews. A section on attitudes towards
religion and politics was added. It was assumed that such attitudes might
serve as indicators of identification with social institutions of different
character - Islam, a traditional cultural element,12 and the post-colonial
political regime.
The main principle behind the structuring of the interviews was the
assumption that information about ways of thinking and sense of identity
could not be obtained in a direct way. The concern for valid indicators of
thought and identity was central. The principal idea was that information
on the life-course phases and events would indicate the social norms for
decisions on an individual's life-course, and thus the nature of the accepted
individual space within the social system. The informants' own evaluations
of these practices would in turn indicate their degree of adaption to the
norms, and their self-conceptualization as opposed to the evaluating of
others in their social surroundings. Opinions about the practice of their own
generation as compared to those of other generations would furthermore
provide an impression of the change in self-concept over time. Differences
in attitudes towards arranged mariages vs. mariages based on love
relationships might indicate the strength of the ide a of one-self as an
individual, as opposed to the idea of one-self as a par of a greater unit -
the family .
A weakness of this type of interview-design is the fact that it is the
researcher who decides what topics are to be regarded as important. The
12 Islam is here understood according to its traditional meaning for the Beldiyins, not the
meaning it is given by the fundamentalist Muslims.
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informants' own evaluation of the relevanee and importanee of the topics
are thus lost. Still, the above mentioned advantages of this particular design
were found to be sufficiently significant to favour this approach to the
proeess of interviewing.
4.2.3 The data-collection
As mentioned, the assistance of an interpreter was required for the
interviews. U se of a mediator of this kind may be a source of complication.
I found that it also had positive aspects:
First of all, I found my interpreter' s connections within the local
community to be of gre at help in the proeess of selecting informants. As
a native Beldiyin, she had few problems of getting in contact with suitable
families, and her guarantee for me and my intentions resulted in positive
answers from informants who would otherwise have refused to assist me.
During the interviews I heard her "translate" my questions into an
understandable and socially acceptable form, in addition to translating the
conversation in a strict sense. In this way, she probably saved me from
more embarassment than I will ever know.
The presenee of a third person was required also for other reasons than
the one strictly related to communication: According to the Tunisian moral
code, I could not, due to my sex and age, enter tnto an interview-situation
with a male informant alone. A num ber of the interviews were conducted
in closed rooms, and some of them went on for hours. Without a third
person present, I would probably have caused a social scandal - hardly a
sound basis for the interviews. Also during the interviews of the female
informants, I generally found the presenee of the field-assistant comfortable,
as it clearly served to reduce the tension between the interviewer and the
interviewed when sensitive topics were discussed.
The durations of the interviews, as well as the actual interview-situations,
varied. The initial plan was to conduct individual interviews, but in
practice, some of them turned out to be group-interviews. Due to the size
of the households, it sometimes proved difficult - and also unnatural -
to be alone with the informant. Hence some of the interviews contain
significant elements of spouses', children's and others' comments to the
topics discussed, and also regular discussions between them. In the
beginning this was a source of frustration to me. By second thought, I
found that instead of messing up the interviews, it actually provided
valuable additional information on differences in opinion, and on relations
between family-members. All in all these "group-sessions" proved very
informative, and raised the quality of the total information gained.
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The interview-data were supplemented by information from other sources.
For reasons that will be discussed later, the celebrations of important life-
course ceremonies, particularly the marriage, were made objects of
observation. Documentation of different kinds constitute a third source of
information.
The presentation and analysis of the data are strctured according to the
main themes of the interviews: Marage, reproduction, formal education,
occupational life in a wide sense, and migration and relation to place of
origin - that is, the small Tunisian town "Bled".
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5. Bled
5.1 The town
Bled has, like so many other Tunisian towns and villages, a long history.
The name of the town is of Roman origin, and one of the main attractions,
the fortress, is evidence of the role of the town during the Roman period.
First built by the se early colonizers, it has followed Bled through the
centuries, and was last used for military purposes during the sec ond world
War'
The ground surrounding the fortress hides ruins of Roman settlements.
A few vill as have been dug out, revealing mosaic-floors and marble
columns. Most of it, however, is still under the turf - to the great
annoyance of the owners of the ground, who are neither allowed to exploit
the historie sites, nor able to make the government buy them out.
The fortress and the Roman remains lie near the harbour, which, partly
thanks to foreign development aid during the sixties, has been expanded to
a degree that makes it one of the best harbours of North-East Tunisia. This,
of course, has been very advantageous for the fishermen of the town,
especially after the new facilities for delivery of fish was built in the mid-
eighties. The fisheries school is right next to the harbour, and most of the
fishermen and their families live in this area. As a consequence of the
quality of the harbour, it has also to some extent been used as a base for
off-shore oil-activity. In the last few years a direct boat-connection has been
established between Bled and Sicily. After the new harbour was completed,
it has also become people's favourite place for evening-promenades that are
very popular during the summer-season.
The town-c entre of today's Bled is, however, situated about one
kilometre from the seashore. This town-centre was founded during the Arab
era. Still, it is no typical Arab town, it lacks the M edina and the walls
surrounding it. The houses of the old part of the town are, however, of the
traditional Tunisian design: Facing the street is only a wall and a door,
revealing nothing of the size and standard of the Dar behind. The rooms
are built around a court yard, with doors and windows opening towards it.
Until quite recently the normal household-pattern - in Bled as in most of
Tunisia - was one where the sons of a family stayed in their father' s
house when they mared, each son's family living in one of the rooms
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surrounding the court y ard. Today most families - that is, parents and
children -live separate from their relatives, in their own houses or flats.
It is still very common, however, that the houses of relatives lie dose
together, sometimes one family may occupy a whole quarter of the town.
The difference is that today each brother has a whole flat instead of just a
rOOff, and the entrances of the flats are now more of ten facing the streets,
instead of the c ourty ard.
The newer quarers of the town are, by contrast, characterized by
aparment blocs of flats and villas; hardly anybody building a new house
today chooses the old dar-style.
Bled has about 30,000 inhabitants. As the town is old, there are several
families with deep roots in the community. Today people move in from the
near-by agricultural areas, and the town is growing visibly. People from
other parts of Tunisia also find Bled to be an attractive place to settle
down, for several reasons:
The climate is known to be good there, particularly in summer. As Bled
lies almost as far North-East as one can get, and along the coast, the
temperature is often as much as ten degrees lower than in the Capital,
which is only one hundred kilometres away. The nature, and especially the
beaches, are furthermore very nice. Recently one of the local beaches was
even awarded the title "the Best Beach of Tunisia" by a travel-magazine.
Still, tourism is not a big industry in Bled. To the extent that it exists, it
is of a rather private charaeter. Surrounding "The Best Beach of Tunisia",
for example, Hes a complex of summer-villas, known as "Petit Pars". The
name, and most of the villas, are remains from the colonial period. At that
time the French owned most of the houses; today they belong to Tunisian
upper-middle-class families, some of which are of local origin, others not.
The quarter has a private atmosphere, and there are no public
establishments there - except for one restaurant, which is frequented
mostly by local people.
The villas of "Petit Paris" are not the only remains from the colonial
period to be found in Bled. Still, this par of Tunisia was not a core-area
for the French, and compared to other Tunisian towns, the signs of a
colonial past are few.
For the time being, there are only two beach-hotels in Bled, and they are
both quite small. One of them receive charter-tourists, but due to the low
hotel c ap aci t y they are few. In addition there is a half-completed bigger
hotel-complex - originally a European project, which went bankrupt half-
way through. Today part of it is run by the local authorities, but very
inefficiently.
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The small amount of tourism in Bled is to a great extent a result of
conscious planning by the local authorities. In the same way as they have
been wary about this particular industry , they have also cautiously regulated
the ordinar industry . The few existing factories have been concentrated in
a special area outside the town, and there is no heavy industry. This policy,
along with other factors, has helped preserve the character of Bled as a
typical small community, with few means of public entertainment except
for the obligatory, cafes, a few restaurants - mainly of bad reputation -
and the quite recently built cinema, which repertoire mainly consists of
carate- movies.
Bled thus features most of the characteristics of a "typical" Tunisian
small town. The basic traditional rules for small-scale community-life are
preserved ~ in principle, if not in degree. The new era has certainly
reached the town, but it changes chwaia bi chwaia - little by little. Few
things indicate that any radical change will occur in the nearest future.
There are plans to expand the sea-contact with Italy with a car-ferry line,
and rumours say that an Italian has bought the bankupt hotel-complex,
with plans of completing it and run it in full capacity. The town's new
sports-hall has just been completed, and is said to be one of the best in
North-Africa. The most obvious sign of the development of the town is,
however, perhaps the widespread building of new private houses.
Still, even if things evidently change, the pace of development allows the
community to adjust itself along the way. Most probably, Bled will be more
or less the same town in ten years time as it is today.
5.2 The Beldiyins
The Beldiyins are proud of their origin. This is, however, not a special
phenomenon for this town - most Tunisians have a strong sense of
identity related to their native local community, and are generally proud of
it. It is often held that people coming from specific places have specific
characteristics as a result of it: The Sfaxians are hard-working and
materialist, people from Matmata are very traditional and "backward", and
so on. The Beldiyins, on their hand, claim to be more open-minded and
modern than most Tunisians. Mohammed, one of my informants, puts it
like this:
Even the French people liked Bled a lot. They cried when they had to
leave. Petit Pars - they enjoyed life here, people here. They found that
they could live as they wanted here, freely. Beldiyins are open to new
things. We have been irruenced by the French, the Italians - many other
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people. The fathers ìn Bled are not Hke the fathers ìn the rest of the
country. We are more open, more HberaL.
This is not entirely untrue. The Beldiyins themselves explain their modern
attitudes by the geographicallocation of the town: Due to the short distance
by sea to Europe, Bled has through history had extensive contact with other
cultures and other people. This is evident in the Beldiyin population -
there are more blond and blue-eyed people among them than what is
common in Tunisia in general. Some of the family-names mirror this
"international" past: L'Englise (the English), Schilli (the Sicilian).
Bled, and all the Cap-Bon-area that it is a part of, is one of the richer
pars of Tunisia. There are, furthermore, not remarkable differences in
people's economic abilities. This is, of course, relatively speaking. The
standard of living vares considerably in Bled, but few Beldiyins are "poor"
if seen in a national perspective. There are, for instance, no local beggars
in Bled. Begging occurs only on Mondays - the local market-day -- when
both merchants and beggars travellong distances for the occasion.
Farming and varous agricultural enterprises are important ways of
earning a living in Bled. The typical Cap-Bon farm is not very large. Most
of them are run by one family , perhaps together with some of their married
sons and their families. Due to the good water-resources in the area, the
agricultural produetion consists mainly of vegetables, various fruit, and
other water-intensive products. Most farmers harvest twice a year. This type
of agricultural production, which makes small-scale- farming possible, may
be seen as one of the factors behind the relative economic equality in the
area. In North-West-Tunisia, by contrast, where farming is concentrated on
cereals, most fars are much larger, and as a consequence more people are
labourers without their own land.
As land is still regarded as a lucrative and safe object of investment, it
is quite common that people who work or have a business in town buy
farm-land, and let other farmers exploit it on a share-crop-basis.
In addition to agriculture and fishing, small-scale trade and handicrafts
are important ways of earning a living in Bled. Many Tunisian towns and
villages have a handicraft speciality: Kairouan is the Carpet-town, Nabeul
the Ceramic-town, and Sfax the Gold-town. Bleds speci ali t y is wooden
furniture. In almost every street of the town there are furniture-workshops.
The sounds and smelIs of wood-work are prominent in the total impression
of the town.
After independence, there has been a large increase in the generalIevel
of education in Tunisia. The Cap- Bon area has today more than the national
average share of educated people. One possible explanation of this fact is
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the relative wealth that characterizes the area. Economic ability makes it
possible for families to provide their children with an education. The
relatively high level of education, it is reasonable to presume, may again
have increased the tendency to open-mindedness among the Beldiyins. Or
was it perhaps the liberal attitudes of the Beldiyins that allowed the
children to study in the first place? Probably both explanations are of some
relevance.
People with higher education often leave Bled. This is partly a necessity,
as there are few jobs to be found for educated people in a town of this size.
My interviews indicate that liv ing away from Bled may also be a personal
choice. Several factors seem to influence this choice: The ambition to have
a professional career makes it neceSSarY to move to the larger cities,
preferably Tunis. In addition, there seems to be a certain feeling that a
"modern" job in administration or teaching may be difficult to combine
with strong family-relations in the town where one works. A wish to obtain
greater personal freedom may also make it attractive for academically
trained people to live away from their native community. I will discuss this
point later on.
Even when Beldiyins leave to live and work elsewhere, they generally
maintain strong relations with their home-town. They of ten prefer to invest
in land and houses in Bled rather than where they actually live. Most of
them also use every opportunity to return home - in holidays, week-ends,
and of course for all the big religious festivals. It is furthermore common
to return home for all the important celebrations in life - engagements,
mariages, births, and circumcisions. As these occasions are associated with
the extended family in most of the world, this may perhaps not be very
surprising. In Tunisia, however, ceremonies attached to such occasions also
seem to play a very important role in the families' relation to the local
community. One may actually say that they are public occasions rather than
private ones.
The rituals connected to the central life-course ceremonies do to some
degree change in Bled today. The change seems, however, to consist of a
change in extent rather than a change in principles. They continue to hold
a significant position in most Beldiyins' sociallives; particularly for those
stillliving there. I shall return to the position such ceremonies hold in the
local community below.
Today people are both moving to and from Bled, and many Beldiyins
spend at least parts of their liv es away from their home-town. Compared
to what was common on ly a couple of generations ago, geographical
mobility is considerable.
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The degree of social mobility is also remarkable, compared to only one
generation ago. Several factors are of importanee for this development.
These are aspects of the life of the Beldiyins that I will elaborate more
extensively later on.
My informants all belong to this local community of Bled, in the sense
that they are born and have spent theirchildhood in the town. Several of
them now live elsewhere, returning to Bled only for holidays and special
occasions. They all belong to the youngest generation, and most of them
are academicaiiY trained. Their parents and grandparents have, with one
exception, spent all their lives in Bled.
The informants may be characterized as "typical" inhabitants of Bled, in
the sense that they are representative of a significant par of the population.
Even so, they have their own unique life-stories. I shall now proceed to a
brief presentation of these representativ es of the Beldiyins.
5.3 The informant-families
The Tejer-family
The Tejer-family has lived in Bled for generations. Still, it is not an
important family of the town. It has never been particularly rich, or
remarkable in any other way. The family is, however, a respected member
of the local community.
Mahmoud, the head of the Tejer-family, was born in 1923, and is by
Tunisian standards already an old man. He is today not dependent on his
own labour for the support of his family; he owns a farm outside town, and
he has some shops and store-houses from which he receives rent. In
addition, he owns a house in the best commercial area of the town, and a
small summerhouse at the beach. His business is now more like a hobby
- he would not know how to make the days pass without it.
Habiba, Mahmoud's wife, is sixteen years younger than her husband; the
difference in age is not exceptional for marred couples of their generation.
They are both unable to read and write; another characteristic that is
common for most Beldiyins of their generation.
They had twelve children; two boys and three girls are "in the grave", six
girls and a boy are alive. Their eldest daughter has studied at the
University, and she now lives in Bled, where both she and her husband
work as teachers. The three next daughters have only seven yearS of
education or less. They are now all fulltime housewives, and they, too, live
in Bled with their families. The son lives in Europe, where he works as a
data-engineer; he will probably stay there for many yearS to come. Several
Beldiyin families have male relatives in Europe; going there is quite
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accepted - for men. The two youngest daughters in the family both have
an academic education. One has finished her studies, and is now working
as a teaeher, but in a town far away from Bled. The youngest one is still
a student.
The children of the Tejer-family thus have highly varying degrees of
education. This situation is, however, by no means special for them. In fact,
this is a rather common feature of this generation of Beldiyins. It is quite
possible to find a professor, a teaeher, a bread-seller and a close-to~illiterate
housewife within the same flock of brothers and sisters of the early post~
colonial generations.
I have concentrated my interviews with the Tejer-family around
Mahmoud, Habiba, and two of the daughters: Meriem, who went to school
for only four years before she dropped out, and who is now a full-time
mother of four; and Nora, the young teaeher who works far away from
Bled. I also interviewed Habiba's mother, Aisha, who is the only one of the
eldest generation still alive.
Mahmoud's sister and her family lives near by the Tejer-house. As their
father moved away from the "Tejer-area" of town when he married, they
are the only relatives of their branch of the family living dose to each
other. Their children have grown up together. The two eldest sons,
Mohammed and Lassad, have been interviewed because of the lack of sons
in the Tejer-family.
The Tejer-family is, as mentioned, a relatively new recruit to the local
middle class. The family is unremarkable in every way. It is a small family;
small in absolute numbers, and small in the sense that it has few male
members in the last generations. Mahmoud's branch of the family also lives
separate from most of the other Tejers in town. The family is thus in fact
in a rather unfavourable situation, according to traditional values. These
conditions may have implications for the family's way of living and
thinking, as we shall see.
The Muaddaf-family
The Muaddaf-family differs from the Tejer-family in many ways: It is one
of the larger and more important families in Bled. For generations the
family has provided one of the bigger mosques in town with ¡mams. This
is a position they could not hold unless they had some kind of education;
the Muaddaf-men have been literate for generations, a fact that has also
introduced them to other advantageous positions in Bled.
In the same way as inhabitants of certain towns are said to have special
characteristics, members of certain families are also believed to have some
specific character in common. The Muaddaf-family is known because of its
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intelligence; they themselves claim sincerity to be a character that the
family appreciates and tres to cultivate.
The family is very much aWare of their special position in town, and it
exercises rather strict rules and demands concerning the behaviour and life-
st yle of its members. The concern for their position and honour may
perhaps also explain why Tahar, the head of the actual branch of the
family, categorically refused to be interviewed.
Born in the twenties, Tahar is about as old as Mahmoud Tejer, but the
age is all they have in common. Taharhas worked all his life as a civil
servant in a good position in Bled, but is now retired. In addition to his
pension, the family has other sources of income, like farland. Tahar has
several brothers, and in general the Muaddaf-family is a large one. The men
of the extended family are furthermore very much in charge of it. All my
Muaddaf-informants refer to Tahar - and his father before him - as
strong, authoritarian personalities.
Tahar's wife, Fatheia, is also his maternal cousin. They have four
children, two daughters, and two sons. Their mother's mother, Fatoma, is,
like Aisha Tejer, "more than seventy". She and her husband now live with
their son in Bled, but earlier they lived in Tunis for many years.
I have concentrated the interviews of the Muaddaf-family around Fatoma,
the maternal grand-mother, her daughter Fatheia, and her four children.
The Falleah-family
The Falleah-family lives in the outskirts of the town; I interviewed two of
its male members in order to supply my material with some more adult
men. Mustfa was eighty-two yearS old at the time of the interview, and he
was proud of his age. He us ed to be a farmer, but stopped working yearS
ago.
His son, Hassan, was born in 1940. He lives with his family - his
cousin-wife and their children - in a house right next to Mustfa. Hassan
is amerehant, he has a grocery-shop near by. He has many brothers; the
age-difference between them is considerable, as is the difference in their
level of education. All the Falleahs live in the same quarter of Bled.
These are the people who were so kind as to provide me with the bulk
of the material on which this thesis is based: The interviews. As we shaii
see, they are different, but still in many ways similar; they share a
background as Beldiyins, and they share the status of a Tunisian small-town
middleclass.
The next section will present and analyze their life-stories in more detail,
focusing particularly on timing and character of important life-course
occasions and phases like education, professionallife, migration, marage,
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and reproduction. Before turning to this analysis, I will, however, discuss
briefly some social aspects of kinship-groups, and their celebrations of life-
course events in the Beldiyin community.
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6. Marriage as life-course phase and life-
course event
6.1 Marriage as life-course phase
One should get mared. Jf someoneis not maried, he lives like a donkey
(Mahmoud, 2nd. gen. Tejer).
Especially for a girl marage is necessary. Because if she does not get
maried, people wil underestimate her, and she wil not be well seen in
the society (Fatoma, 1st. gen. Muaddat).
As argued in chapter three, the patrilinear kinship-group holds a
fundamental position in the North..African societies. TraditionaiiY,
households based on patrilinear kinship-relations have constituted the basic
units in the Tunisian society concerning produetion, social organization, and
ideology. Today, there is a general tendency of "nuclearization" of the
households. Still, the family maintains an essential role in the society;
ideologically , and practically.
The institution of marriage holds a position of central importanee within
this kinship-dominated social system. As extra-matrimonial cohabitation
have been - and still is - socially unacceptable, mariage is the only
legitimate way of forming a family, and thus create one's own fundamental
social unit.
Seen from the individual's point of view, marriage is the most important
phase in life. In addition to the significant status it provides in itself, it is
necessary in order to get access to most of the other statuses and roles that
are regarded as valuable: An independent position towards parents is
normally obtained only when forming a family . Parenthood is furthermore
essential for both genders concerning their status in the local community,
and also within the kinship-group. In addition, having children and thus
securing the continuation and growth of the family is generally seen as a
primary objective in life. Other life-course phases are to a large extent
regarded as preparatory or concluding phases of the mariage-phase. This
is particularly the case for women, who according to traditional values
ideally should have no working-career but the domestie one, and who are
supposed to spend large parts of their life within the household-sphere. It
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also to a significant degree applies to men's life-phases, however. Even
though men will have an important working career in the public sphere, a
main purpose of work is to be economically able to get maried, and later
to fulfil the obligations as provider of the family .
Being maried is thus important in order to achieve the respect and
acknow ledgement of the social surroundings. In short, the society demands
that an individual is maried in order to accept it as a full member.
Traditionally, the decision about whom and when to mary is a collective
family-responsibility. The proeess of decision-making is as a rule the
responsibility of the marred women within a family , even though the
consent of the male members will be a precondition for the realization of
a marage. Until recently it has been quite common that the individual
actually getting mared has had no influence on the choice of spouse.
Today this is changing - at least for certain groups of youths. It is now
more accepted that they choose their own partner, or at least that they are
asked for their opinion before the decision is made.
In accordance with this collective family-approach to getting maried, the
well-being of a family-member in his or her marrage is also conceived of
as a collective responsibility. Even though the wife is thought of as a
member of the husband's family after mariage, her parents and brothers
will remain her protectors in case of conflicts with her husband or in-laws.
Thus, being maried according to the traditional concept of the institution
implies managing a complex set of inter-personal and social relations within
and between the families involved; it may be seen as a union of
representativ es of two families, as mue h as a personal relationship based on
affection. As the tendency of the youth choosing their own partner
increases, this understanding of marriage as a collective project decreases.
Today, one may find both "collective" and "individual" marriages co-
existing, even within the same family and same generation. The definition
of what kind of marage it is, will depend on how it was aranged.
There are two kinds of conceptions of marriage as life-course phase in
Bled at the present; one based on collective ideas, and one that is more
associated with individuality. Whether the last one will constitute a real
alternative for a person about to get married, will, however, dep end on his
or her family's attitude to the "individual" marriages. Whatever concept of
marriage is applied, most young Beldiyins will get mared one way or
another. Extra-matrimonial cohabitation is not a possible alternative, and
even for those who might not wish to establish a relationship to a person
of the opposite sex, it is hard to stay single. The social burdens related to
such a status is regarded as considerable by my young informants, while the
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elder ones find it hard to understand why anybody should wish to stay
unmarried at all.
Engaging in marriage as a significant phase in one' s life-course is still
a precondition for ameaningful adult life. It is, however, generally regarded
as a rather popular social institution, and even the most radical-minded
seem to fin d marage and organized family-life to be a positive and
meaningful aspect of life.
6.2 Marriage as life-course event
i am for the traditional marage, because one wil not get marred twice
in one's life. So we should profit from this ceremony (...) And besides,
my family insisted on this traditional mariage. So I did not say no to
them (Leila, 3rd.gen. Muaddat).
I find the rituals of mariage in aur society to be a massacre of the
masculine personality, and even more of the feminine personality. It is an
exhibiton that covers a lot of suppression, and which expresses sexual
fantasies which should be eliminated the sooner the better (Nejib, 3rd.gen.
Muaddaf).
Beldiyin sociallife is characterized by celebrations and ceremonies related
to life-course events. The events traditionally celebrated are all associated
with the family: Births, circumcisions, engagements, mariages, and
funerals. The celebrations serve multiple functions; they maintain the
network of duties and obligations within the extended family , and they also
constitute an important arena for the families to confirm and increase their
social status in the local community. Much attention is paid to the way the
ceremonies are performed. The standard of the performanee is a sign of the
family's economic, social, and even moral abilities, and a good "show" will
tend to improve the status of the celebrating family .
The celebrations also have an important entertaining function; especially
for the women, who are the main participants in the ceremonies, and who
have few other socially accepted means of entertainment but the
celebrations of the life-course events. More importantly, the planning and
realization of the celebrations of the life-course events are traditionally the
tasks of the married women of a family. Because the family hol ds such an
important position in the Beldiyins' lives, and because the performances of
the celebrations are so essential to the family , s reputation, these are tasks
of outmost importance, and provide the women with considerable power
and influence both within their kinship-group, and in the local community.
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Recently, celebrations of new life-course events, not traditionally
associated with the family, have occurred on the Beldiyin women's part y-
repertoire; children's success in schooL. The passing of the sixth grade
exam, and particularly the success in the Examen Baccalaureate, are today
occasions of considerable festivity in Bled; the celebrations follow a similar
pattern to the traditional life-course event celebrations. Still, the social
marking of such events has not become obligatory and ritualized in the
same way as the traditional ones; whether they are performed is to a large
extent an economic question. This introduction of new celebrations may be
seen as women's strateg y to increase the number of significant events of
which they are in control, and in so doing their arenas of influence and
power.
Of the celebrated life-course events the mariage is the most important
one. This is evident from observing the different celebrations: The
marriages are by far the most time-consuming and costly ones. In addition,
they attraet the most people, they require that the guests are nicely dressed,
are most spoken of, and so on.
The importanee of the ceremony of marriage is quite understandable.
First of all, it is the celebration of the most fundamental social institution
in the society. As argued above, the mariage is furthermore the
individual' s gate to adult life, and thus to the bulk of the other important
life-course events. Moreover, it is a union of two families, implying an
opening up of the integrated family-unit to external influence, and an
acceptance of new obligations and duties. In addition, the marriage activates
all the most central socia! relations in the local community. A description
of a traditional marrage as it is celebrated in Bled today may serve as an
example of the multiple social functions of the celebrations of life-course
events, and the importanee of the position they hold in the local
community:
6.2.1 The celebration of traditional marriages in Bled
Most Beldiyin marriages take place during the summer-season, but the
planning and preparations for a traditional marriage take years. The
bridegroom is supposed to provide a fully furnished house or flat, which
implies years of saving. The bride, on her hand, has to prep are her
trousseau, which among other things should contain kitchen-utensils and the
necessary amount of blankets, pillows and other textiles.
The planning of the actual celebration of the marrage also takes a long
time. Many things have to be aranged: new clothes for all the family ,
reservations of the different professionals who are necessary in order to
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celebrate a marage properly, booking of the place where the mariage is
to take place, and so on.
What is today called a "traditional" mariage in Bled lasts three days.
Before they used to last for five days, but this changed about a g en er ati on
ago. Of the three days, two are exclusively for women.
The first night is called the "henna-night", and is a women's affair. The
women of the two families gather in the houses of the parents of the bride
and the bridegroom in the evening. One Derboka-player, a drummer, is
present, singing songs that are special for marages. From time to time she
sings about one of the women present - then this woman has to dance,
and to pay the player. All the women dance, and all of them pay, but those
sung for should pay more. These are normally close relatives of the person
who is to be marred. The main point of this preparatory celebration is to
gather the female members of the family.
As the evening proceeds, the time comes for the relati ves of the
bridegroom to go to the house of the bride's family, where the female
relatives of the bride are gathered in a similar way. The women go through
town in a proeession: The Derboka-player goes in front, singing and
drumming, and the women follow, ululating. People stop and watch the
proeession; in this manner the local community is informed that this family
is now celebrating the mariage of a son.
When the proeession arives at the house of the bride, the women are
served lemonade and cakes, and the dying of the bride's hands and feet
with henna begins. A professional woman is there especially to perform this
task. After the application of henna is done - the bride sits in front of all
the guests during this operation - the women of the bride's family start
dancing. The closer relatives - the bride's mother and sisters - open the
dance, and the others join them. Then the women of the bridegroom's
family dance. The two families should not mingle at the floor. The henna-
dyer and the derboka-player is paid in the same way as earlier that night.
The party is over when the bride is carried to bed; she has to sleep with the
henna-paste on, and can therefore not walk.
At day-time on the second day of the marriage-celebration the closer
female relatives of the bride gather in the home of her parents. Her body-
hair is removed with a mix of melted sugar and lemon-juice, and her hands
and feet - now bright henna-red - are dyed again, black. These
operations may be performed either by a woman of the family, or by a
professional.
At night, the women of the two families gather again. In the meantime
the bride has been to the hair-dresser, and is made-up and hair-dressed. She
is wearing a coloured evening-dress, similar to the one she wore on the
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henna-night, but usually not the same. This night she normally also wears
a small veil, covering the lower par of her face. When the bridegroom's
family arives, she is seated on a throne in front of the guests. The high
point of the night is when she stands up, her eyes closed and her hands on
her hips, for about twenty minutes. This is a symbol of her virginity.
Except from the performanee of this ritual, the night very much follows the
pattem of the previous one; family-vice dancing, serving of cakes and
lemonade, seeing-and-being-seen, and the paying of the musicians and the
woman guiding and assisting the bride.
The two first nights are celebrated in an ambience of cheerful
expectation. The women ululate frequently, an expression of happiness that
characterizes all the celebrations of life-course events, except funerals
where the dead person was married.
The men are absent on both these nights. A few assist the women with
practical tasks, like caring chairs and cases of lemonade. They are,
however, not dressed up, and also in other ways it is made clear that they
are not taking part in the celebrations. At the end of the night some more
men - mostly young boys - show up, in order to escort the women
home.
The third night is the gre at night of celebration. Some people celebrate
all three nights at home - because their courtyards are big enough, or
because they can not afford to rent the cinema or the out-door-scene, which
are the alternative locations for marriages in Bled. In the cases of
celebrations at home, the two first nights are spent in the home of the bride,
while the last night is celebrated in the bridegroom's home.
On this third day preparations go on from early morning. Members of the
families gather and assist each other. The most important event during day-
time is that the bride goes to the hairdresser, and stays there all day - at
least six or seven hours. Her family is waiting for her at home, and in the
evening some of the women from the bridegroom's family also arrive.
When the bride returns from the hair-dresser's, she and her doser family
are driven to the place where the celebration is to take place. The bride is
driven first in a long proeession of cars - it is the responsibility of the
bridegroom to provide as many and as nice CarS as possible for the
proeession - they tour the town, and honk constantly . In some cases a
marching brass-band is leading the proeession of cars. This is the present
form of the important ritual of the bridegroom's bringing of his bride from
the house of her parents to her new home.
The bride is normally wearing a traditional marriage outfit: Long, wide
trousers covered with pearls and spangles, and with a short top decorated
in the same way. This ceremonial dress weighs at least twenty kilos, so the
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brides of ten need assistance when walking. The bridegrooms normally
wear dark suits.
The guests arrve; this third night may well attract a couple of hundred
invited people. The women wear all their jewellery and their best dresses:
Gold lamé, spangles, and high-heeled sandals. Many of them have dyed
their hands and feet with henna as a sign of happiness. They are seated in
rows, facing the couple, which is seated on a thone in front. The men do
as a rule not sit down; they stay in the re ar , chatting. At the most, they are
wearing white shirts, many of them have not changed clothes at alL. From
time to time they disappear; they visit the nearest cafe for a little while.
Even on this night it seems important to signalize that the whole thing
interests them only moderately.
A band, playing either modem Arab popular music or traditional
marriage music, stars their show. After a while, the female relatives of the
couple start dancing. The other women follow - they all dance in front of
the rows of people. The young unmaried girls tend to dance the most, and
the better they are dressed, and the better they dance, the longer they go on.
The others sit, watching them, while they are served lemonade and cakes.
Men dance only rarely; some of the young boys may do it, but then they
as a rule dance separated from the women. Boys and girls may dance
together only if they are brothers and sisters, or close cousins.
Half way through the night the bride may disappear, and return dressed
in white wedding-gown and bridal veiL Whether this is done or not is an
economic question. Then it is time for the newly wed to dance, and then
the photographer gets busy; pictures of the couple with all thinkable
combinations of family-members are to be taken. Of ten the event is also
videotaped.
Late at night the party is over. The couple is driven to their new home,
accompanied by the closest family.
Next morning, the first visitors come to see the newly wed. All day
relatives come to pay their respect, and to admire the new home. The
visitors are mostly women, and the bride receives them dressed in a new,
short, white dress. The visitors are served tea, lemonade, and cakes.
For seven days after the celebrations everything is calm. During this
period the bride is not supposed to leave her new home. On the seventh
night after the third night of the marriage, people go to the home of the
newly wed. Women predominate among the guests. They come to pay their
respect to the couple, and to admire the home. For the first time gifts are
given - money-gifts to the bride personally. There is Derboka-music
again, and the couple and the guests dance. During the night the bride will
withdraw, and return in a new outfit. This procedure should be repeated at
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least half-a-dozen times - it is a show of the personal wardrobe the family
of the bride has provided her with. (All the dresses and outfits used during
the marage is the economic responsibility of the bridegroom, whether they
are bought or rented.)
This night is the formal end of the marage-celebrations. The following
weeks the couple will be invited to lunches and dinners given by most of
the mared members of the families. All in all special celebrations linked
to the marage take place for at least a month. And the title of Arosa -
bride - sticks with the brides for several months. According to the
statistics, within a year it will probably be replaced by Oumm - mother.
This is how a traditional mariage is celebrated in Bled today, roughly
described. More rituals are connected to this event than the ones mentioned
here. The rituals left out of this description do, however, serve similar
functions as those mentioned. (For a more elaborate description of
traditional North-African marage-celebrations, see for example Abu Sahra
1982, and Evers Rosander 1991.)
The legal part of the mariage, the signing of the contraet, is not an
integrated part of the social marriage. It may take place at any time; it is
quite common to sign it - and thus be legally maried - already at the
time of the engagement. It may also be done on one of the days of the
mariage celebration, or shortly before it. A legal marrage is, however, not
regarded as a marrage - living together when only legally maried is
considered as fomication. The social marking of the union is a necessity.
6.2.2 Alternatives to the traditional marriage-celebration
Recently, an alternative kind of marriage-celebration has emerged in Bled.
It has existed as a possible alternative for a relatively short period - not
mue h longer than ten years. This marage-celebration is only of one night s
duration. That night resembles the third night of the traditional marage,
but may be somewhat more modest.
The most important single traditional ritual that may be excluded in the
new marrage-practice, is probably the bride's confirmation of virginity on
the sec ond night. The fact that this ritual is sometimes integrated in the
one-night celebration, indicates its importance. The most significant
difference between the two ways of celebration is, however, the alteration
of the whole concept of marriage implied by the new alternative. The
women's part of the mariage is drastically reduced. In the new form, the
marage furthermore looses much of its public charaeter; the aspect of
promotion of a family , s social status in the local community is thus
weakened.
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The vast majority of marrages celebrated in Bled are still conducted
according to the traditional practice. The alternative one-night-mariage is
gaining ground, however, and will probably be even more popular in a few
years time. The advantage of the "new" marage celebration most
important to people is its low economic cost, as compared to the traditional
one. The disadvantage that seems to bother people the most, is the decrease
of the public aspect of the celebration - which, it is feared, may lead to
a weakening of the family's social status.
6.3 Trends of change in marriage-practices in Bled
We have seen that the marriage still holds a position of fundamental
importanee in the lives of the Beldiyins; both as life-course phase, and as
life-course event.
Changes in ways to be maried
Two conceptions of marrage as life-course phase co-exist in Bled today;
one characterized by the idea of marriage as a collective ac tiv it Y , and one
that is based on an idea of mariage as a more individual activity.
The collective kind of mariage reflects the traditional view of the
institution as basically a family-matter, concerning both the actual matching
of the partners, and married life. A wife's problems with her in-laws are
regarded as her entire family's problem, and vice-versa. This kind of
marriage reflects an idea ofmarrage as a union of kinship-groups and
families, and, as a consequence, a perception of the partners as the principal
representatives of their families in the union.
The individual kind of marriage is a relatively recent phenomenon. In
such marriages, the choice of partner is an individual matter; through this
choice it is also implicitly understood that the couple assumes the
responsibility for their future married life themselves to a much larger
degree than what is the case in the collective mariages. Still, the practice
of "individual" mariages is group-dependent, in the sense that the
possibility of practising such a marrage to a significant degree will dep end
on the attitude of the families of the partners. An absolute rejection of the
idea by the family will often constitute such a burden for the couple that
a realization of their plans may be impossible.
Being married - one way or the other - is, however, close to an
absolute demand from the social environment in order to be accepted as a
full adult member of the community. The continued undisputed position of
mariage as a fundamental social institution and as an equally fundamental
life-course phase, indicates that the kinship-group and family and the
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attendant roles and statuses still hold a principal position in both the
individuallives and the Beldiyin sociallife.
Changes in ways to get marred
Also when it comes to marage as life-course even t, Le. the ceremonies
contained in the celebration of the marrage, thereare two alternative ways
co-existing in Bled today: the three-day celebrations, and the simpler one-
night celebration.
The three-day celebration is the traditional way of getting maried in
Bled. This kind of celebration is characterized by a form, meaning and
function that reflects the traditional North-A frie an principles for social
organization, and it may be argued that even though these celebrations are
strongly associated with the kinship-group, they are actually public events,
more than private ones:
First of all, we have seen that the entire celebration is of a thoroughly
other-directed nature. The "others" to which the performances are directed
vary, as do to some degree the "us'es" involved, even though they are all
based in the kinship-group as an identifying and motivating unit.
The varous proeessions are the rituals most clearly directed towards "the
others" in general. They have both informational and exhibitional
functions. The women's proeessions of the two first nights is a female
presentation of the bridegroom's family; they have essentially an
informational function. Still, the exhibition involved is not insignificant; it
exhibits both number - it is important with a large proeession - and
looks. The car-procession of the last night - today's form of the important
ritual of the bridegroom's bringing of the bride to his home - is, by
contrast, primarily a male exhibition. It shows the bridegroom and his male
family's ability to mobilize a large number of car-owners, and as a car is
an important status-symbol in Bled, this proeession indicates the family's
social relations with people of a certain standard. The eventual marching
brass-band leading the proeession adds to its grandiosity, and as it is
expensive to rent, it also indicates the bridegroom' s economic status to the
"others". It furthermore catehes the "others'" attention, as does the honking
of the cars' horns.
The parties also clearly involve "us' es" and "others". Their physical
arangement emphasizes the total impression of a show: the guests are
seated in front of a scene, on which the significant actors of the different
parties perform. The two first nights belong to the women. The female
members of the two families about to be united compete, thus constituting
the group of "significant others" for each other. The hostess of the party is
the object of intense interest. Her performance is thoroughly examined by
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the members of the other family: What kind of cakes has she bought, the
cheap ones, or the expensive ones? What does her home look like, what is
the quality of her furniture? and so on. Throughout these parties, the
women of the two groups perform separately. Through their family-vice
dancing, they show each other their jewellery, party-dresses, and also their
dancing-abilities, which indicate grace and femininity.
The third night is the high-point of the marage-performance. While the
previous nights involve relatives only, a large number of non-relatives are
invited as guests this night. The invitations are guided by rules of
reciprocity in social relations, and a large number of guests are in itself a
confirmation of the family's respectability, as reflected in their large social
network. The bridegroom and his family , s economic status is furthermore
exposed this night more than the other nights, through the choice of
location for the party, the bride's dress, the quality of the band - in short,
through the vi si ble economic input to the party.
Thus, the third night the male and fem ale members of a gro up perform
together, and in front of the most important audienee of the entire mariage;
well aware of the fact that the performanee on this night will be the topic
of discussion and evaluation all over town the next day, and that everybody
is looking for a mistake, or preferably a lIttle se and aL. The wish to perform
without mistakes is one of few interests that unite the two kinship-groups
involved in the common "us", directed towards the guests as "others", and
indirectly towards the local opinion in general.
Through this examination of the other-directedness of the celebrations,
the importanee of the kinship-group in the traditional marriages is also
revealed. The marage is basically a competition between two kinship-
based "us' es". The two groups try to outdo each other, in order to win the
support and approval of the "others". It is also an internal competition
between the two groups; they are in the proeess of being united, which
implies that new relations of obligation are to be created. A "victory" on
the mariage-celebration arena will provide the winning group with a
favourable position when these new relations are to be negotiated.
The traditional mariages require participation from the entire significant
kinship-group of the families involved. The overall function of the
participation is symbolie; the presenee of a large number of relatives is in
itself a statement of the size and importanee of the group. Also in the
practical tasks involving the kinship-group is the symbolie aspect present;
there is a fixed division of labour concerning these tasks, involving both
gender and the exact kinship-relations between the members. The two first
nights require the presenee of the female members of the group only, and
the collecting of the bride in her home on the third night involves specific
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women relatives of the bridegroom only. A failure to fulfil one's kinship-
defined obligations in a relative's mariage will be seen as a sign of weak
kinship-bonds and existing conflicts within the group.
An important function of the traditional marriage-celebrations is thus the
activation and maintenance of kinship-relations that today, as a result of the
"nuclearzation" of the groups, to a large degree may be inactive in daily
life.
One particular feature of the traditional marages indicates to which
degree a marriage-celebration is regarded as a collective kinship-
performanee rather than a union of two individuals: Throughout the
celebrations, the couple getting marded to aremarkable degree remain
passive. They play no active part in their own mar age-p art y, but serve as
objects of display for their group. Of the two, the bride is the one most
involved in the parties, as her presenee is required throughout the three
nights. All the same, her passivity is striking: Dressed up, made up,
decorated with jewellery, she is seated in front of the guests. She is
expected to remain silent while she is observed and evaluated, applied with
henna, and so on. One of her few active tasks during the celebrations, her
standing up in order to confirm her virginity, should be seen mainly as a
confirmation of her family , s moral it y and respectability, as they have been
able to protect their daughter until her marrage.
The bridegroom's presenee is required only on the third night. On this
night, his appearance is similar to the one of the bride: Together they sit on
display in front of the guests. They should not be too verbally active, and
should not leave their throne. The main actors of their mariage-celebration
are not themselves, but their relatives, paricularly their female relatives.
Here we see in operation the general gender segregation of the traditional
society. The women are the main actors of the performanees, particularly
during the two first days of the celebrations. These parties are the ones
most restricted to the female, "inside" arenas of the involved dars. The
women of the kinship-groups are the actors on these nights, "outsiders" are
not included.
The third night has a more public character. It includes the men of the
groups, non~relatives and guests, and it is celebrated either in the
bridegroom's dar, or on a public arena - the cinema, or on the out-door
scene. It is decidedly the most public, male, "group-for-others" inspired
night. Today, women and men celebrate together in the same room on this
third night. Still, an invisible line is drawn in the middle of the common
space; the women stay in front, the men stay in the re ar. Earlier, this line
of division was also physical; the men and women celebrated in separate
parts of the bride-groom's dar.
69
Most stages of a mariage are, however, clearly female-associated; from
the choice of spouse for a family-member, via the planning of the pary and
the execution of it, to the principal evaluation of it. The mariage-arena also
serves as a "market-place" for new mariages; the mothers of grown-up
sons get an opportunity to examine possible daughters-in-law while the
young girls dance in their nicest outfits. Another feature stressing the
general femaleness of the marages, is the marage-professionals, who
traditionally are women, normally mared women. This is an accepted
female working-career, and it is furthermore an extremely lucrative career.
Today, it is probably the best paid job any Beldiyin woman can have; far
more lucrative than a job as a university-teacher, for instance.
We thus see that a traditional Beldiyin marage activates all traditionally
significant principles of social organization: The kinship-group as the main
collective actor in the celebrations, and the division of gender in all its
expressions: Women and men primarily perform separately. The "inside"
is the arena for the women's parties, while the "outside" arena plays a more
important part in the celebrations that involve men. The overall other-
directed way in which the marriage is celebrated furthermore indicates its
importanee as a means of promoting the kinship-group in the local
community. This is achieved through a considerable transformation of
economic capital into symbolie capital; a large amount of money is invested
in the performanee in order to achieve the approval of the ultimate social
court of judges, the significant others of the local community. While it is
primarily the women who take Care of the performance, the men provide
the economic capital required for a proper performance.
The traditional marage-celebrations in Bled today appear as more
conservative in conformity to the traditional rules for sociallife than do the
daily lives of most Beldiyins. It is a conserving rehearsal of the traditional
values, but not in any way "folkloristie" for the actors involved. To them,
iiis a real thing, not a nostalgic show in memory of how things us ed to be.
Even though the daily conditions of existence may have changed from the
traditionallife, the traditional values are still valid, real and important to the
larger part of the Beldiyins, who still practice the traditional way of getting
married.
Lately, a new, shorter and simpler one-night alternative to the traditional
mariage-celebrations has emerged in Bled. The one night celebration
resembles the third night of the traditional celebrations - a change that
implies a number of alterations of the traditional meaning of the marriage:
Firstly, the fact that the two women's nights are left out, implies that the
influence and power of women related to the celebrations is drastically
diminished. Secondly, certain central symbolie acts are often left out, such
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as the bride's confirmation of virginity - which again means a reduction
of this traditionally essential point in a marage. Thirdly, the economic
input is drastically reduced, which implies that the possible symbolie capital
to be gained is correspondingly reduced. The reduction of the number of
parades also reflect this relative lack of a public aspect, or other-
directedness, in the new marrages. Together, these factors lead to a total
mariage-practice that is significantly more modest, less costly, and less
gendered than the traditional one.
The new, "individual" practice of being maried mentioned earlier, and the
new, "modest" practice of celebrating the union of marage are strongly,
but not necessarily linked together. Both of them imply, as we have seen,
a radical alteration of the traditional conceptions of mariage both as life-
course phase and life-course event. These new practices confront the old
ones, making explicit the cognitive and motivating structures behind them.
This is noticeable in the strong opinions most Beldiyins have about the two
alternative practices:
Not very surprisingly, there is considerable reluctance and resistance
towards the new practices among the Beldiyins - particularly among the
women (which is not very surprising, given the importanee of the
traditional marriages in their lives.) My material does, however, suggest
that the resistanee towards the new practice of getting maried is actually
larger than the one directed towards the new practice of being married. Or,
put differently, there seems to be a larger change in the practice concerning
how couples get together and live together, than in the way their union is
celebrated. While relationships often will be initiated privately, and thus are
not so conspicuous, the celebration of the union of mariage is a major
event in the local community, and will be observed and evaluated
thoroughly. This may be interpreted as yet another sign of how significant
the "others ", evaluation of the group performanee is to the majority of the
Beldiyins, and how essential such performances still are as generators of
symbolie capital for the kinship-groups.
New mariage-practices, quite profoundly different from the traditional
ones, are gaining ground in the Beldiyin community. This indicates that
certain changes in the conditions of life for at least a part of the Beldiyins
have taken place. As these new practices involve a smaller amount of
economic capital- transformable into symbolie capital- it may indicate
that an investment in symbolie capital in the Beldiyin environment will be
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of less relevanee for the people who choose to practice the new kinds of
mariage phases and events.
These new practices put less weight on both the group-aspect and the
gender-aspect of the mariage, both as life-course phase and life-course
event. In the new practice of marage as phase, the choice of spouse is
primarily an individual decision, and the mared life is conceived as more
of an individual responsibility. In the new practice of marage as event, the
aspect of promoting the kinship-group through the celebration is diminished
quite radically , as are the principles of gender-segregation in the
celebrations.
According to the discussion of identity in chapter three, the new
marriage-practices may also be seen as indicators of a new kind of identity
among certain groups of Beldiyins; a less group-based, less gender-based,
and less other-dependent kind of identity than the one that still seems to be
dominant within the Beldiyin population.
Factors influencing the Beldiyins' marage preferences wiU be discussed
in the next section, which deals with the informants' experiences with
marriage - both as life-course phase, and as life-course event.
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7. Marriage
7.1 The women
7.1.1 The experiences of the two eldest generations of women
i just knew that I was engaged, I did not know how, or when (Fatoma,
lst.gen. Muaddaf.
The women of the two eldest generations of informants to a large extent
have similar experiences with their engagements and marages. Common
to all of them is that they were very young at the time of the marrage.
Aisha, the Tejer grand-mother, does not know how old she was when she
got married to the man who used to come and seIl fis h at their door, but
she had not yet had her period. But, as she says, "my husband accepted
that. He said that he could w ai t. "
Fatoma, the Muaddaf grand-mother, has been told that she was fourteen
when she got married, and twelve when she got engaged. Both women
claim that their age when they married was normal at that time, and they
both explain the reason for the low age in the same way. Aisha puts it like
tbis:
Because, for example, if a gìrl was bom in a good famìly, well known,
so the famìly of the boy dìd not care about the age. The ìmportant thìng
for them was that the gìrl was from a good famBy.
This illustrates to which degree the marage has been viewed as a union
of families, rather than a union of individuals. It may also explain why the
alliances were decided without the participation of the girls involved. Like
in the case of Fatoma:
Nobody asked for my point of view. My famBy~ìn-law dìd not come to
the house to ask for me, they went to see my father at hìs work, he
agreed, and that was alL.
Their daughters, Habiba and Fatheia, had similar experiences with their
marriages. None of them had any influence on the choice of their partners.
73
Both of them were older when they got married, though; Habiba Tejer has
forgotten her age, but her husband knows: She was sixteen. Fatheia
Muaddaf, by contrast, did not get married until she was twenty-one. Even
though she was exceptionally old at the actual time of marrage, the
alliance was aranged when she was five, and she was form all y engaged
when she was seven, so the plans were settled well in advance. Fatheia is
the only one of these women who is mared to a relative, a maternal
paralleI cousin. They all got mared to local men, however, and did not
leave Bled as a result of the marriage. None of them knew their husbands
until the wedding-night.
Except from Fatheia, who was older than the average, all these women
report their mariage-ages to be normal for their generation. There seems
to have been a slight rise in the average age of mariage from the eldest
generation to the next. The rise do es not seem to have been of any great
significance for the women's experiences of getting married, however.
Habiba has probably a point when she explains that:
Before, girls did not go to schooL. So, when they became older, they had
no other alternative but mariage..... They had no reason to wait, sa they
married.
It is evident that these women had no way of expressing their opinion about
their marriages at the time they took place. What is their opinion about the
way they got maried today?
They all, with the exception of Fatoma's daughter Fatheia, find that they
were too young when they got married. The reaction of Aisha on her
wedding-night illustrates the way they may have experienced the situation:
When I got marred, I was very young. So the first night I ran away, to
my mother-in-Iaw. I passed the first nights with her, I did not live with
my husband until after fifteen days.
Why do they find the age unsuitable today? The main objection seems to
be that they were generally badly prepared for mared life. Fatoma puts it
this way:
No, it was not a good age. Because girls at that time did not meet with
each other, they did not speak with each other. Sa, we did not know
anything about mariage, or life in generaL. In addition, we were under
pressure from our parents. Because of this, I found myself in a completely
new environment when I got mared. (...) if it were now, I would never
have accepted to marr at that age.
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As mentioned, Fatheia is the only one with personal experience of marriage
between relativ es. She is quite satisfied with her own relationship, but do es
no longer support the general idea - too many times she has seen it create
problems within the family , and particularly for the girls in question.
Habiba shares her point of view, and in addition she does not like it
because it "is not good for the blood". Their mothers, by contrast, support
the custom, because you know what you get when you mar a relative:
It is not bad to get mared to relatives. Because it is hetter to get
someone you know than someone you do not know. In some cases a girl
from outside can dis-unite the family.
says Fatoma. Aisha agrees with her. For these women, the consequences of
mariage for the total family-group seem to be the main concern.
Concerning the rule that the family chooses partners for their children,
the opinions are somewhat less differentiated. Fatoma sees the move away
from tbis rule as a negative one. Because, as she says:
I think that parents should have influence on their children. Because
parents are more experienced, and they are usually looking for the best for
their children (...) It was better before. At that time the girls and boys
obeyed their parents. The mother asked for the girl for her son, and did
everything by herself. And it was rare that couples failed.
Her daughter Fatheia seems to have the same idea, but finds that today,
parents can only giv e advice. This is, in fact, a problem that occupies her
very much these days. Her two sons are getting old enough for marrage -
but how is she going to assure that they get married to suitable girls?
Aisha and her daughter Habiba have also realized that today, the position
of parents is as advisors. Still, Aisha finds that
parents should have influence on the mariage. Especially if, for example,
the family of the man is not good. Then the family of the girl should
intervene, and advise her not to get maried to him. But if he is a good
boy, why not? They should encourage her to get mared to him.
Again, we see the tendency to evaluate the family of the individual in
question rather than the individual in itself. The ide a that one gets married
to a family rather than to a person, still seems to be strong.
The views on marrage hel d by these women may appear as ambiguous
and inconsistent in some cases. Aisha, the Tejer grandmother, for instance,
states that she is dissatisfied with the timing of her marage - she was too
75
young. Still, she obviously mared her daughter Habiba off at a similarly
young age, causing her the same kind of problems she had herself. This
may not be as strange as it seems: A significant feature that characterizes
all the elder informants, is this lack of ability to compare the time of their
childhood with the present one. Aisha, for example, says: "I can not prefer
before for now, or now for before. The times are different. Before was a
time, and now it is another time." One may assume that a major social
change is the reason for these problems of comparng. Thus, the conditions
of existence may also have changed to such an extent that the criteria for
a good marage then and now have to appear inconsistent, which in away
they are.
7.1.2 The experiences of the women of the young generation
There were two men from the family who both wanted to mar me, and
the family got together to decide whom of them I should mary (Leila,
3rd.gen. Muaddaf).
I met him at the university, three years ago. We studied together. We met
each other every day, we ate together - that is how we met (Nora,
3rd.gen. Tejer).
Of the female informants of the third generation, two are married, one is
legally mared only, and one has no commitments to a man. Meriem and
Leila, the two maried ones, are older than Nora and Jalila, who are not yet
marred. This can, however, not account for the difference in civil status-
when Meriem and Leila were the age of Nora and Jalila, they were both
already mothers, and had be en maried for years. A more plausible
explanation may be that Meriem and Leila have never got a higher
education. The stories of how they got maried support the suggestion that
this is a fact of significance:
Meriem Tejer never got any further than fourth grade in school; she
failed, and was expelled. After dropping out, she stayed home. When she
was twenty, her husband came to Mahmoud, Meriem's father, to ask for
her, after having been advised to do so by a cousin who was the neighbour
of the Tejer-family. Mahmoud found it to be a suitable alliance, and aske d
Meriem for her opinion. As she trusted his manner of judgement, and as
she liked the man, she agreed. They got marred when she was twenty-one.
The advice of the family was essential to her:
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They (the parents) should advice their daughter or son. And I think that
if, for example, my father said to me not to get maried to my husband,
I would accept that. Before my husband I was engaged to another one.
But then my father told me that he was no good. So I followed the advice
of my father, and broke relations with him.
Meriem met with her future hus band frequently during the time of
engagement, so she did not marr a stranger. Today, she is satisfied with
her marage - both the timing and the mariage in itself. She finds
marrage and the establishment of a family to be a natural and fundamental
stage in life. Marages within families do not please her, though. It is not
good for anything - not for the children, and not for the family.
Leila, the eldest Muaddaf-daughter, has quite different experiences with
her mariage. She finished secondar school before she stopped studying in
order to form a family. She was twenty-two when she got married, but by
then she had been engaged for four years:
My father decided, and I could not say no to my father. And I did not
know him (the husband) very well until we maried. Not before. There
were two men from the family who both wanted to mary me, and the
family got together to decide which of them I should mary. They chose
my husband, because he is a Muaddaf. The other one did not have our
name.
Like Meriem, Leila finds marriage to be a necesSarY and natural stage in
life. She is also content with the timing of her marage - "I think that it
is the best age for marage, after twenty." As for being mared to a
relative she is, however, negative to this custom, which she personally has
found to cause her problems. She is also against parents intervening in the
children' s choice of spouse;
Because I think that if a girl or a boy choose the partner by themselves,
afterwards, if there are problems or something, they wil assume the
responsibilty by themselves, because it is their choice.
This is actually a rather interesting attitude, as the same argument is often
US ed in support of the opposite view. It is generally seen as an advantage
that the problems occurrng in an arranged marriage will be regarded as
collective problems.
Like their mothers and grand-mothers, Meriem and Leila got marred the
traditional way. They furthermore support this way of getting mared, and
find economic inability to be the only reason to abstain from it. The elder
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women are somewhat more reluctant towards the traditional mariage-
celebrations than these young women. The elder all prefer the three-nights-
mariages to their own, that lasted five nights. They also seem to be
positive to the one-night-marriages, because they are less expensive, and
less tirng. "One night is sufficient", says Habiba.
Nora, the younger Tejer-daughter, is legally maried. She and her
boyfriend chose to sign the contraet in order to solve a practical problem
- as they are both teachers, they need to be maried in order to be
assigned to jobs in the same town. It did not work, however - not even
the government accepts a signed marriage-contract as a proof of marriage.
She does not reg ard herself as mared, but is planning to be next summer;
then she will be twenty-five.
Nora met her future husband during her time as a student in Tunis:
I met him at the university, three years ago. We studied together. We met
each other every day, we ate together - that is how we met.
Personally, Nora had no problems with her family concerning the
relationship with her boyfriend. But lots of her friends have:
y ou know that in general it is very difficult. But in my case, with my
family, I did not find any difficulties. Especially with my mother. Because
from the beginning I made it a habit to tell her everything, to be frank
with her (...) But this does not exist in all familes. It is really - it is
rare. I am lucky.
What if her parents had objected to her choice of partner?
I think that I would have continued, because - I am convinced. I chose
him, and ... I do not know. It depends on the reason, why they refuse him.
if I find out that this reason is acceptable, for example, is logical, perhaps
I would stop.
Personally, Nora do es not find marriage to be necessary for a couple who
wants to live together; she does, however, recognize that such relations are
socially impossible in Tunisia today. She and her boyfriend would like to
celebrate their mariage the simple way - a one-night-pary for family and
friends. But Nora do es not think it will be possible, because neither her
family nor his like the idea. They want a proper celebration:
Because my mother, for example - I spoke with her on that subject, I
said to her that if we... Because now we are legally mared, we have the
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contract. Re can for example come and tae me without anything. She
said: Y ou are not - cheap, or (...) They take into consideration people.
What wil people say? "Why is she doing like that, why is she getting
maried like that?"
Getting mared is important to Nora, but not at any prize:
It is important - if we can relate that to the society ~ because...
especially the situation for girls. A girl who is twenty-five years old and
not maried, is a big problem. But I think that if I for example did not
meet a man that I agree with, and that I know that I can live with, I think
that mariage has no sense. With anyone - I think it has no sense.
Today, there seem to be two different standards in operation concerning
suitable age for mariage: For girls without higher education, it is
problematic to reach the age of twenty-five and still be single. For girls
who are studying, by contrast, this is a fairly normal situation. Higher
education seems to delay marage by about five years for girls today. For
both categories there has been a significant rise in the average age of
mariage, however, as compared to the previous generations.
In Nora's case, what is decisive for the timing of the marriage?
Of course the material situation, because we have to prep are things for the
house, furnishing the house - the minimum ~ with two wages, my
wages, and his. And second, we have to get work in the same town.
J alila, the younger Muaddaf-daughter, is still unattached. As a student, she
is for the time being concentrating on her studies. Mariage is not on her
mind, she only knows that she will stay single until she has completed her
education. Certain things concerning marrage she has made up her mind
about, though:
The important thing is that I find somebody that - that we understand
each other. That is the important thing. I do not think about house, or
money, or anything like that.
She has, in fact, strong opinions on several general aspects of marriage. She
is certain that she will find her own future husband, and marry him, in spite
of the reactions of her family . And she definitely wants only one night of
celebrations when she gets maried, still independent from the family's
attitudes. If she gets married at all, that is. She could well imagine her life
single; she might for example find a good job more tempting than marrage.
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Both to Nora and Jalila the custom of marrying relatives is rather
unattractive. First of all because it may harm the children, but also, says
J alila, because such mariages tend to create problems for those involved.
Generally , they fin d that the choice of life-companion should be a personal
task. Parents may interfere within certain limits, they may giv e their
opinion of the alliance, but nothing more. In general, they seem to
understand marriage as a rather individual decision, both concerning the
choice of spouse and the different aspects of maried life. The right to
decide for themselves in these matters is quite essential to them.
This is how the female informants reported their experiences and
attitudes towards marriage. For most of them, the main factor influencing
the timing of their marages has actually been when they were asked for
by the family of their husbands. The girls, or rather, the family of the girls,
have most often played a passive part in the proeess of creating alliances.
The initiati ve is thus traditionally with the man and his family. One
would assume that this fact influences the men's experiences with this
social institution. I will now turn to their accounts of the different aspects
of mariage.
7.2 The men
7.2.1 The experiences of the two eldest generations of men
Let me tell you a story: A man wanted to get maried, but he knew no
women ~ he had not seen anyone, there were no women outside in the
streets. So he put on a sefseri, and went from door to door as a woman,
pretending that he was sellng eggs. Like that he saw a girl that pleased
him, he asked for her ~ and like that he got maried (Hassan, 2nd. gen.
Falleah).
When Mustfa Falleah was twenty-seven - which was a long time ago, as
he is now eighty-two - ms father told him to go to Tunis to buy the
necessities for his marriage. When the jewellery and dresses for the bride
were bought, they brought it to the house of her family , together with oil
and other foodstuff for the marage. The bride also got half of the cow that
they had slaughtered for the occasion. Then he got mared. He had no
influence neither on the choice of his wife, nor on the timing of the
marriage:
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I was ashamed for my father, so I could not say no to him. It was he who
decided everything. But there were some who could decide for
themselves.
The mariage took place when it did in order to avoid that Mustfa had to
serve three years of military service. He reports, though, that most men got
maried at that age when he was young. He is also content with his age
when he got married.
Mustfa supports the right of parents to interfere in their children' s choice
of spouses ~ "if a son or a daughter want to get mared to a partner from
a bad family." He does, however, see their position as advisers only.
Marage is important to Mustfa: "I can not imagine a life without
mariage (...) I should form a family." He does not approve of marrages
within families, though, for genetical reasons. Re explains why people used
to prefer this kind of mariages this way:
They wanted to get maried to relatives because they knew each other. It
was better than to get mared from outside. But many marned from
outside. I, for example, did that. And - before, there were not many
people, so we could not choose.
Mustfa is a supporter of the old, grand marages. Because, as he says:
It was happier, better than now. Before, they kiled a cow so that people
could eat, but now - they buy four kilos of meat at the market!
Mahmoud Tejer did not get married until he was thirty-two. He is not very
happy with the age; he would have preferred to be a couple of years
younger. He was not able to choose, however; it was the economic situation
that decided when a man could marry, and as he was poor, he had to wait.
He also had to get his sisters marred first - as his father was dead, they
were his responsibility. He was, however, older than normal: Most of the
men of his generation got married in the period between twenty- five and
thirty.
It was Mahmoud' s mother who suggested that he got maried to Habiba.
He did not know her, but agreed when asked for his opinion. Re could not
have chosen his wife all alone, he says, "because we could not see girls at
that time. Even if it were my cousin, I could not see her, or meet her." In
other words, the community was so gender-segregated that finding a wife
without the assistance of a female relative was practically impossible - the
men hardly saw women.
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Marriage within the family has no special position compared to other
relationships, as Mahmoud sees it. Jf two relatives want each other, why
not? He has a quite interesting explanation of why these relations used to
be so popular, however:
It was regarded as a good thing, especially if someone was rich. He
preferred to mary his son or his daughter to a relative so that the property
stayed in the family. And the relations between the towns, between for
example Bled and Dar H., were confined. (Dar H. is the neighbouring
town, eleven kilometres from Bled.) People from Bled did not go to Dar
H. So one did not know much people, like today. So they were somehow
obliged to mary somebody from the family.
Like Mustfa, he stresses the physicallack of alternatives as a significant
explanation of intern al mariages.
Mahmoud cherishes married life, and can not imagine life without it. He
loathes the ceremonies of marage, however, and does on ly attend them Ìn
cases where it is absolutely necessary. It is, then, perhaps only natural that
he prefers marriages nowadays: The shorter, the better - and less
expensive. Also concerning his children's choice of spouses he has a liberal
view: "I think that the family should have no influence on the decision. Jf
the boy and the girl want each other, it is ok."
Both Mustfa and Mahmoud got married during the time of colonization,
before the big changes in the social life of the Beldiyins had occurred.
Mustfa' s son Hassan, by contrast, got married in the sixties; by then, things
were somewhat different:
I knew my wife before, she was my relative. So I chose her, and I sent
my mother to ask for her.
Then what decided the timing of the marriage?
There were two reasons: The first one was that I wanted to form a family.
The second one was that Iloved my wife, so I wanted to mary her as
soon as possible.
Hassan is the only representative of the elder generations who mentions
love as a factor influencing the choice of life-companion. He is also the
only one who is married as a result of his own, personal choice. Still, the
advice of the parents was essential to him, and he generally thinks that
parents should advise their children in these questions. But within limits -
not like befare.
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The mariage took place when he was twenty-three. It was a traditional
mariage-celebration, alternative ways had not yet occurred in Bled. He was
somewhat younger than the average, but he still finds that the age was
perfeet. He mared his relative out of love, but it was not exactly a
disadvantage that she was from the family:
It was very important to me. Because when a man chooses to mary a
relative, it is easy for him. If he maries an outside-girl, her family wil
demand a lot of him: Jewellery, and - many things. But inside the family
it wil be easy. No conditions, no - .
We see that the men of the two eldest generations generally had somewhat
more influence on the circumstances around their mariages than the
women of the same generations. Still, this freedom seems to have been
rather dependent on the individual's family; Mustfa had no more choice
than his wife probably had, for instance. According to Hassan's story, these
rules were about to change already in the sixties. How are they today?
7.2.2 The experiences of the men of the young generation
When I wanted to mary, I met with many girls, but we did not
understand each other, so I cut it. And after that my mother told me about
my wife (Lassad, nephew of Mahmoud Tejer).
I used to refuse the mariage-concept. I believed in the free union. But in
our socia! context it is almost impossible to practice this, the free union
- it is practically forbidden (Nejib, 3rd.gen. Muaddaf).
The two Muaddaf-sons are not yet married, while both the nephews of
Mahmoud are. It is hard to say why - they are all about the same age.
Studies may have delayed the event for some of them, but it is doubtful
whether this is a factor of any decisive significance in these concrete cases,
as we shall see. "In my family they mary late", says Tarek Muaddaf.
Together with other factors, this may actually be of some significance.
Lassad, the nephew of Mahmoud Tejer, was twenty-seven when he got
marred. He had made up his mind about when he wanted to get maried
long before - his economic and occupational situation had been the same
for years, so there were no material reasons for waiting that long. Anyway,
it was a normal age for mariage. He had certain problems with fin ding a
girl that he liked:
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When I wanted to mar, I met with many girls, but we did not
understand each other, so I broke it off. And afer that my mother told me
about my wife. I to Id them that it was a condition that I met her first. So
I met her, and she pleased me, so we went to ask for her, and we stayed
engaged two years be fore we mared.
It is important to Lassad to stress that he chose his wife on his own. He
do es not approve of too strong interference from the family in these things
- only if the boy does not live in Bled, and does not know the girls of the
town. In general, it is better to take the responsibility of the choice alone.
Lassad married a relative of his. The fact that she was from the family
was not on his mind, though - it just happened to be like that. He makes
a point of stating that love may exist also between relatives:
Perhaps (they like marying relatives because) they want to make the
family doser to each other, and also, sometimes, the two - the girl and
the boy - perhaps they love each other, before the family decides.
Lassad had a traditional marage-celebration, but does not like it much
himself. He would have preferred to have a short celebration, and then be
able to afford a honeymoon with his wife instead. He marred like that
because of his mother. His elder brother Mohammed had a short marriage,
and she wanted one of her sons to mary the traditional way.
Lassad' selder brother Mohammed got married directly after graduating
from the university, and could hardly afford his one-night-mariage. Still,
even if he had the money, he would never have wasted them on a
traditional marriage. He met his wife while he was a student:
I knew my wife at the university, the second year at the university - I
studied for four years. We stayed together for two years without deciding
to mary - we tested and tried each other. In the third year, we decided
to go ahead, and to tell people that we were going to mar.
Mohammed was only twenty-four when they maried - a very low age,
especially for the cultivated boys. They are twenty-four or twenty-five
when they finish studying. And they work for at least four years - to
eam money to build a house, to buy the gold for their wives - you need
a long time. So the normal age for students, and for cultivated boys, is
about thirty.
They maried "in a terrible material situation", but did not mind it; they just
wanted to live together:
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I did not discuss with myself at that time ~ "is it better to mary at this
age, or is it better to wait?" ... The question is not the age, but to find a
partner that one can found a family with, and one can ~ mary.
Today, Mohammed is very content with the timing of his mariage. It was,
however, a struggle with both the families - his mother wanted him to
marry a Beldiyin-girl, while his father-in-law wanted his daughter to mary
a Sfaxsian, as their family originates from Sfax. The families also objected
to the material situation they were in when they mared. But they were
stubborn. "In this period you have to be hard." In the end, their fainilies
gave in. But even if they had not agreed, Mohammed is certain that he
would have maried his wife anyway.
Personally , Mohammed could imagine himself staying single throughout
life - to him, marriage is not an absolute necessity. But when placed in
a L arg er context, he finds it to be important:
We must think about in which family, and in which society we live. In
Tunisia, it is very important.(....) To have a career, for example, for my
professional life, I must be a good example with my family ~ I must be
maried, I must be a respectable man. In Tunisia, to be maried is a
necessary point in order to complete the ~ "bonne image de l'homme".
Mohammed would actually have preferred to live with his wife without
being mared - at !east for a while. But
here in Tunisia we do not tind this. It is very rare. We may have this kind
of mariage ~ if we study with the girl, for some period. But I think that
we need this kind of marage, because although we study together with
our future wife, although we discuss before the m ar age, we may find
problems ~ because, quite simply, we do not live together. (...) So, to
live together is very important ~ the best way to get to know your
partner well, is to live together. (...) And the marage wil be the final
decision.
Mohammed is clearly a man of strong opinions on this subject. Still, he
thinks that the interference of the parents as advisers may be a good thing
in some cases - "because most of the Tunisian boys cannot make the nice
choice." He has no objections towards marages within the family. He
actually sees a few advantages with it:
It is better, because you can save a lot of time. To combine your family
with a family from Sfax ~ that takes time. It may be better to tind one
from your family, because then you have "le terrain favorable".
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Even though Tarek Muaddaf has become thirty yearS old and has a settled
life-situation, he is not yet engaged or married. This fact does not bother
him, however:
In my opinion there is no fixed time. It arves when it arives. (...) We
can maryearly, and we can mar late.
Marage is important to him, but it has to be a relationship based on love.
If the situation is right, nothing will stop him. If he does not meet the right
girl, however, he prefers to stay single. Like Mohammed, he finds that this
may cause social problems, though.
Tarek has no objections to relativ es marrying among themselves, as long
as they love each other. He do es not think that parents should have any
influence on their children's choice of partners, however:
The up-bringing of the children stops when the children grow up and
become adults, and go to the university, and - because they wil perhaps
know more than their parents, have more experience than their parents.
Sa, I do not think that it is good, that it is right.
If and when he marries, it will be a simple celebration - even if his family
objects. The largest problem will probably be with the family of the bride,
though - not his own.
Like his elder brother, Nejib Muaddaf is not engaged or mared. He has
got a girlfriend, but that is still unofficiaL. Lately, he has started to consider
mariage:
I used to refuse the marage-concept. I believed in the free union. But in
our social context it is almost impossible to practice this, the free union
- it is practically forbidden. Because neither the society, nor the religion,
nor the law, nor the human concept here allow the couples to live together
without getting mared. Sa, liv ing together would not allow personal ease
and relief. (...) So, marage and free union are the same, the only
difference is that the ceremony of marage is an etiquette that the society
imposes. (...) Now I have started considering mariage, because in our
society it is a brake not to be maried. It makes it difficult to advance. Of
course, itrequires a partner with an image that I believe in. But when this
is the case, I permit myself to think about marage.
Nejib's opinion of the traditional ceremony of mariage has already been
quoted elsewhere - he sees it as a massacre of the gendered personalities
of those involved. On the basis of this view, he refuses to be exposed to a
traditional marriage:
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So, even if I wil have to face a conflict with my family, even if they
reject me, I wil never be engaged to get mared in the traditional way.
(...) I imagine my mariage to be in the municipality, simply because we
need the signature. (...) A simple and rapid mai"riage.
It is evident that Nejib has a rather individual approach to the questions
concerning marriage - an approach he shares with all the academically
trained informants, and an approach that will be a main topic in the
discussion below.
7.3 Trends of change in marriage-concepts among the
informants
Some features stand out as particularly remarkable in the above: Firstly,
there has been a significant rise in the marrage-age for women during the
three generations. In contrast to this, the marriage-age for men has
remained fairly stable during the same period. Secondly, there are distinet
differences in marriage-practices to be found also within the youngest
generation; level of education rather than gender seems to be of
significance for the differences. Each of these features will be discussed in
more detail below.
7.3.1 The women
Timing of marrages
The marrage-stories of the three generations of women informants show
that there has been a significant change in the timing of entranee into the
maried life-course phase. The rise in marage-age furthermore seems to
have been particularly large from the second generation to the third. The
total effect of the rise is considerable; the difference between Aisha Tejer' s
age at marage and that of her grand-daughter Nora is close to fifteen
years.
As we saw in chapter two, this rise in mariage-age for the youngest
generation of women is a nation-wide phenomenon. The introduction of a
legallower age of marrage - seventeen years for girls sine e the sixties -
evidently must have been an effective brake on the practice of early
marriages. Still, the tendency of postponing marriages seems to go further
than the law imposes. In 1988, only four per cent of the Tunisian girls
under twenty were maried (see ch.2). The fact that none of the younger
female informants got maried before they had passed twenty yearS of age,
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correspond with this general tendency. One may thus assume that other
factors than the law of legallower age have influenced the standards for
suitable marage-age for girls during the post-colonial period.
Habiba Tejer states, as quoted above, that before girls got the possibility
to go to school, there was nothing that gave any reason to marr late. There
were no significant preceding life-course phases that could influence the
timing of the marages of the colonial generations of girIs. The
introduction of compulsory school after independence changed this; a new
pre-matrimoniallife-course phase occurred in the lives of the young girIs.
Even though, as we have seen, this phase's actual duration may VarY
significantly, its mere existence could be a factor of relevanee for the
general rise in marriage-age, as it introduces the ide a that there are other
central aspects of the life of a young girl than her coming mariage. The
fact that some girls today continue to study way into their twenties, and
thus mar very late as compared to the previous generations, may also
have contributed to the general postponement of girls' marriages.
The change in standards for suitable marriage-age for girls is thus aresult
of changes in attitudes, as well as changes in girls' objective situation. As
women traditionally act as major mariage-brokers for their children, their
experiences will be important for the practices to which they expose their
daughters. Still, Aisha, for example, had her daughter Habiba mared off
at a similarly young age as her own, even though she herself had negative
experiences with her early marriage. This may be explained by a low
degree of change in the general conditions of existence from her own
generation to her daughter's. Put differently: by the time Habiba got
maried, it was still not socially possible to mary late for girls. As Aisha
explains above, the most attractive girls - the girls from the best regarded
families, who also had a spotless personal reputation - were maried off
early. A late mariage would be a sign that the girl for some reason was in
low demand - a stigma that would do neither the girl personally, nor her
family any good. The social burdens related to a late mariage may thus
have been regarded as heavier than the individual burdens related to an
early mariage. As a result, the practice of early marriages for girls were
reproduced in the next generation.
The introduction of formal education for girls provided a reason to
postpone girls' marriages. It is reasonable to as sum e that the elder WOlnen,
because of their own experiences, have been positive to this possibility to
delay their daughters' marriages. The introduction of formal education may
thus have had an indirect effect on the timing of girIs' marriages in general,
even if many of the girls actually have had quite brief personal contacts
with schooling.
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The direct effect of education on the timing of marriage for girls is,
however, vared. Today, those who continue their studies have their
marages delayed for about five years, as compared to those who leave
school early. There seem to be two separate standards for women's suitable
marrage-age today; one applying to girls with low education, and one
applying to those who continue their studies.
This difference in timing is, however, only one of several aspects of
change in marrage-practices that, according to the marage-stories of my
young female informants, seem to c orre sp ond with level of education:
Perceptions of marrage
For the young women with low education, the difference in timing is
actually the one thing that distinguish their marage-stories most from the
on es of their mothers and grand-mothers. All the se three generations of
women share in central respects a common experience of mariage - both
concernng the actual practices and their general perception of the
institution. True enough, Meriem Tejer got the possibility to object to her
parents' suggestion of husband for her; she did, however, not wish to make
use of it. Their advice weighed so much for her that she felt comfortable
with their choice. Her understanding of her marage as a collective family-
affair to a considerable degree seems to match the mariage-concept of her
parents. The other young woman with low education, Leila Muaddaf, faced
a marage-practice even more similar to the one of the elder women; she
had no influence on her mariage at all.
These young women to a significant extent seem to share both the
marrage-practice and the general concept of marrage with their mothers
and grand-mothers; in some respects they are even more conservative than
their elder fem ale relatives. The understanding of marrage as a collective
family-affair thus seems to be the dominant one both for the elder women
and for the young women without higher education.
Nora and Jalila, the academically trained young women, express radically
different attitudes; both concerning the general perception of mariage, and
preferences for marage-practices. Nora has already chosen her future
husband by herself, and Jalila is expecting to do so; they both find the idea
of being mared as a result of other considerations than love meaningless.
They both reject the idea of celebrating their marrages the traditional way;
Nora seems ready to do so as a compromise, but reluctantly. They distance
themselves quite markedly from the practices of their female relativ es -
a fact that they are highly aware of themselves. They do not deny the
possibility that their sisters and mothers are happy in their marrages, but
cannot imagine themselves being satisfied in a similar situation to theirs -
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they conceive their personal situation as qualitatively different from the
situation of their female relatives.
We also see that Nora has left the traditional passive role of a bride.to-
be, and plays an active part not only in the choice of her husband, but also
in the planning of their marage. She is in a position to do so because of
her higher education: As a working woman, her income is as important for
the preparations of the marage as the one of her future husband. A main
factor deciding the timing of her mariage is exactly her occupationallife;
they cannot mary until they have been appointed teachers in the same
town.
On the basis of the above, one may then conclude that for the young
generation of women informants, level of formal education seems to be a
significant factor for differences both in marrage-preferences and in
mariage-practices. While the young women with low education seem to
share both marriage-conceptions and marriage-practices with their elder
female relatives, the academically trained women to a significant degree
practice, or expect to practice, their mariages in a quite different and more
"individual" way.
7.3.2 The men
Timing of marriages
In contrast to the case of the women, the marage-age for men has,
according to the male informants, changed little during the last three
generations. The normal age for founding a family is today, as before,
between twenty-five and thirty years for men. In the same way as the
timing has remained stable, the factors influencing the timing also seem to
be much the same: A certain economic ability is still a main precondition
for mens' marriages.
The introduction of compulsory school has seemingly had little
significant influence on the men's marriage-situation in general. Mahmoud
Tejer's nephew Mohammed, who himself mared early for his generation
and situation, states that even academic training normally does not change
the timing of marrages today. If anything, higher education tends to
postpone men's marriages, as it will postpone their entranee into the
working-force, and thus delay the point of time when they have generated
enough money to marry. Higher education may change the way in which
men earn money, but not the fact that they should do so before getting
mared. Still, Mohammed's marage illustrates that it is possible to deviate
from this rule, as it also illustrates that such a deviation may be difficult to
practice, because of resistanee from the families involved.
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Generally , the male informants of all generations report to be more
satisfied with the timing of their marages than the fem ale informants. The
fact that the men have been considerably much older than the women when
they got maried, as well as the fact that they seem to have had more
influence on their marrages, may be of significance for their greater
satisfaction. Still, the elder informants' personal influence on their getting
marred was limited. An individual approach to choosing a wife seems to
have been practically impossible in their time; the strict gender-segregation
of the community made the assistance of female relatives required.
Perceptions of marrage
Even if the men generally seem to have had some more personal influence
on their mariages, most of them still share both marrage-practice and
general conception of marriage with the majority of the women: Mariage
is to them a desired phase in life rather than a personal relationship based
on romantic love. It is basically a collective family-related project; the
family has played an important part both in the marrage-arrangement of
most of the men, and in their married life. As in the case of the fem ale
informants, this concept of mariage exists in all three generations; Lassad,
the young man without higher education clearly has an understanding of
marage closer to the one of the elder men than to the one of his educated
age-group. Also for men it is the level of education rather than the age that
is decisive for the way in which marage is conceived.
Like the young, educated women, the young, academically trained men
express views on mariage that are markedly deviant from the ones of their
male relatives. Their deviant views are reflected in their actual marage-
practices: Mohammed chose his wife by himself, and out of love, and he
mared before he was, according to traditional standards, economically
prepared for it. He also resisted the objections of the involved families, and
he seems to regard it as his right to do this. Correspondingly, the two
Muaddaf-boys have refrained from mary ing at a conventionally right age,
because they have not yet met the right girL. In all cases, love - the
presenee of it, or the absenee of it - is a decisive factor for their
deviations from the traditional marriage-practices. None of them can
imagine adapting to the traditional concept of marriage. As the girls with
higher education, they do not deny the possibility that their lowly educated
relatives are content with their marriages; they do, however, clearly not
identify with their situation. Mohammed's way of dividing his age-group
according to level of education illustrates his experienced distance towards
those with less education than himself: Most of the Tunisian boys are not
capable of making a nice choice of partner, he states; unlike cultivated boys
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like himself, they may therefore be better off with the advices of theirparents than on their own. ,
Also for the young men the length of education seems to be an
influential factor both for their conception of marrage, and their actual
marage-practices. It is clear that the educated men have a more
individualized approach to the topic - to the extent that they tend to
regard acting in opposition to the opinion of their family a normal thing to
do. The role they giv e their families in their marage-planning is thus the
opposite of the traditional one, that is characterized by cooperation within
the family-group.
Education - both the introduction of compulsory school in general, and
academic training in particular - has however, had a less fundamental
influence on the young men's marage-practice than on the marage-
practices of the young women, as it has altered neither the timing, nor the
factors influencing the timing of men's marages in any significant way.
Today, like three generations ago, a certain economic ability is the main
precondition for the men's mariages.
We see that it is primarily the young, highly educated Beldiyins who prefer
the recent individualized ways of marage both as life-course event, and
as life-course phase as described in the previous section.
It seems as if the possibility to practice these new ways is experienced
as essential to them, and that they personally distance themselves from the
traditional marage-practices to a considerable extent. Both the young men
and women with an academictraining seem to regard their conditions of
existence as qualitatively very different from those of their relatives. It is
clear that they see their higher education as the main reason for the
qualitative difference in their lives.
These young academically trained people approach the topic of mariage
and marred life in a rather different way from the others. While the
informants with low education give an impression ofbeing in harmony with
their social surroundings - to the degree that the fact that it is Hnormal"
is the best argument in favour of a practice. The young academically
trained informants, by contrast, seem to evaluate and negotiate their
personal preferences in relation to the social restrctions on their freedom
to act, as a natural strategy to the task of creating both a socially realizable
and individually acceptable life for themselves. Concerning marage, most
of them come out with similar minimum demands: They refuse to enter a
relationship based on other principles than love, they demand to choose
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their parner on their own, and they want to get mared in the simplest way
possible.
Even though both the ideal preferences and the minimum demands of
young educated men and women are much the same, the two genders seem
to have somewhat different experiences concerning the possibilities of
realizing them - the sociallimitations they have to relate to are evidently
not quite the same:
The academically trained men tend to express themselves more
categorically about these things than the women ~ "even if they reject me,
I will never be engaged to get maried in the traditional way", states Nejib
Muaddaf. The men generally seem to be quite determined to act on their
own will. Mohammed, the maried academically trained man, went very
mue h against his family's wishes when he got mared - both in his
choice of wife, and in his timing and celebration of their union. In short,
the men seem to regard the right to do as they please in these matters as
more self-evident than do the women:
Nora is in a position to choose her own husband. She does, however,
recognize that her case in many ways is exceptional: "it is rare. I am
lucky". She also seems ready to compromise on her celebration of marriage
- she is aware of her parents' opinion, and will, if necessar, respect it:
"They take into consideration people. What will people say? Why is she
doing like that, why is she marying like that?" She does not seem to take
people' s opinion personall y into consideration; it is important to her family,
not to her. Still, she is ready to do what is necessary in order to please
"people", for the sake of her family.
If we relate these gendered differences in possibilities of realizing
personal marriage-preferences to the discussion of the principles of honour
and shame in chapter three, they appear as reflections of the traditional
gendered perceptions of members of a group - the family , or the local
community. According to the traditional principles of North-African social
organization, a woman's sexual modest y is one of her main contributions
to her family's honour, and thus its reputation. Her passivity in relation to
male "others" is another main female contribution to the collective family-
honour. The marrage is the most sexualized social institution existing. Any
dubiousness in a woman's performance of the socially required rituals for
entering this institution will be of gre at danger to her family's honour. A
considerable pressure towards conformity from the family of a girl who
wants to get married in an unconventional way must be expected.
The men's traditional honour-preserving behaviour is, by contrast,
characterized by active relations with "others", and agenerally challenging
and conquering kind of performance. A love-relationship will be potentially
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morally bad mainly for the involved woman and her family . In addition, the
traditionally active role of men, in family-relations, as well as in relations
with "others", justifies a man's determination of realizing his own plans,
while the passive role of women makes a similar determination illegitimate.
An academically trained woman will be more dependent of the permission
of her family-group to behave in an unconventional manner. For both
genders, however, the traditional gender-roles constitute the outer limits of
their possible un-traditional marage-practices.
The influence of traditional principles is evident also in the timing of the
marages of the academically trained informants. The men express an
overall relaxed attitude towards getting mared: "it arves when it arives",
says Tarek Muaddaf. The men's age as such does not seem to be of
relevanee to these matters. Nora, by contrast, is highly aWare of the fact
that "a girl who is twenty-five, and not yet maried, is a big problem".
Hence higher education do es not seem to replace youth as a female asset
on the marage-market. It provides a postponement, sets a new standard for
when a girl is "old", but does not change the fact that she eventually will
be so. The young educated women still have to relate to socially set time-
limits concerning suitable marage-age, while the educated men - like all
men - seems to be evaluated mainly according to their material situation;
they are not "devaluated" as a res ult of age. Again, we see the framework
of traditional principles constitute the social limits for the possible un-
traditional practices.
Academically trained young people tend to mary each other. Seen
against the background of the differences in their ideas of marriage as
compared to the ideas of the young people without higher education, this
is hardly very surprising. The academically trained people of ten meet their
future partners as students at the university - which is also not very
surprising. These practices have, however, implications that may turn out
to be quite problematie in relation to the families involved, as they actually
challenge a number of traditional principles of social organization:
The "student-couples" often originate from different are as in Tunisia.
Marrages across such geographical distances is a quite new phenomenon;
according to Mahmoud Tejer, Beldiyins hardly travelled a distance of
eleven kilometres in their lifetime when he was young, and they certainly
did not marr that far away from Bled. This reported low geographical
mobility corresponds with the general principles of traditional North-
African social organization discussed in chapter three: The local community
constituted both the relevant social universe to its members, and one of
their significant relative "us'es".
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Mohammed' s description of his marrage-negotiations suggests that these
principles have significant impact on the elder Beldiyins' ways of
understanding unions of marrage: The fact that his fiancée was not a
Beldiyin girl was actually the main objection of his family to ms mariage-
plans. In the same way, he was not wanted as a son-in-law by the family
of his fiancée because he was not a Sfaxian like them. In their case, the
problem was overcome; still, as he says, "to combine your family with a
family from Sfax - that takes time".
We see that the academically trained people's marage-practices break
with central traditional principles. The conception of mariage as a union
of families is not applicable to a situation where the families belong to
different social universes. The "student-mariages" not only require that the
involved families accept to have no influence on the choice of a new
family-member; they also require that people who all their lives have been
relating to others on the basis of their family-affiliation, accept as new
members of their family individuals who appear on the social arena alone,
without any identifying family-affiliations, and thus without any social
identity or value in their universe. In Mohammed's, and also in Nora's
case, the families have accepted the situation. But as Nora states, she is
lucky; a lot of her friends have different experiences with their attempts of
practising individualized mariages within a traditional social context.
We see that the traditional principles for social organization,
characterized by group-related and gender-dependent definitions of accepted
procedures, still constitute the ultimate limiting framework around the
possible mariage-practices for the young people who, as a result of their
academic training, have developed preferences that diverge from the
traditional principles. We also see that their preferences are characterized
by a profoundly more individualized approach to mariage both as life-
course phase and as life-course event. The principal guardians of this
limiting framework are the families of which the young people are
members; their possibility of realizing their individualized ideals will
depend on the good will of their traditionally most significant group whose
influence on their liv es they seek to diminish. This situation will, as argued
above, be particularly relevant for the women. The story of the young
Muaddaf-sisters illustrates to which degree this may be the case:
Leila Muaddaf had no influence on any aspect of her mariage. Her
family decided whom she should mar, and the considerations behind the
choice indicate a fundamentally traditional approach to the task from the
part of her family: "They chose my husband, because he is a Muaddaf. The
other one did not have our name." The timing of her mariage was also
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decided by others; she was engaged when she was eighteen, and maried
when she was twenty-two.
Her younger sister Jalila is twenty-three; she is a student, unattached to
any man, and has no plans of getting engaged in a relationship for some
time yet. Her family has given her permission to study; a possibility they
denied Leila, because she was engaged to get mared to the man they
chose for her. The two sisters live in different realities today; because of
Jalila's education, they will probably do so for the rest of their lives. Leila
lives her life in an environment characterized by traditional conditions of
existence as a result of her family's decision; her sister leads a "modern"
student-life, and will probably as a result later lead a "modern" adult life,
because her family has decided to allow her to do so. Hence her
individualized life-style is preconditioned by the will of her traditionally
defined superiors - her family. In line with the traditional dependency of
a girl on her family, the two sisters have had to accept the lives they were
given. As it happened, they turne d out to be quite different.
Once the young informants have become students, the demands directed
towards them concerning adaption to the traditional marriage-practices seem
to change, as compared to the demands directed towards those without
higher education. Their families seem to acknowledge that a change takes
place in their lives paralleI with their academical training; they seem to
enter a new social category. The young educated informants themselves
seem to be highly aware of their intermediate situation; on the one hand
they defend what they reg ard as their minimum rights of individual choice,
on the other hand, they accept that there are sociallimits they cannot cross.
They are in a situation of constant negotiation; their aim is to be able to
unite their individual ideals and their familial and social obligations in a
practice that is acceptable to all involved parties.
More than their individualized ideals of marriage, the ability to negotiate
a social situation where these ideals can be realized indicates that these
young people possess a distinet conception of themselves as autonomous
individuals. Or, put differently: A sense of individual identity will be a
precondition for the ability to manoeuvre in to a social situation that
provides room for an individual identity.
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8. Children
I like ~ we all like ~ children, because ~ before, they said that women
should have children to guarantee that their husbands did not divorce them
(Aisha, lst.gen. Tejer).
I can not imagine a life without children. Because of ane reason: I love
children very much. That is why. I wantto have children (Nora, 3rd.gen.
Tejer).
Child-births as a consequence of an organized union of woman and man are
probably one of the most universal characteristics of human societies. The
connection between mariage and children has until quite recently been
strong in Tunisia - both physically, as effective means of controlling the
number of children have become available only lately, and also mentally ,
as the founding of a family has been the main objective of the union of
marrage. Significant changes have taken place both in attitudes and in
practice concerning child-births over the three generations, though. This
section will deal with these changes in more detaiL.
8.1 Number of pregnancies, and means of IImiting them
8.1.1 The two eldest generations
Fatoma, the Muaddaf grand-mother, had her first baby one year after she
got married. The children continued to come; sometimes she had a pause
of three months after a birth before she got pregnant again, sometimes eight
months. Ten of the children she had grew up, five of them died. She was
lucky to keep such a large number; her mother gave birth to twenty, but
only eight of them survived. All women had such numbers of children at
that time:
We did not know any kind of planning but the traditional anes, and they
were not efficient. Sometimes I used them, but I got pregnant. I wanted
to plan, and to have a limited number of children, because my husband
was a farmer, and I worked hard in the house. Moreover, I was young and
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thin. But I could not, there was no possibilty. All women had children
until they stopped naturally.
Because she was too young to conceive when she married, Aisha, the Tejer
grand-mother, did not have her first son until two yearS after her marage.
It was, however, normal to get pregnant right after the marage for those
who were physically able, she says. The only means of controlling the
number of children that she knew of, was breast-feeding - and that was
not a very reliable method. In the end, she had only five children left,
though; a small num ber compared to the average of her generation.
The mother of Mustfa, the eldest Falleah, had sixteen children, but eleven
of them died. He himself has six sons and two daughters still alive; a rather
large number for his generation. He and his wire had to wait two years
before they had their first son:
We did not want to wait two years to have a child. It was from God. Sa
it was not normal at that time.
After this first birth, God continued to be the only one in control of the
fertility of Mustfa's wife.
B y the time Aisha' s daughter Habiba got maried, few changes had taken
place. She had her first child about one year after the mariage:
It was normal. Directly after the mariage we should have a baby. They
did not care if for example the wife was young, and could not have a
baby at that age. Many of the girls died when having their first baby. I
had big problems myself. Ipassed two days in labour - and after that I
had my first daughter.
To Habiba Tejer and her husband Mahmoud, breast-feeding was the only
means of limiting the number of children. The result has in their case been
six girls and a boy who survived, and two boys and three girls "in the
graveyard". "Every year we had a child", says Mahmoud, and laughs. They
tried to limit the number, but were not very successful, as the means were
so inefficient.
Fatoma's daughter Fatheia had a unique opportunity right from the start
of her mariage: The doctor gave her "medicine from France" that made her
able to choose when she wanted her children. But, she stresses, this was not
at all normal at that time. First she and her husband decided to have two,
and after that, another one. J alila, the youngest child, was not planned.
Practising family-planning at that time was not easy:
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All my relatives, and my mother-in-law said to me: How? It is impossible,
how, it is few, four children are not sufficient at all. But Tahar and I
insisted. We wanted only four children, to have them well brought up, and
well educated, and able to live in a good situation. That is better than to
have many children.
Fatheia's access to contraceptives was indeed exceptional; when Hassan,
Mustfa's son, got mared more than ten years later than her, he and his
wife were still without any reliable way of con trolling the number of
children. They first had a son one year after the marage; he died. Later,
they had six children who grew up.
Little change in the general conditions for child-bearing took place
between the first and the second generation; even if the mortality of
children seems to have been slightly reduced, it still has been considerable
for both generations. The women of both generations had their children at
home, aided by midwives without any formal training. These generations
of women were generally unable to control their fertility; the case of
Fatheia must be regarded as exceptional, particularly when we see that even
Hassan and his wife were unable to make use of modern contraceptives,
more than ten years after Fatheia starte d using them.
8.1.2 The young generation
As Meriem and Leila are the only young women who are married, they are
also the only young women who are mothers. Meriem, the daughter of
Habiba and Mahmoud, has four children today; her first son was born nine
months after the marrage:
It is normal. Especially for non-educated girls. Directly after the marage
they should have children.
After the first birh, she has, however, been planning the number of
children, and the spacing between them - by using an IUD, still by far the
most used kind of contraceptive in Tunisia.
Leila Muaddaf did not want a child right after the marrage. She found
herself unable to realize her wish, though:
Before, I planned to wait one year before getting pregnant. But people-
especially because - my brother-in-Iaw got mared one month before us,
and his wife got pregnant at once. So people said: Why not you? Can you
not have children? So I was obliged to get pregnant.
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Today, Leila has two girIs. Even though she had a bad start concerning
family-planning, she is now practising it successfully.
Neither Meriem nor Leila have lost any children, and while their mothers
and grand-mothers had their children at home, they have given birth at the
hospitaL.
Mohammed and Lassad, Meriem Tejer's cousins, are the only fathers of
the last generation, for evident reasons. Lassad has one son - he was born
exactly one year after the marage. Having a child the first year is still
very normal, according to Lassad. He wants another child - preferably a
girl - but not yet. Two children are enough, because
first of all, many children are tiring for the mother, and for the father, too.
And also, it is better to get two, and make the m live in a good situation,
than to have five, for example, and live in a bad situation.
Mohammed, Lassads elder brother, also wants only two children. He
already has one son, and the next is on the way. They waited three yearS
after the marriage before they had the first one; he will be three years old
when he gets a brother or sister. Both Mohammed and Lassad plan their
families actively, and consider it a natural thing to do.
We see that while the two eldest generations of informants to a large
extent have been unable to control their number of children and the timing
of them, the informants of the third generation have access to effective
contraceptives, and fin d it natural to use them. The mortality of children
has furthermore decreased drastically for the third generation, a fact that
places them in a situation where they are able to go through few
pregnancies, and where they can rely on the plausibility that the children
they bear will survive. This is indeed a dìfferent situation as compared to
that of their parents and grand-parents.
8.2 Attitudes towards reproduction
8.2.1 The two eldest generatìons
There is one thing all the informants of the two eldest generations agree on:
Having children is one of the main objectives of an adult person's life. All
these informants are parents themselves, and they all would have
experienced a lìfe without children as meaningless.
They also agree on that they have had too many children. The only one
being reasonably content with her number of children, is Fatheia Muaddaf.
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She is also the only one who has been able to control the number of her
pregnancies. All the others report a wish to have had the same possibility
as her.
We see that, on the one hand, the elder informants cannot imagine a life
without children. They also tend to have an understanding of marrage and
children as more or less interlinked, as is evident from Mahmoud Tejer' s
way of expressing himself about mariage: "Mariage is important, so that
the population grows." Paricipation in the human reproduction seems to be
understood as a self-evident and necessary task.
On the other hand - with the exception of Fatheia, they find that their
personal participation in this task has been too pervasive. They are unhappy
with the large number of children they have brought into the world. The
more exact considerations behind this view, however, vary:
To Fatoma, the eldest Muaddaf, a fundamental reason to have children
is to produee inheritors who will continue the family and the property. The
security in her old age is, however, important to her. But four children are
sufficient - in contrast to the ten surviving children she had herself. She
finds that young people today have too few children, as a result of wrong
priorities:
Because of the difficulties of life, and the high prizes. And in addition,
people now want to travel, to entertain themselves, to wear nke clothes,
to buy a car, to build houses. They imItate each other, and give
importance to image.
According to Aisha, the Tejer grand-mother, child-bearing used to be a
necessity for women in order to keep their husbands. She does, like the
others, report that sterility used to be a common reason for divorce - for
men. Another solution practised until it was abolished after independence,
was that the man mared another woman if he could not have children with
the first one:
What could we do about it? It was not good, especially if the husband
kept his first wife, and got maried to another one. That was really
terrible.
The women, on the other hand, tended to accept the situation if their
husbands were unable to give them children. Divorce is no solution to
women, as it is to men, according to Aisha: "Because men can get married
to another, and even socially ..."
Mustfa Falleah points out a practical problem related to this:
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The problem before was that there were no doetors and health-care. So
sometimes the men divorced their wives, and mared again, to find that
they could not have children in the new marage, either. There was no
way of finding out whose fault it was. But the women said nothing, and
stayed with their husbands, without having children. I think that a woman
should also divorce a sterile husband, in order to have a family.
Few share this view with Mustfa, and no-one else puts it as categorically
as him. Most of the others think that a sterile couple should stay together;
it is God's will, and nobody's fault. In some cases it might create
insolvable problems, though; in such situations divorce is the better
solution.
In Mustfa's opinion, the possibility of family-planning is a sig n of
progress. He has eight children himself, but finds that two or three children
are enough, paricularly these days, when everything is so expensive.
Aisha's daughter Habiba and her husband Mahmoud share the same view
on these things; they both wish that they had the possibility to have less
children, mainly because they could not really afford to provide properly
for the ones they have. It is better to have few children and give them all
what they need. In addition, Habiba thinks about the health of the mother;
having a lot of children is not good for a woman, it wearS her out, and
makes her less capable of bringing them up properly.
Children are important to Habiba, though. Like Fatoma, she is concerned
with her old age; the children are her security, and this is essential to her.
Fatoma' s daughter Fatheia shares the concern of her mother and Habiba;
her children will take care of her when she grows old. Still, even with only
four children, she actually finds that she had too many; three children are
the ideal number to her. She is very content that her married daughter Leila
practices family-planning, but thinks that she should have one baby more;
two are not enough.
As the youngest of the eldest, Mustfa's son Hassan is somewhat
surprisingly conservative in these matters: He is happy with his six
children, and thinks that
planning, and getting less children, is good - but only for poor people,
and those who are economically in the middle. But those who can afford
a large num ber of children, why not? They should have many children.
While the elder women generally see the children-as-providers-aspect as an
important reason to have children, none of the men mention it. They tend
to find the continuity of property and family to be essential in this
connection; they seem to regard their reproduction as some kind of social
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obligation. The ideal number of children is for all the elder informants
lower than the number of living children they have had themselves. The
exact number vares somewhat, but seems to be around three or four. This
opinion is shared with the youngest women without education:
8.2.2 The young generation
Meriem, the daughter of Habiba and Mahmoud, has four children:
I do not want to have more. That is sufficient. My husband wants more,
but this is enough. I get tired like this.
Leila Muaddaf also finds four to be the ideal number. Still, she will not
have that many children herself - she is satisfied with her two daughters:
I decided to have that number because the children tae all my time. And
I feel that I am already growing old because of the children. So I want to
take care of myself, not spend all my time with the children, and doing
housework. I want to stop to take care of myself.
Still, hav ing children is important to her:
I think that it is very important to have children, especially because I am
the kind of person who gets tired quickly, so I need someone to talk to.
In the morning I have the housework and all that, but in the afternoon I
have nothing to do. So I need a child to speak with - like that I feel that
I have something to do.
Here, we see Leila contradicting herself: She wants only two children in
order to have some time to herself; at the same time she finds children
important in order to have something to occupy her time with. This is
perhaps not SO strange as it seems; she is probably thinking about two kinds
of life here - her li fe as a housewife, and her life as a working woman.
She has tried both; I will return to this problem of hers later.
Nora, Meriem's unmaried sister, does not plan to have more than two
children. This is because of economic considerations, and because of her
health, and also, she admits, because of her job. Anyway, she will wait at
least three years after her mariage before she gets pregnant "Because we
have other things to do ..." Why does she want children at all, then?
I cannot imagine a life without children. Because of one reason: I love
children very much. That is why. I want to have children.
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If Jalila, Fatheia's youngest daughter, gets married, she will have one, or
possibly two children only:
I choose this number because with few children the mother can bring her
children up better than with three or four. She has time to educate them,
to bring them up better than with many children. (...) less children mean
less problems, and less expenses.
Nora's cousin Lassad shares the view of the elder men concerning the
purpose of getting children: "It is good to have children, so that my name
continues to live, and does not die with me." Ris brother Mohammed's
view differs considerably from his brother's; he fiods children to be a good
thing because they enrich the family life, and makes the every-day life
more pleasant.
Fatheia's eldest son Tarek is rather reluctant towards the idea of getting
children; still, he may have one, or maximum two:
Because life is expensive. And the education is expensive, because we
should educate our children very well. And I think that it is a
responsibilty. And I think - another thing - because normally, if it
depends on me, perhaps I wil never have any children at alL. (..) Because
perhaps they wil - after, in the future, they wil say, perhaps, "Why?
Why was I bom?" Perhaps they wil blame us, their parents. Perhaps. (..)
Because of the world-situation, and religion, and God, and - etcetera.
Many problems.
Tarek's doubts about having children are shared by his brother Nejib. Re
claims other reasons for his attitude, though:
I frankly do not like children. Perhaps the reason is the nature of my job.
I am a primary-school teacher - I usually frequent children from the
vilage I work in, children who are unfortunate,dirty, impolite, vulgar-
future gangsters. In addition I think that I do not like children because I
personally reject my childhood, that marked me a lot. (...) But, I think that
I wil have two. A girl and a boy - like that it wil be balanced. But of
course, it is not certain.
The young, uneducated girls seem to share their parents' ideal concerning
number of children - at least in theory. Lassad, on the other hand, shares
the elders' idea of the purpose of children, while he prefers to have less of
them. In general, the young people without higher education seem to have
much of the same conception of family and children as the previous
generations.
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The educated young people, by contrast, report a rather divergent attitude
towards their own reproduction. They tend to see children as less of a
necessity, and seem to have considered the possibility of not having any as
a realistie alternative to becoming parents.
8.3 Trends of change in reproductivity
Two features stand out as particularly remarkable in the above: Firstly, the
change in ability to control one's fertil it y that has taken place from the two
eldest generations to the last, and secondly, the difference in the way this
ability is practised among the informants of the third generation.
Possibilities of family-planning
The informants of the two eldest generations report to have had little
opportunity to control their fertility, as there were no effective kinds of
contraceptives available to them. Fatheia Muaddaf, who got "medicine from
France" , is the only exception to this rule.
Even if, as we saw in chapter two, family-planning programmes from the
beginning were a main priority for the post-colonial regime, the early
effects of the programs were moderate. By 1968, only 3.6 per cent of the
married, fertile Tunisian women practised contraception. The situation of
most of the elder informants is representative for the general situation in
Tunisia at that time. Fatheia's "medicine from France" was indeed a rare
possibility when she started using it in the late fifties - not only in Bled,
but all over the country.
As a result of the lack of means of controlling the number of children,
most of the women of the two eldest generations have been through a
tremendous number of pregnancies. This tendency was further increased by
their early marriages; as we saw in the previous section, the timing of these
women' s marriages to a considerable degree corresponded with the start of
their fertil e life-course phase. As a consequence, these women have been
through close to as many pregnancies as are physically possible.
The high mortality of children reduced the number of children actually
surviving - with more than a half, in some cases. Still, it is evident that
the total effects of these women's reproductive situation - constant
pregnancies, the care of the surviving children, and the loss of those dying
- must have resulted in a situation where their reproductive role has taken
the better part of their time and energy throughout their adult lives.
As reported in chapter two, the child-mortality rates dropped markedly
during the late sixties. At that time, the women of the sec ond generation
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were approaching the end of their reproductive period; these changes had
little impact on their reproductive situation.
By the time the children of these women got maried, remarkable
changes in the objective structures conceming reproductivity had taken
place, however. First of aU, effective means of contraception had been
made available to those who wanted to make use of them. Secondly, the
child-mortality had decreased to an extent that made it irrelevant for the
decision of how many children to have. Together, these two factors have
pro due ed a situation where couples today are able to plan their families
quite well, if they want to.
As we saw in chapter two, the number of women who actually make use
of the available contraceptives have also risen remarkably since the late
sixties: By the end of the eighties, half of the maried, fertile Tunisian
women practised some kind of contraception. This indicates a change also
in the cognitive and motivating strctures concerning reproductivity during
this period.
The increase in the practice of contraception among the informants is
even more remarkable; all the maried i nformants of the youngest
generation plan their families actively, and those who are not yet married,
expect to do so. The ways in which they practice family-planning, however,
vary significantly. The variation corresponds with their level of education:
Ways of practicing family-planning
The marred young informants with low education all had a child within the
first year of their mariages. According to Meriem Tejer, this is very
common, "especially for the non-educated girls". As we have seen, Leila
Muaddaf tri ed to break with this pattern, but the pressure from the
surroundings was too strong; she had to give in and become pregnant soon
after her mariage.
To the elder informants, it seems to have been important to have the first
child as soon as possible after their marriages. They report to have tried to
limit the number of children in general, but none of them attempted to
postpone the birth of the first child, even though, according to Habiba,
there was a considerable risk involved in the first pregnancy, as a result of
the mothers' low age.
The birth of the first child seems to have been of some particular
importance, both for the elder generations, and for those of the young
generation who have liule education. There may be several reasons for this.
Mahmoud expresses a common view on the nature of mariage when he
states that "mariage is important, so that the population grows". There
seems to be general agreement between these informants that physical
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reproductivity is a main purpose of mariage. There may have been HUle
reason to postpone the fulfilling of this main purpose.
There is, however, probably more to this than a general wish to
reproduce oneself. As discussed in chapter three, it has, according to the
principles of the traditional North-Afrcan social organization, been the
birth of the first child rather than the ceremony of mariage that has
consolidated the young wife's position in her family-in-law. The first child
has secured the woman's mared status. Aisha confirms the relevanee of
this point when she states that "before, they said that women should have
children to guarantee that their husbands did not divorce them". This
emphasizes the importanee of women's traditional role as physical
reproducers discussed in chapter three. The birth of the first child is a
confirmation of a wife's reproductive ability, and of her value as a maried
woman. The fact that women's presumed infertility is reported to have been
a common reason for divorce in the generations of the elder informants,
further supports this argument.
As we saw in the previous section, the young informants with low
education both got maried, and practice their mared life in accordance
with traditions. Accordingly, the young women hold positions as traditional
housewives in their marriages. There is no evident reason why their role as
reproducers should have lost its relevanee ~ both to themselves, and to the
surroundings. Proving one's reproductive ability at an early stage in the
marage may still be of importanee for these young women. Leila
Muaddaf' s story about how she was unable to postpone her first pregnancy
confirms this argument: "So people said: Why not you? Can you not have
children? So I was obliged to get pregnant."
None of the academicaiiY trained informants seem to fe el personally
concerned by the custom of having a child as soon as possible after
mariage: Mohammed and his wife waited three years after their mariage
before they had their first child. Nora, his cousin, is planning to wait at
least as long as them, "because we have other things to do ...". This seems
to imply two things. First of all, the academically trained young people tend
to be socially able to postpone the birth of their first child; compared to
Leila, they seem to be exposed to less social pressure. Secondly, they are
evidently interested in making use of this opp ortuni t y; unlike most of the
other young informants, they seem to fin d the postponement of the first
child to be of significant value. Y oung people - and particularly young
women - with higher education are perceived differently by the social
surroundings than the young people without higher education - they are
not required to prove their reproductive abilities in the same way. The
young academically trained informants perceive themselves differently from
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the other informants of the third generation - their reproductive role seems
to hold a less dominant position in their lives.
After having the first child, the young informants with low education
plan the number and timing of the following child-births. They do,
however, want more children than their academically trained relatives. They
tend to find three to four children to be the ideal number, an opinion they
share with their parents and grand-parents. The main reasons reported for
not hav ing more children also corresponds with those given by the elder
informants, and relate to economy and the mother' s health.
The same reasons for limiting the number of children are also given by
the academically trained young informants. Their preferred number of
children is, however, only one or two. This may indicate that they have
other and higher standards for the necessary economic means that are
required in order to provide for a child in a proper way; the fact that their
consideration for the well-being of the mother includes her professional
career, may also account for their lower ideal number of children.
As remarkable as the differences in preferred numbers of children,
however, is the different way in which the educated informants reflect on
having children. First of all, they tend to relate both the question of having
children at all, and the question of when to have them, more directly to
other aspects of personallong-term plans for the future. In addition, more
philosophical ways of treating the topic seem to be relevant for at least
some of them: Tarek Muaddaf, for instance, seriously considers his right
to bring children into the world. This stands in shar contrast to Lassad, the
young male informant with low education who wants to have children who
can carry on his name.
The post-colonial changes in objective. structures relevant to the human
reproduction have put the third generation of informants in a situation
where they are able to control their fertil it y from the beginning of marage.
The ways in which they make practical use of this ability, however, VarY
significantly, and in correspondence with their level of education.
The possibility of the lowly educated young informants to practice what
one may call the "traditional ideal reproductive life" implies a number of
central changes in their married life-course phase, as compared to the one
of the elder informants. The reproductive phase of the young women take
markedly less time and energy than the one of the elder female informants:
First of all, the later mariages of the young generation postpone the start
of their reproductive phase significantly. Secondly, the lower number of
children leads to an earlier end of their reproductive phase. And thirdly, the
fact that they loose fewer children on the way, and in general go through
fewer pregnancies, makes the reproductive phase less intense. One may
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expect that this change in the "traditional" reproductive pattern has led to
a considerable shift in time-use, and in the way in which the role of a
"traditional" wife and mother is performed today. This may in turn lead to
a change in the general perceptions of wife and mother over time.
No fundamental changes in the traditional perceptions of married women
seem to have taken place yet, however. The way Leila Muaddaf sees her
life shows that for a maried woman in a traditional social setting, children
are still a necessity. Without them, she would have nothing to do she says.
Her days would have been empty. There does not seem to be any role
available to these women that could replace the reproductive one - if they
are not mothers, they can not be anything else. The traditional idea of a
maried woman seems to be unchanged - the way in which the idea is
practised has evidently been through a change during the post-colonial
period, however.
The academically trained married women have "other things to do" than
having children. They are allowed to do these "other things" by their social
surroundings; the pressure on them to prove their reproductive abilities
seems to be weaker than on their lowly educated contemporaries. They are
conceived of in another way by their families and social surroundings.
It is even clearer that the young educated informants also conceive of
themselves as different from the others. They have, as a result of their
education, other essential purposes in life than having children. They also
reflect on reproduction in a more "individual" way than the others: Nora
wants to become a mother because she loves children, while Nejib is
reluctant towards becoming a father because he do es not like children.
Compared to the considerations of the lowly educated young informants,
who want children because it is necessary and normal, or because they want
their name to survive, the reflections of the academically trained young
informants are remarkable, and suggest that they understand their
reproductivity in a quite different way from the traditional one.
Certain post-colonial structural changes - the decrease in child-mortality,
and the introduction of contraceptives - have resulted in a situation where
people today are able to plan their reproductivity. It does, however, seem
as if it is other post -colonial structural changes - the introduction of
higher education - that influence the way in which the young people want
to practice their reproductivity, and the way in which they are expected to
practice it by the social surroundings. Concerning children, higher education
seems to lead to a more individualized approach, a tendency that in turn
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may be seen as an indicator of the existence of an individualized sense of
identity among those who have such an education. On the other hand, the
lack of higher education seems to correspond to a more family-directed and
collective way of perceiving one's physical reproduction, and to, one may
assume, a more family-directed and collective way of perceiving oneself.
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9. Education
The topic of education and its impact on the lives of the Beldiyins has
already been introduced. We have seen that the level of education vares
considerably among the informants, and that higher education particularly
tends to have an effect on several other central aspects of the lives of those
who have obtained it. This section will examine changes related to the
introduction of compulsory school after the independence, and the
informants' personal experiences with these changes.
As we saw in chapter two, access to formal education was practically
non-existent for most Tunisians before the independence. The kutteb
(koranic school) was the only instItution of education available for the vast
majority of the population. In theory, this system of education could lead
all the way to the Zitouna University in Tunis; most people were only
briefly in contact with the kutteb, however. As we shall see, this was an
educational alternative that in practice, if not in theory, was offered to the
male part of the population only.
The kutteb may be characterized as a semi-formal system of education;
it was not compulsory, and the studies were not following a standard time-
frame. Each pupil stayed as long as desired by his family , and followed his
own pace in the studies.
The introduction of compulsory school13 for both boys and girls shortly
after the independence constituted a major change in post -colonial Tunisia.
We shall now see how significant this change has been for the lives of the
Beldiyin informants:
13 The present Tunisian educational system is in most respects similar to the French. All
children spend six years in primary schooL. (Before, children could be expelled also from
primary school, as the case of Meriem ilustrates. This rule was changed in the early
1980's.) There are two kinds ofsecondary education: Three years ofprofessional training
for those who do not qualify for theoretical secondary education, that lasts for seven
years. Of these seven years, the foUT last are specialized. Theoretical secondary school
is completed by Examen Baccalaureate, that qualifies for university-studies. These may
be of either two, foUT, or six years' duration.
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9.1 The two eldest generations of informants
There is no woman of my age in Bled who has gone to school (Fatoma,
1 st.gen. Muaddaf.
I thought about that (I wanted to go to school). Especially since the
Kutteb was near our house, so I saw the boys going ... But at that time
girls could not go to the Kutteb (Rabiba, 2nd. gen. Tejer).
My father tried to make roe go to the Kutteb, but I refused. I preferred to
go with the cows (Mahmoud, 2nd.gen. Tejer).
9.1.1 Level of education
None of the women of the two eldest generations have ever had any formal
education. As the quote of Fatoma, the Muaddaf grand-mother, shows, this
was the normal situation for all the women of her age. According to
Habiba, Aisha's daughter, this was also the case for her generation of
Beldiyin-girls. Fatheia, the daughter of Fatoma, was in brief contact with
the kutteb, but had to stop. She gives the following explanation of why she
could not go to school:
I never went to school, because of my grandfather - he was very severe.
Re could not imagine that a girl could go to schooL. For him, a girl who
went out was a bad girl, a girl who went out, was not good. And all
people would see her - so it was not good.
The women all report to have wanted an education already when they were
young:
I thought about that. Especially since the kutteb was near OUT house, so
I saw the boys going ... But at that time girls could not go to the kutteb
says Habiba Tejer. Fatheia felt the same way; she did, however, find away
to learn at least something:
I like d very much to go to school, especially since I was elever. But at
that time girls could not make decisions for themselves. When my
brothers came back from school, I used to do mathematics with them, and
usually I was right - I did the calculations in my head, and usually I was
right.
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Her mother, Fatoma, tried the same thing; she asked her brother to teach
her to write, but she never succeeded in learning it. She reports that her
only formal education is some surats from the Koran, enough to enable her
to pray. Aisha, Habiba's mother, is in the same situation.
Fatheia attended kutteb for a short period; form all y , it was open to girls.
She had to stop, however, because her attendanee was found morally
reprehensible. None of the other elder women attended kutteb at all, for the
same reason. They say that no girls of their age did so; together , these facts
indicate that this educational institution in practice was unavailable to the
Beldiyin girls. Even for most boys, a short stay at the kutteb was all they
could count on, however. Like in the case of Mustfa, the eldest Falleah:
When I was young. first I went to the kutteb - after that, my father
brought me with him to the land, to work there.
His period as a pupil was not long enough to teach him to read and write;
today he knows neither.
Mahmoud never went to kutteb at all. "My father tried to make me go
to the kutteb, but I refused. I preferred to go with the cows", he laughs.
After independence he attended an evening-course for aperiod; he was,
however, too busy with his work to beable to complete it. Today he knows
how to write his first name, and he has his own system for the books of his
shop; nobody else understands it.
Mustfa's son Hassan is the one of the elder men who attended kutteb for
the longest period; he sat for the exam that would allow him to continue on
a higher level. He did not pass it and dropped out after that. As a result of
his kutteb-attendance he is today able to read and write Arabie, however.
While the women report that they missed schooling already when they
were children, Mahmoud did what he could to avoid it - the interest in
education seems to have been varying during the childhood of these
informants. How have the informants of the two eldest generations
experienced their adult life without knowledge of reading and writing?
9.1.2 Experiences with illiteracy in adult life
With the exception of Hassan, all the informants of the two eldest
generations regret that they never received a formal education. The reasons
for their regrets seem, however, to be somewhat different for the women
and the men:
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The women report to be bothered by a general feeling of being ignorant;
in addition they would like to be literate. Education as a way to get an
occupation has, however, not been on their minds:
It is not a question of occupation or work; I want to study to know -
know how to write and read, and to know many things about life. I do not
need money. I have a husband who provides for me. So it is not a
question of money.
These are the words of Fatheia Muaddaf. Her mother Fatoma expresses her
similar experience this way:
I wish that I had gone to school, and I miss it a lot. For example, when
I went to Mecca, I wished that I could read and write. I also travelled to
the south of Tunisia. I discovered many traditions there that were new to
me, and then I wished that I could make notes of everything that was new
to me. I would like to know things, and to be able to write whatever I
like, make notes of things. But I never thought about work.
The women have, however, not experienced much difficulties in their daily
lives as a result of their illiteracy. As Habiba says:
I do not have any diffculties. Especially since my hus band is like me, he
did not go to school - .
Fatheia shares Habiba' s experiences to a large degree:
I do not find many difficulties. But in some cases, like if I want to phone
somebody, and I do not know the number, or if somebody phones to me,
and asks me to tae amessage - the n I wish that I knew how to write
and read.
These women still seem to live under conditions where literacy to a large
extent is superfluous. Illiteracy is a handicap mostly in rather exceptional
situations; connected to traveIs, or other outstanding events. As only about
two per cent of the households in Bled has a phone, the dilemma of Fatheia
may be said to be a problem of luxury. In short, the main concern for these
women seems to be their lack of general knowledge. They would have
liked to. know more of the world.
The men, by contrast, do not report to suffer from a similar feeling of
general ignorance. Mustfa Falleah has, however, a special interest that he
would have liked to cultivate:
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I wish that I could have gone to school so that I could have studied the
Koran, to know the religion of Mohammed, and the Christianity - to
compare, and to know both religions.
Mahmoud Tejer misses an education for two reasons:
Because, especially when a man grows old and has nothing to do, he can
at least read a newspaper, or the Koran. (..) I find many difficulties in my
daily life, especially in my job. For example, if somebody asks for a
receipt, I cannot help him. Or if somebody buys something from me
without paying, and I want to write it down, I cannot do that.
Being able to read and write, Mustfa's son Hassan does not regret not
having further education - on the contrary:
I have not missed education, because - those who passed the exam (that
I failedJ, were appointed as teacher assistants. At that time, they got fifty
dinars a month. And I earned more than them in my job. So I was happy
that I did not succeed in the exam.
The men tend to have a more practical attitude to education than the
women; their needs seem to be more specialized, directed towards jobs,
income, and also religion. In addition, they have more difficulties in their
daily lives as a result of their illiteracy, mostly in connection with their
professional lives. Still, none of them report to have experienced serious
problems caused by their lack of formal education; their functional
difficulties do not seem to be of fundamental charaeter.
The perceptions of education seem to be rather different for the two
genders. Their thoughts about the education of the children and grand-
ehildren also reflect this gendered divergence in views:
The eldest women, Aisha and Fatoma, to some degree share the men's
practical attitude to education: If it does not lead to increased income, it is
not very important. They do, however, also express an understanding of the
view of their daughters Habiba and Fatheia, who find other values of the
education of their children more important than the economic output.
Habiba has the following evaluation of the situations of two of her
daughters - a housewife without higher education, and a teaeher:
There is a big difference between the two, because - it is not only a
question of how to live, how to eat - money. It is also a question of
culture. If, for example, somebody speaks or discusses something, the one
without education cannot understand him. This is the most important thing
for me.
115
Her husband Mahmoud has a quite different view on the benefit of
education for his children:
I think that those of my children who could not cary on their studies, live
better now. I speak of the economic situation. They live better than those
who caried on their studies.
"What about their culture? Is that the same also?" Habiba asks him.
"Culture? What is culture?" Mahmoud answers her, and laughs.
Mustfa Falleah and his son Hassan share Mahmoud' s material approach
to the evaluation of their children's education; Mustfa sees no difference
between the lives of his educated and non-educated children, while Hassan
seems to find a slight advantage for those who have studied - their
chances of getting a well paid job are, according to him, somewhat better.
In spite of this evident divergence in views on the value of education, all
the informants of the two elder generations somewhat surprisingly agree on
one thing: The children should study as long as possible - both girls and
boys. As the men mainly evaluate education on the basis of material gains,
and as they seem to think that studies do not necessarily lead to a better
economic situation, there is in fact no evident reason explaining their
positive attitude to higher education. I will return to this problem later.
N ow, let us see how the youngest generation experiences the need for
and consequences of education:
9.2 Educational level of the young generation
i think there is a big difference between my life and the lives of the
educated women. I think that they are freer than me (Meriem, 3rd.gen.
Tejer).
They (the educated) do not live better than us, than me. Because
economically I do not think that they earn more than me, and even in the
way of life - (...) - the rhythm of their life is very tiring (Lassad,
nephew of Mahmoud Tejer).
After independence there has been a tremendous development in the
educational sector in Tunisia. Still, as mentioned earlier, the actuallevel of
education varies considerably within the younger generations. Fewer
Tunisian girls than boys continue their studies; do ing so, however, seems
to have larger consequences for the girls, as we shall see:
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9.2.1 The young women
Meriem Tejer failed and was expelled from school after only four years of
education. Today, she regrets this:
I feel very sorry about my education, and I think that if I could, now, go
back to school - to the first dass in primary school - I would do that,
and study from the beginning.
The main reason for her regrets is the same as for her mother - a wish for
general knowledge:
The important thing for me is to be educated, to be cultivated. So, if I
could choose - (I would like to be) a primar school teacher, for
example. Because the important thing for me is not to get a job, but to be
educated, to know things in life. That is the important thing.
Like Meriem, Leila Muaddaf is today a full-time housewife, and without
any professional training. She studied for thirteen years, however, and did
not stop because she failed, but because she was to get maried:
For me it is not O.K. Iregret that I did not continue my studies, and I
think that it is better for a girl not to get mared or engaged while she is
studying. Because she cannot compromise between her studies and a
husband or fiancé. It is better for her to get engaged after her studies.
As accounted for earlier, Leila was not in a position to influence the timing
of her marage. She is thus not to blame for the situation she is in today.
Her mother Fatheia also recognizes that it was wrong to have her mared
at such an early stage in life, and does not want to repeat the same mistake
with her younger daughter Jalila:
I think that the life of Jalia wil be better, of course. Because with Leila
- for me, that is a loss. She studied until the bac,14 and now she is in
such a dilemma: She cannot cary on her studies - with her children she
lost that. And with her bac she cannot do anything. So for me that was a
lesson. With Jalia, I advise her not to get engaged until she finishes her
studies. Like that, I think that she wil be better off than her sister.
Jalila has taken Fatheia's advice - so far she has studied for seventeen
years, and she is still unattached. To her, the most important incentive to
14 Examen Baccalaureate.
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study is the study in itself; she appreciates her life as a student. Gaining
qualifications for a professionallife is also of importanee to her. In general,
her decision to study is guided by individual concerns; the possibility that
the family might need her economic support has not been on her mind.
Habiba's daughter Nora has finished her studies - after eighteen yearS
of education, including four at the university. Her reasons for choosing a
higher education are the same as Jalila's - she wanted to be qualified for
a professional career, and also to experience life as a student. She finds this
period to have been very valuable to her:
It taught me a lot, more than it changed me. I kne w it would allow me to
see, to know something new - to get many experiences, to know many
people of different minds.
All these young women recognize the importanee of a higher education -
particularly for girls. Meriem sees it like this:
I think that there is a big difference between my life and the lives of the
educated women. I think that they are freer than me. First of all,
economically they are better off than me - they have their own wages,
and - for example, the y can go out whenever they want. They can for
example drive a car, and - they live better. Better than me. I am in the
house doing housework - that is alL.
Leila has the same idea:
There is of course a differenee between someone who studies until the
bac, and someone who has a higher education. There is a difference
intellectually. The one who continues her studies in higher schools is
more cultivated than the other.
Both Jalila and Nora share their lowly educated sisters' view on the value
of higher education. And as they have had the privilege of going to the
university themselves, their basis for comparing the liv es of educated girls
to the lives of girls with little education are even better. This is how Nora
sees it:
Educated and non-educated people in the same family do not live in the
same situations. For example, my sisters, who are not educated, have
never left Bled. Or at most, they have been to Tunis. Sa they have not
had this experience of - at university - to live alone, for example, in
a dormitory - to tae this responsibility. To meet with students from
different towns, from the south, from - many towns in Tunisia. Even
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from outside, from foreign countries. So this experience has - I think -
an importance.
The importanee of high er education for girls is recognized by all the young
women, whether they have one or not. Like for their mothers, the elements
of general know ledge, and also personal development, represent significant
benefits. Academical training seems, however, to imply even more
important changes; according to the informants, the changes in a girl' s life
caused by higher education are quite fundamental. Meriem' s evaluation of
her own situation illustrates this point very well - and Nora's evaluation
is an even hetter illustration of the fact that the main consequence of higher
education for girls is not the potential economic or educational gain, but a
completely different kind of life. The fact that early obligations towards a
husband or fiancé seem to disqualify the girl for higher education, suggests
that plans for a traditional married life and higher education are mutually
excluding aspects of young Beldiyin girls' lives.
9.2.2 The young men
After obtaining his primary-school certificate, Nora's cousin Lassad decided
to leave school and start working with his father in the construction-trade.
He has therefore only six years of education, but has never regretted his
choice. In no way do es he envy those who have completed their studies:
They do not live better than us, than me. Because economically I do not
think that they eam more than me, and even in the way of life - of
course, those who continue their studies wil get mared to a working
woman, both of them wil be working outside - the rhythm of their life
is very tiring. Contrary to that, I got mared to a woman of the house; I
come back to my house and find that all is ready - the house is dean,
my son is dean, lunch is ready - . So I think that I live better than them.
Mohammed has more than three times longer education than his brother
Lassad; nineteen years all together. It was important to him to get a high er
education for several reasons:
Because in Tunisia it is the first way to become a - man. And to have
your independence from your family, from society - . (...) Here, without
studies, there is nothing.
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Individual independence seems to have been a significant incentive for him
to continue his studies. At the same time the lack of individual
independence - or rather, his obligations towards his family as the eldest
son - was an equally important reason to both start studying, and to stop:
L have always thought about it - since L was small, I knew that L was the
biggest boy. Not everybody has this responsibilty. My cousin, for
example, has never had to think about it. His father (Mahmoud) manages
on his own. (...) So, L both had to stat studying, and to finish studying
quickly, because my family needed me. My father was getting old, and
they had no other income than his wages. And my brother Lassad had
done a lot to help them - it was my turn, and L could not be selfish.
Mohammed thinks that education makes a large difference for the kind of
life you lead:
My wife and l, we have - "notte propre vie". For my friends without
university-education - they are tied to the family, tied up by the customs
- for us, it is a little bit separated, this.
Tarek, the eldest Muaddaf-son, studied even longer than Mohammed; he
has twenty years of education. He denies that he had any choice but to
continue his studies:
No, no. Because, to get a job in Tunisia - L was obliged. (...) To get a
job in Tunisia, you must have a minimum-leve! (of education). Licence,
a diploma of engineering - it is - not sufficient to have a very good
situation, but a normal situation.
Still, he felt no economic obligation toward his family to continue his
studies. It was his personal wish for a decent job, and also his interest in
his particular discipline that were the most important incentives. While
Mohammed finds absolutely nothing to envy those without higher
education, Tarek thinks that they have one advantage:
Perhaps the financial situation. Money, perhaps. Sometimes we fe el that
- we want to do many things, but the lack of money... perhaps. That is
the only thing.
As Mohammed, he finds that education has a large effect on people' s way
of thinking. His brother Nejib do es not wholly agree with this:
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High education can never qualify the individuaL. It is rather the individual
who may be able to enrich his personality through higher education.
Generally it is the person who manages to do this that succeeds in life.
Nejib has got sixteen years of education; he stopped studying after one year
at university, because he was not allowed to study the discipline he wanted.
He has no regrets about not completing his studies; what he does regret, is
not having been able to study psychology, as he wanted. To him personally,
work and career does not mean much; there are other and more significant
values in life, he says.
Like the elder men, Lassad does not recognize personal development as
a consequence of higher education. The economic aspect is the most
important criterium of evaluation also to him. The young men who have a
higher education, by contrast, tind the development in personal attitudes to
be one of the most important consequences of long studies. As Nejib points
out, this is not a consequence of necessity, but at least one will have a
better chanee of improving one's personality when studying. The
professional and economic aspects are also important to them. Here, one
should notice Tarek's statement: He envies the uneducated their economic
situation. Like in the case of the elder generations, we find a rather
ambivalent and confusing perception of the value of an education: At the
same time as Mohammed states that "without studies, there is nothing" , it
is generally recognized by the young male informants that the economic
benefits of higher education may be limited.
9.3 Trends of change in educational practices
Two features stand out as particularly interesting in the above: The dras tie
increase in the availability of formal education since independence, and the
distinet gendered difference in the ways this development is evaluated by
the informants.
Effects of increased access to formal eduation
According to the informants, the kutteb - the only available institution of
education in Bled during the colonial period - was frequented by boys
only. Boys normally spent a relatively short period of their childhood as
pupils at the kutteb - if they went there at alL. The purpose of most of the
boys' kutteb-attendance seems to have been a minimum of religious
education as mue h as literacy. For the elder informants the result is that
only the youngest of the elders, Hassan, is able to read and write; the rest
of them are more or less illiterate.
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Information presented in chapter two suggests that the colonial
educational situation in Bled may be representative for the general situation
in Tunisia at that time. At independence, fifteen per cent of the Tunisian
population were literate. The distrbution of literacy among the genders
was, however, rather unequal: while twenty-five per cent of the men could
read and write, only four per cent of the women had these skills.
The Tunisian women were thus almost completely excluded from the
available institutions of education until independence. According to the
elder female informants, the main reason for their exclusion was the arena
in which the kutteb was situated; girls were not supposed to leave the dar,
and as the kutteb was "outside", it was not possible for them to go there.
As Fatheia states, "I never went to school because of my grand-father -
he was very severe. He could not imagine that a girl should go out to
school" .
As we saw in chapter two, the establishment of a nation-wide
compulsory school system was a main ambition of the post-colonial regime.
As a res ult of this ambition, ninety-two per cent of the children in Tunisia
were enroled in first grade in primary school eight years after
independence. Other information presented indicate that the actual duration
of the education of many of these children was relatively short; still, the
fact remains that the vast majority of the young Tunisian girls by 1964 had
been introduced to a new life-course phase - the first phase that was
situated "outside" . In less than ten years, the insurmountable barrer
preventing women' s presenee "outside" had been removed.
The actual increase of literacy in the population is only one of several
significant consequences of the introduction of compulsory schooL. At least
as important, seen in a perspecti ve of social change, is the opening up of
the "outside" to the girls.
As we have seen, formal education held a rather insignificant position in
most people's liv es before independence. Except from boys' possible
kutteb-attendance, education was no explicit and standardized institution,
but an integrated part of the general up-bringing. It was taken Care of by
the family; the education thus belonged to the private sphere, and it also to
a large degree to ok place on the "inside" arena. The compulsory school
system introduced a number of major changes in this traditional educational
setting. The changes concerned both the actual nature of the childhood, and
the kind of knowledge that was provided as a part of their education:
One significant change was that a large part of the children's time was
spent away from home. This time was invested in an institution of aquite
different structure and purpose than previous institutions known to the local
community. The structure of the kutteb was at most semi-formal; it was not
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obligatory, and it followed no standardized time-schedule. Its currculum
was overall religious; training in Islam was the main purpose, while literacy
was a possible consequence of this training rather than a main aim.
The compulsory school represented quite different values; the values of
the new society the regime wanted to create. First of all, the institution was
organized according to national standards for educational practices. It
contributed to diminish the regional isolation that until then had
characterized the Tunisian society. Secondly, the education was secularized;
Islam was reduced to a subject among others, while it earlier had
constituted the framework within which the entire education took place.
Thirdly, new kinds of knowledge were given priority; as a part of this,
literacy was promoted to a main aim. And finally, the education of boys
and girls became more equal, while it earlier had been characterized by
complementarity rather than equality, as argued in chapter three.
The introduction of compulsory school after independence thus had a
number of significant consequences: A dras tie increase in literacy, a general
opening up of the "outside" for girls, and, more specifically, the
introduction of a first "outside" female life-course phase. It led to a
reduction of the qualitative differences in the childhoods of boys and girls,
and a "de-domestication" of a significant part of their time. In addition, it
contributed to the unification of the new state on a nationallevel, and led
to a secularization of and general shift in central elements of children's
education. Together with the fact that less than ten years after
independence, more than ninety per cent of the children of first grade age
in Tunisia was enroled in this new institution, and the fact that the trend of
school-attendance has been steadily increasing since then, this makes it
reasonable to argue that the introduction of compulsory school has been one
of the most significant single factors of social change in post-colonial
Tunisia.
The introduction of compulsory schooling contains a considerable
potential for general social change. However, the stories of the young
informants indicate that the direct effects of access to formal education as
such on individuallife-courses have been variable. As we have seen in the
previous chapters, Meriem and Leila, the young female informants without
higher education, today lead adult lives that in central respects are similar
to the lives of their mothers', and even their grand-mothers'. This also
seems to be the case concerning the role of literacy and formal education
in their adult lives:
Above, we have seen that the elder women report to have few practical
problems with their illiteracy in their daily lives; one may therefore assume
that their life as housewives do not require literary abilities. This also
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seems to be the case for the lowly educated young women. Meriem states
that she would have like d to start her education all over again, from first
grade in primary schooL. One may thus assume that whatever she learned
during her four years at school has been forgotten, which again may imply
that she has had little use for it after dropping out of schooL. At the same
time, Leila, who after thiteen years of studies evidently is literate,
complains that her life as a housewife gives no room for her favourite
activity, reading. This information suggests that these young women's
formal education has little influence on their practices as full-time Beldiyin
housewives; like their mothers' and grandmothers', their lives do not
include literary activities to any significant extent. Today's "traditional"
young women's practices do not seem to have changed much as a result of
the younger housewives' educational background.
Accordingly, we see that the "outside" life-course phase introduced to the
lives of these young women as a result of their school-attendance has not
been followed by other phases similarly linked to the "outside". After
dropping out of school, Meriem for the most part stayed home until her
mariage. After she got maried, she has been a full-time housewife,
occupied with traditional female "inside" tasks. The same is at present the
case for Leila, even though she has also had other experiences, as we shall
see in the next chapter.
The same tendency of low concrete change in literary practices from the
elder generations to the younger is also evident in the case of Lassad, the
young male informant without high er education. He chose to leave school
after six years of education, to join his father in the construction-business.
He probably has more use for his literar abilities in his job than the young
housewives have in theirs; still, the fact that he does the same work as his
illiterate father, suggests that his job does not require advanced literary
abilities, either.
The concrete way in which these young informants lead their adult liv es
do es not seem to have changed much from the practices of their elder
relatives, even though they, unlike the elders, all have periods of
compulsory school-attendance behind them. It also seems as if the
knowledge they obtained at school have limited practical relevanee for their
present adult lives. The introduction of formal education as such has
apparently not resulted in radical changes of the "traditional" adult
practices.
This argument is supported by the informants' own evaluation and
categorization of education; as we have seen above, they all stress the
importanee of higher education, rather than of education as such, as a factor
causing significant change in general conditions of existence. The fact that
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academic training changes one' s life is recognized by all the informants; the
actual way in which they evaluate the consequences of higher education
varies, however, according to the informants' gender:
Gendered evaluations of formal education
The women, independently of their age and level of education, tend to
emphasize the aspects of personal development that an education implies.
They relate this aspect to higher education especially, and recognize that it
has paricularly large consequences for the living~conditions of women.
Meriem's thoughts about the lives of her academically trained equals in
gender and age illustrate this point well: "I think that they are freer than
me. First of all, economically they are better off than me - they have their
own wages, and - for example, they can go out whenever they want. They
can for example drive a car, and - they live better. Better than me. I am
in the house, doing housework - that is all."
The women informants see high er education as a gate to an entirely
different life for girls. Academic training provides women with knowledge,
freedom, economIc independence, and a key to the "outside" .
In line with this picture, the women with Hule or no education seem to
be aWare of their own ignorance, as compared to the knowledge of the
highly educated women; they report this feeling of ignorance to be a main
result of their lack of education - more bothersome than the practical
problems caused by their illiteracy. The same perception of higher
education is also shared by the young women who have obtained it. Nora
reports that she finds the personal development implicit in her job-career
most important, and, like Jalila, she explicitly states that the economic gain
is not so important. The women's understanding of education may thus be
characterized as generalist; both in the sense that they ten d to evaluate the
total concept as important, rather than particular aspects of it, and in the
sense that they report to see it as a gate to an entirely different kind of
women's li fe.
The male informants, by contrast, reveal a more particularist attitude in
their evaluation of higher education. The men with little or no education
recognize no other aspect of higher education than its poten ti al economic
output in a later job-situation; they do not admit that higher education has
any value in itself.
The elder male informants also approach the question of education as
such in a similar manner. First of all, they report to have more practical
problems with their illiteracy in their daily lives than the women. Their
problems are related to paricular situations; their occupational life, and
their religious practices. They seem to have a larger practical need for
125
lIteracy than the women, a fact that may explain their tendency of giving
education of shorter duration more value.
The young men who have obtained an academic training do, like the
women, recognize a bigher education's cultivating and developing qualities,
and find it significant. Still, to a larger degree than the academically trained
women, they emphasize the economic aspect of higher education, the aspect
that their lowly educated male relatives find so important. All the men tend
to evaluate education according to practical and economic criteria, while the
women seem to be more occupied with the general effects of education on
the individuals' - and then paricularly the women's - lives.
The divergence in men and women's attitudes towards both formal
education in general, and higher education in p artic ul ar, may find an
explanation in the principles oftraditional North-African social organization
discussed in chapter three:
Men are traditionally producers and providers, the responsible for the
material situation of the family-group. Men who live according to these
principles for gendered division of work will naturally evaluate the
introduction of formal education mainly according to these principles. For
such men, an education's value will equal its potential to improve the
performanee of their provider-role. This will particularly be the case in the
evaluation of academic training, that clearly is an alternative professional
qualification, and an alternative way of fulfilling the provider-role. For
"traditional" men, higher education will tend to represent a modern
approach to the ful filmen t of a traditional male role, rather than a radically
new feature in their lives.
Women's traditional roles are, by contrast, related to non-material
functions, as physical, moral, and practical reproducers of the family-group.
The direct relevanee of formal education for their practice of these
functions appear to be lower. The stories of Meriem and Leila, who have
education, but report not using it in their situation as housewives, support
tbis assumption. Education will appear as a qualitatively new, and -
strictly speaking - useless value, seen in relation to their traditional
gender-roles. One may assume that as a result of this situation, the women
will tend to evaluate formal education independently from their own
practical use for it, and in a more general way.
This argument is further supported by the women's reported perceptions
of high er education as a gate to a qualitatively different kind of women's
life. Formal education qualify women for a new life. To men, by contrast,
education represents an alternative way of qualifying for the practice of
their traditionally defined gender-roles. As this discussion is closely linked
to the topic of the next chapter, occupationallife, it will be continued there.
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We have seen that personal experiences with the post -colonial system of
compulsory school have led to major concrete changes in the adult life-
courses of some of the young informants only. A certain level of formal
education, rather than formal education as such, seems required in order to
obtain significant changes in the totallife-courses of the young informants.
The low degree of actual change in individuallife-courses as a result of
a shorter formal education does, however, not contradiet my argument
concerning the post-colonial introduction of compulsory school as a major
factor of general social change. Significant changes in the social conditions
of existence for both men and women are reported to have taken place
since independence. All the elder female informants claim that today they
experience no restrictions on their freedom to move "outside"; in shar
contrast to the situation earlier, they may now leave their dar as they like.
In addition, the traditional veil, the sefseri, is no longer required for
younger women when they go out. It would be reasonable to relate this
general opening up of the "outside" to women of all ages to the particular
legitimation of girls' presenee "outside" provided by compulsory schooling.
Hence there has been a radical reduction of the restrictions on women's
physical presenee "outside" since the independence.
There are still consíderable functional restrictions on most women's
presenee "outside", however. Today, women may be there; many of them
do, however, still have nothing to do there. It is not formal education as
such, but higher education that today provides young women with lasting
"public" functions that are situated "outside" , as we shall see in the next
chapter.
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10. Occupation
In the last chapter we saw that the educational level of the informants
varies significantly - both between the two eldest generations and the
youngest, and within the youngest generation. We shall now see that the
nature of the occupational life of the informants varies as much, and that
this occupational variation is closely related to the educational previously
discussed.
10.1 The experiences of the two eldest generations
i think that my work is as important as my husband ' s, and sometimes
even more important (Fatheia, 2nd. gen. Muaddat).
I like my job because it allows me to get friends, and I like it also
because of the money. My job allows me to live a respectable life
(Mahmoud, 2nd.gen. Tejer).
10.1.1 The women
Since Aisha, the Tejer grand-mother, got mared, she has been a
housewife. After the death of her husband, she has been living alone in her
house. Only the last three years has she had an income of her own; one
night a week she rents a room to some merchants who come for the weekly
market. She enjoys earning some money, so that she does not have to ask
her children for economic assistance so often. Still, they have to support
her, she is far from economically independent.
As the only informant of the two eldest generations Fatoma, the Muaddaf
grand-mother, has spent a period of her life away from Bled; she spent
twenty years of her life in Tunis, because of her hus band ' s work. She
returned to her native town many years ago, however; now she and her
husband live with one of their sons. All her adult life has she been a
housewife - without any income of her own:
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How could I have an income without any education? I passed all my life
takng care of the children. My husband worked. (...) I have always
wished that I had my own income.
Aisha and Fatoma have in common their opinion of housework: "it is a
tiring, but important work", as Fatoma puts it. Both of them also evaluate
the housework of the women to be as important as the work of the men -
Aisha express her opinion thus:
I think that we can eaU the housework a job in itself. Because the women,
especially before, without washing machines - they did all things by
themselves. They cleaned clothes, and - they got tired. Like the men
who worked outside. It is the same.
Even if both genders lived tiring lives she does, however, flnd that the lives
of the men were easier:
I think that men lived better than women. Before, the women could also
go out, to their parents' house, or to their sisters ' house, but men' s lives
were easier.
Fatoma does not share her opinion; she finds that the traditionallives of a
husband and wife are equal, but different - as long as "they agree with
each other and understand each other".
None of the two old women are today housewives in the proper sense of
the word; Aisha has her own house, but no husband or children to care for;
Fatoma's husband is alive, but she has no house of her own. Still, their
days are occupied with the activities of a housewife - Aisha prepares daily
lunches and dinners for one, and Fatoma assists her daughter-in-law in the
house. In the afternoons they visit their children and other relativ es - their
lives are spent within the context of family and household.
Their daughters Habiba and Fatheia still have husbands, and in holidays
also children, to Care for. None of them have any income of their own
today, but both of them used to sew for people when they were young.
Habiba stopped because the children took all her time; Fatheia stopped
when she got married, because her husband did not want her to work - he
did not need her economic support. She has never wanted an income of her
own, her husband provides for her to her full satisfaction. Habiba, by
contrast, has missed it; she has even wanted to have a job outside her
home:
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I wanted to have a job outside, but I could not because of the children. I
spent much time bringing them up, and also with the housework. And I
helped my husband doing his job, so I did not flnd the time to work. In
addition, at that time I was not supposed to leave the house. Even if I
wanted to go to the house of my parents, I went out dressed so that only
my eyes showed. And what kind of job should I get? There were no jobs.
Both these women classify themselves as housewives. We see, however,
that at least Habiba has been assisting her husband in his job, in addition
to her housework and twelve live-born children. It is therefore not
surprising that she ~'did not tind the time to work".
Habiba and Fatheia find the tasks of a housewife to be of great
significance; at !east as important for the family as the jobs of their
husbands. "I think that my work is as important as my husband's, and
sometimes even more important", says Fatheia. Particularly the part of the
duties that is related to the up-bringing of the children is seen as a big
responsibility.
For them, the traditional gendered division of labour in the marriage has
been the only alternative. They have, however, no problems with accepting
other arangements concerning the tasks of home and family; they find it
quite natural that men take part in the housework in cases where both
partners are engaged in wage labour outside the home. As their mothers,
they support the increasing tendency of educated married women working
- a wife should "help her husband" support the family if she is trained for
a suitable job, as the men should "help their wives" at home in those cases
when they both work. Their attitude to these questions appearS to be quite
uncomplicated, and to a degree guided by purely functi onal concerns.
Habiba expresses her view this way:
I think that it is good for the men, too, because before, the women used
to stay at home. So, they shared the work. She worked inside, and he
worked outside. But now, both of them work outside. So, for example, the
first who come back home, should do the housework, and - they should
share. And it is good for both of them.
Still, both Habiba and Fatheia find that engagement in wage labour is not
only positive for the women. When living according to the traditional
division of labour, the women are without any economic responsibility for
the family , and are spared such worries. When comparing the traditional
duties of a wife to those of a husband, Habiba explains her view thus:
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The life of the woman is easier. Because she does the housework, and
after that, she can tae a rest. B ut the man, he works from the morning
- all day. Re can not take a rest.
The daily lives of Habiba and Fatheia are characterized by their duties as
housewives. The first part of the day is usually spent on regular housework;
the sec ond part of the day they do extra work, like preparng different
textiles for the house, or they go to visit relativ es, or receive visitors. Quite
a few central household-tasks are as a rule conducted in co-operation with
the women of the family , even if they do not belong to the same household.
Typical tasks are the preparation of a year's stock of cous-cous, or the
baking of cakes for the celebration of the end of Ramadan, the month of
fast. As their mothers, Habiba and Fatheia spend their lives within the
context of family and household. The most significant differences between
the present lives of them and their mothers seem to be related to their
varying stages in the life-course; as younger women, they still have house
and family intact, and more duties than their mothers, rather than different
duties.
The lives of mothers and daughters in the two eldest generations are in
most central respects similar. They are characterized by tasks closely related
to the family and household, both work and leisure. These two activities are
not easily distinguished - work and rest are two aspects of the same
concept of occupation in a traditionallife of a housewife. The differences
found, can to a large degree be accounted for by different stages in the life-
course.
10.1.2 The men
The father of Mustfa, the eldest Falleah, brought him to the fields at an
early age; he has been a farmer ever since. He loved his work, and misses
it now that he is old and unable to keep it up. Without the work, there is
little left for him to do:
Before, I spent all the day in the fields. Then I worked a lot. But now -
what can I do? I wake up, pray, have breakfast, and after that I sit here,
all day.
He like d his work for two reasons; the nature of the work in itself, and the
money it provided.
Mahmoud Tejer, too, finds the material output of his job to be one of the
main aspects of it:
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I like it because it allows me to get friends, and I like it also because of
the money. My job allows me to live a respectable life.
Today, Mahmoud is amerehant, but he has had several occupations in his
life:
At first I was a shepherd. Then I worked in the stone quares. I also
worked in a cafe, and in agriculture. And after that, I stated as a
merchant.
As reported before, he preferred the work as a shepherd to the kutteb when
he was a boy. He has been engaged in wage labour most of his life - from
the age of five or six until today. When he was around eleven yearS old, his
father died; he left him the sole responsible for his mother and four sisters.
"I have suffered a lot during my life, and I also worked very hard," he
answers when asked if he has had a good life. He is content with his life
now; both the nature and the pace of it. Still, in away he longs for the time
when life was harder:
My life before, when I was young, was better. Because I used to work
and think about nothing. But now, when I growold, I feel something like
a complex of inferiority. I feel that I am old, and can not car on my
w ork, and especially since I have not many sons.
Even if he has slowed down the pace of his work considerably the last
years, most of his day is still spent in a job~situation. He rises at four in the
morning, prays, goes to his shop, and stays there all day, except for his
lunch-brake in the middle of the day. He do es not return home until eight
at night. He does his business in the shop, but the time spent with his
friends and acquaintances there is at least as important to him.
Hassan, Mustfa's son, is also amerehant. He used to trade in fish, but
now he has a shop next to his home. His day is very much like
Mahmoud's; it is spent in the shop. He is home only for lunch, and at
night, after nine or ten. He lov es his work, for the same reasons as his
father and Mahmoud like their jobs: the material output, which enables him
to take Care of his family, the sociallife it provides him, and in addition,
he likes the physical part of it, that keeps him fit.
Hassan is the only one of the male informants belonging to the two
eldest generations who finds that his work is a little bit more important than
the one of his wife, who works in the house. Like all the women, the other
elderly men claim to recognize their parners' work as equal to their own
in importance. All the elderly men also say that they support the idea of
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sharng the housework when the wife has a job outside the home.
Mahmoud puts it like this:
The man should help his wife, because if he does not do that, the wife
can not bring her children up very welL She can not do two jobs at the
same time, can not work both outside and inside. It is too much for her.
Also for these men this kind of division of labour does not seem to be a
problematic topic - at least in theory. All of them practice the traditional
gendered division of labour themselves, however, and it is clear that they
do not personally consider taking part in their wives' work. Still, a general
attitude in favour of an upheaval of the traditional gender-roles, held by
men of this age and background, is in itself worth noting. So is the respect
they have for their wives' work with the house and family. This attitude is,
however, reported to be of relatively new date; it is a phenomenon that to
a large extent has developed after the independence. Again a quote from
Mahmoud:
I think that equality is good for the women. Because before, women were
under-estimated. And men, for example, a husband, if he wanted to
divorce his wife, he did that without tellng her. So now, with equality,
their situation is better.
The greater part of these men's adult life seems to be invested in their job
- "outside". The stories of the elderly male informants indicate that the
job is of significant importanee for a man's self-image. Mahmoud finds that
the fact that he is old and unable to work as hard as before gives him a
fe eling of inferiority. Mustfa's experience of his old age points in the same
direction. On the basis of the above, one may also assume that a man's
occupation and his occupational performanee is of considerable significance
for ms reputation and status within the local community; his ability to lead
"a respectable life" seems to be strongly associated with his occupational
life. The economic aspect is thus only one of several benefits of hav ing a
job.
10.2 The experiences of the young generation
I cannot imagine myself not working. Jf, for example, I am convinced to
stop working, I stop, but I cannot accept that my husband, or anybody
else, imposes that on me. Especially after this long period of studying.
Yes, I think that it is my own life. I have to decide (Nora, 3rd.gen. Tejer).
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I think that one should work. That is the maìn element (ìn a good life).
Because with work, many problems wìl go away. (...) I do not mean
money, but work ìn Ìtself. This movement, and change - . One should
pass one's tìme workìng, better than using ìt for other thìngs (Lassad,
nephew of Mahmoud Tejer).
10.2 .1 The women
Meriem, the Tejer-daughter with only four years of education, has no
income of her own, the work in the house takes all her time. She was
occupied with housework in the home of her parents before she got
marred, too, except for a six month period when she worked as a
seamstress in a garment-factory. Like her mother and grandmother, she
fin ds the tasks of a housewife to be important, but tiring work. She thinks
that housework is the responsibility of the wife, also when she has work
outside the home:
I think that the wife should be responsìble for her chìldren, her house, and
also her husband. Even if she works outsìde, she should take thìs
responsibilty. It is an important thìng.
The work of a housewife is as important to Meriem as the work of a
husband. A woman is best suited for the work in the house, she thinks, a
man cannot replace her. Meriem shares her mother's evaluation of
housework as compared to the job of a husband:
I think that my life is better. I am free, when I want to do housework, I
do it, when I do not like thìs, Ileave it for another time. But my husband
has certaìn - he should follow the time, he ìs obliged to follow the tìme.
To go to work at a certain tìme, to come back at a certaìn time. He is not
free like me.
Meriem's daily life is in most respects similar to the daily lives of her
mother and grand-mother - though the fact that she has small children
makes a difference. In the morning she feeds and cleans the children, then
she does the housework. In the afternoon, she sews clothes for herself and
the children. She is busy, and quite happy with her life. She only misses
one thing:
If I had enough tìme, I would like to sew, and earn my own money. That
ìs the thing that I miss.
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Leila Muaddaf is also a full-time housewife. She did, however, work as a
secretary in Tunis the first period after her marage. After she had the
children she stopped; it became too much for her. She misses her job, and
hopes to find another permanent position - it is better for her to work. In
Bled it is not easy, though, not like in Tunis. Like the other housewives,
she finds her duties 10 be very tiring, but important - as important as her
husband's work.
Leila's day is typical for a young housewife: She gets up, dresses and
feeds the children, cleans the house, washes clothes, prepares lunch. In the
afternoon, she stays home, goes to visit her parents or other relatives, or
perhaps she takes the children to the beach.
Men leading a traditional kind of life live better than women in the same
situation - before they get marred, Leila thinks. After the marrage, they
face the same problems, however, and the lIves become similar. Both have
to work hard in order to have a well-functioning family.
Leila leads a temporary life; she is not very happy with it. She is looking
forward to when their new house will be completed; then she can move
from her mother-in-law, with whom she is now staying, and live with her
husband and children - if only her husband will tind a job in Bled. For
the moment he lives and works in the CapitaL She also hopes to tind a job
for herself. Until she fulfils this hope she will, however, continue to live
her life in a way very similar to the lives of her mother and grand-mother
- a life dominated by the traditional female tasks related to the family and
household.
N ora Tejer has been working as a teaeher for one year after she finished
her studies. The work is very important to her:
I cannot imagine myself not working. If, for example, I am convinced to
stop working, I stop, but I cannot accept that my husband, or anybody
else, imposes that on me. Especially after this long period of studying.
Yes. I think that it is my own life. I have to decide.
When she first started studying, she did not want to become a teaeher.
After she had completed her education she found that she had no other
alternative, however. Today, she is happy that it turned out like that; to her
own surprise, she loves teaching:
To me, I think that the most important part of my job is to feel that you
are giving something to another. Y ou are - I do not know how to say
this - giving something interesting to another ... They listen to you -
they are interested in what you are saying. Yes. I try to give them all that
I know. This is the most important thing. It is enjoyable.
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There is also another reason why she finds a teaching job suitable; it is a
job easily combinable with a family:
When I think about the future, as a woman, and my house - it is better
to have three months (of holidays), for example, with my children. And
that counts. Better than working every day.
Because of her job, Nora now liv es in another part of Tunisia. Before she
moved there, she spent five years in Tunis as a student. She has thus not
lived in Bled since she was nineteen. She shares a flat with some
colleagues during the year, but returns to Bled in the holidays. As she
works in a small town, there are few means of entertainment; her days are
spent at work, or at home, doing the minimum of housework required of
a working woman living alone.
Fatheia's youngest daughter Jalila is still a student, and has not yet any
job-experience. She does, however, reg ard the possibility to get a job after
finishing her education as very important, because:
I think that I wil get the respect of people, and also, working - there are
usually new things in work, and in our life in general, when we work.
Like Nora, Jalila do es not find the economic aspect of a job to be the most
important one. She does not want to work as a teaeher after she has
finished her studies; her father tres to convince her that it is the job most
suitable for her, but she refuses - she would like to use her education
working for a company.
Both Nora and Jalila find it self-evident that the traditionallife of a man
is significantly much better than the traditionallife of a woman. The man
has his freedom to go where he wants, and the authority to make whatever
decisions he likes on behalf of the family . The wife, by contrast, is left
with the hard and tiresome housework, and with few possibilities of leaving
the house.
The occupationallives of Meriem and Leila, the young female informants
without higher education, are in central respects similar to their mothers',
and even grand-mothers'; again, the differences can to a significant degree
be explained by their different stages in the life-course. The two young
women's attitudes towards their own situation differ, however: Meriem is
satisfied with her life, her main ambition is to find time to ear some
money of her own by sewing. Leila, by contrast, has experienced the life
of a professional woman, and is longing to return to it. She has problems
accepting her present situation.
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The lives of Nora and Jalila, the two young academically trained women,
stand in shar contrast to the lives of all the other women: They have
already spent significant parts of their lives away from Bled as a result of
work or studies; their profession has become a central part of their self-
image, and they find a life without work hard to imagine, and it should not
be imposed on them. Even if Nora includes her future family in her job-
considerations, it is clear that her professional career means mue h more to
her than a way of assisting her husband with his economic obligations.
Economic concerns are not essential to them; the aspect of self-realization
is more important.
The occupationallives of the young uneducated women are more similar
to the occupationallives of their mothers and grand-mothers than to those
of their educated sisters, both concerning their practices, and their
perceptions of these practices. This tendency has been made clear also in
the previous chapters; the women's occupational stories confirm it.
10.2.2 The men
Lassad, the nephew of Mahmoud, has been working ever since he left
school after six years of education. His mother did not want him to enter
the construction-business like his father, so she made him start learning
how to make furniture. But he left the furniture's workshop after three
months, and has been building houses ever since.
For the time being, his activities has led him to Tunis; he is living there
with his Beldiyin wife and son. They do, however, spend much time in
Bled, paricularly during the summer-season.
Today, Lassad has his own small company, and finds that the main
advantage of his job is the freedom it gives him. The better part of his day
is occupied with work; he normally goes home at six in the afternoon, but
often works extra hours after supper.
Like the elder men, Lassad evaluates the work of his wife to be as
important as his own - particularly the responsibility for the children. He
also thinks that the traditional Tunisian gender-roles produee lIves that are
equal in burdens and advantages for men and women. As accounted for
earlier, he finds the traditional way of life more convenient than the way
of life practised by academically trained people; it provides a more pleasant
pace of life, and it also gives a man the possibility to concentrate on his
job.
The work is of outmost importanee to Lassad; he actually names it as the
main ingredient of a good life:
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I think that one should work. That is the main element. Because with
work, many problems wil go away. (...) I do not mean money, but work
in itself. This movement, and change - . One should pass one' stime
working, better than using it for other things.
Lassad's elder brother Mohammed lives in Tunis with his teaeher wife and
their son. He has been working in a bank there after he completed his
studies. He also studied in Tunis, and he even went to secondary school
outside Bled. He has not lived in his town of origin since he was a young
boy.
Mohammed considers himself lucky to work in a bank - it was what he
hoped for when he was a student. He finds that his job has increased his
insight in polities, economics, and the society in general. This is to him an
important aspect of his job:
I am lucky to work in this bank, and in this service, because - to work
in a bank - where in the bank? You can work there as a labourer. O.K?
But to work in the bank - to assist the board of administration, to
discuss the projects, which are the better ones - to follow the hotels -
which is good, which is not good - it is very important. (...) My
personality has developed a lot. And when I speak with frends, I tind that
I know most things better than them. So, it is very good to work in an
important agency.
Mohammed' s day is for the most part spent at work; in the morning he
takes his son to his wife's mother, who looks after him during the day.
Then he goes to work, and stay there until six. On the way home he picks
up his wife and child - normally , they spend the night at home.
Contrar to all the informants dealt with so far, Mohammed finds the
work of housewives to be of no importance, and he has little regard for
housework in general:
It is a waste of time. Really, even with my wife, I am irrtated, because
she works a lot in the house. (...) My mother - what has she seen of the
world? She has seen nothing. She has seven children, and a husband, and
she passes all her day in the house. She prepares this and that. She has
got nothing. We have always food, and our clothes are always dean, but
her - she has gained nothing. I am against furious housework. (...) The
human beings are made to live outside.
In line with this view, Mohammed finds that the traditional life of a man
is very much better than the one of a woman:
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My father has certainly lived better than my mother. Thousand times
better than my mother, certainly. (...) My mother cannot go outside. Re
can. Re worked hard, but he could go out at night, to cafes, and - .
Tarek, the eldest Muaddaf-son, lives and works in Tunis. He also studied
in Tunis, and except for a short period, he has been living away from Bled
for about ten years - all his adult life. As he is not mared, he lives alone.
He has not been as lucky as Mohammed - his job is not the one he hoped
for:
It is interesting, but I would - it is not my dream-job. (...) The economic
part (is most important), perhaps. The financial. Because it is not very
bad, and if I wil stay there, perhaps, it wil be interesting. With time -
if I climb the scale ...
Tarek does his own housework, but does not invest much time in it. The
first half of his day he spends at work. In the evenings he stays home, or
goes to the town-c entre to meet frends; they have dinner together, or just
go for a walk.
Like Mohammed, he does not find the situatIon of his mother and his
housewife sister to be very good for them:
Their situation would have been better, perhaps, if they were not full-time
housewives. (..) I feel sorry, of course. I said to you, in my opinion, the
job for a girl is some kind of liberation. She must work. It is a liberation
for them, for girls. To be liberated is the most important thing. Rere in
Tunisia. Perhaps it is different outside?
He also shares Mohammed's evaluation of the traditionallives of men and
women in Tunisia:
The man has all the advantages. Re is outside all the time. That is why,
for example, I said that - why a job is a liberation for a girL. With a job
she has much contact with people, and hear many opinions - different
opinions. She can get many opinions of life. That is why, in this situation,
the man is so far from his wife.
Nejib, Tarek's younger brother, has been working as a teaeher in a small
village in the Cap- Bon-area for the last four years. Before that, there was
ms uncompleted studies, and his ary-service, so he has not lived in Bled
for years. He is tremendously dissatisfied with his present situation, but
with his lack of a diploma, he can not choose between jobs. He does not
like his job, and he hates the place where he lives: "It is mortal. It is an
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unbearable village, life there is disgusting." Because of rus feelings for the
place, he leaves it as of ten as possible. As Bled is the biggest town in the
area, he often goes there - as a better alternative. He hopes to be able to
change job soon. The only reason for remaining in his work, is that he
needs the money. He does, however, admÜ that his profession has an
importanee in a social context:
Today I have a medium social status: I am not Nejib Muaddaf; I am Nejib
Muaddaf, the teaeher. In the society that has importance.
Nejib has a clear opinion about the traditional Tunisian society and its
consequences for the two genders:
The traditional society contains slavery, and is a typical repressive society.
The woman has been oppressed, imprisoned at home - taking care of
children, doing housework - staying home in order to satisfy the needs
of her husband, and that was all their lives were about. Women have
never had rights beyond these limits. Within the recent society, there are
changes. The idea of women helping the man in work and helping him
managing his home exists, but it is very annoying for the man to accept
this situation, this new idea. This new situation is created by the meagre
wages the society provides the workers with. The man can no longer
satisfy his material needs alone. But the men are usually against this
development; there is just nothing they can do about it, in order to protect
their earlier position. The men stil regard the women as their personal
belonging.
Personally , he finds equality between husband and wife to be an evident
principle:
Both woman and man have the same right to study and to work. This is
dear, it should not be a problem. As far as the social tasks are concerned,
I think that they should be shared, as life is shared by a couple. My
personal consideration towards the phenomenon is simple: Life is shared,
so the tasks are shared - that is all there is to it.
Again, we see that Lassad shares both the practices and perceptions of life
with the elder men rather than with the educated men of his own age.
Unlike the elder men he has, however, left Bled to live and work in the
Capital; a fact that may be seen as a function of the general increase of
geographical mobility discussed in chapter two. He also shares the elder
men's respect for the housework of their wives, but he himself takes no
part in it. Like the young women with low education, he lives a life that in
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central respects is similar to the liv es of the elder generations, and in
accordance with the traditional North-African principles of social
organization.
The young men with higher education diverge from all the other
informants in their view on traditional female work as housewives. They
giv e it little importance, and also little respect; it is, in Mohammed's words,
"a waste of time". At the same time, they claim to support the idea of men
taking part in domestie tasks.
While the elder men, and also Lassad, to a large ex ten t have been
creating their own jobs, the young educated men are all employees, with
less possibility of influencing their own job-situation. Still, and even if they
may not be entirely happy with their present jobs, they tend to be satisfied
with their kind of occupation. Being a higher functionar in a bank, or a
principal engineer in a company, or even a teaeher, definitely seems to be
more status-generating than having a shop at the corner. Like in the cases
of all the other male informants, as weii as in the cases of the young,
academically trained women, the profession seems to constitute a
significant part of the self-image of the young, highly educated men.
10.3 Trends of change in occupational lives
Concerning the occupationallives of the informants, higher education rather
than generation and gender stands out as a main factor of change - both
for practices and concepts. This tendency, also found in the previous
chapters dealing with marriage, physical reproduction and education, is thus
further strengthened by the occupational stories of the informants.
10.3.1 The informants without higher education
The occupational practices of the two eldest generations in most central
respects correspond with the principles for traditional North-African social
organization discussed in chapter three. This is also the case for the
occupations of the young informants without higher education:
Practises of "traditional" occupations
The young female informants without higher education have at the present
occupational lives that share all central characteristics with those of the
elder women. Like them, they are full-time housewives, and their practice
of this occupation is similar to the practice of their elder female relatives,
as we saw in the previous chapter. The occupational pasts of the young
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housewives, however, var somewhat from the ones of the elder women:
They have for limited periods of time been engaged in wage labour
"outside". A general change has take n place in the accepted income-
generating occupational activities for this category of women during the
three generations represented by the informants: Aisha and Fatoma, the
eldest women, have never eamed their own money. Their daughters Habiba
and Fatheia have had an independent source of income as seamstresses, but
they both performed the job "inside". Meriem and Leila, the youngest
housewives, have for a shorter period been engaged in wage labour
"outside"; Meriem worked in a garent-factory for six months before she
got mared, while Leila was a secretar in the early period of her marage.
The fact that the youngest women have worked "outside" is, however,
probably of less significance than the fact that they, like their mothers, gave
up their income-generating occupations when their duties as wife and
mother required it. The women of this occupational category are first and
foremost housewives; they may engage in alternative occupations only as
long as it does not affect their domestie duties. Meriem and Leila's brief
"outside" careers should probably be seen as a consequence of the general
opening up of the "outside" to women, rather than as an indicator of a
fundamental change in the perception of the housewife-role.
The men of the two eldest generations have been engaged in jobs
"outside" ever since they were young boys - contrary to the occupational
stories of the women, and in accordance with the complementary nature of
the traditional North-African gender-roles discussed in chapter three. They
are all self-employed, and their occupations are what one may call
"traditional", in the sense that they have existed as occupations in Bled for
a long time, and they require "traditional" skills, rather than modern ones,
like formal education. The job, or rather the job-situation, occupies most of
these men's time, and it constitutes a general framework around their
"outside" existence, as their social life is reported to take place mainly
within the job-situation. It is also clear that the elder men's self-image is
closely related to their occupationallife, and that a loss of it, like the cases
of Mustfa and Mahmoud indicate, may be experienced as humiliating and
lead to a life that is "empty".
The occupational story of Lassad, the young male informant without
higher education, corresponds in most central respects with those of the
elder men. Like them, he started working while he was still a boy, and like
them, he is self-employed within a "traditional" occupation, construetion.
It is evident that the job means a lot for Lassads self-image.
The traditional perception of the individual as a part of a larger family-
group lies implicit in - and is at the same time a precondition for - this
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complementary division of labour between the genders, as argued in chapter
three. This collective understanding of the individual is particularly clearly
expressed in these informants' ways of conceiving their own occupational
lives:
Perceptions of work
Habiba assisted her husband in his work for several yearS; the actual tasks
she performed was of importanee for a significant par of his business, and
her labour resulted directly in an income - received by her husband. Still,
she does not reg ard this as work, but as "helping my husband". In sewing
for people she was, by contrast, "working" .
While Mahmoud's material situation made him ne ed Habiba's assistance,
both economically, through sewing, and through her help with his work,
Fatheia's husband made her stop earning money by sewing after they
marred, because he did not need her help. Several things are worth noting
here: First of all, sewing and other textile-works has been an accepted way
of eaming an income for women over a relatively long period. The fact that
this kind of work can be practised "inside", and that it is regarded as a
typical feminine occupation, may to som e extent explain this. We have also
seen that Meriem continues this tradition of women's accepted income-
generating occupation among the young generation. Before she mared, she
practised it "outside"; now, because of her present situation as housewife,
she finds it necessary to practice it "inside" - if she can spare the time for
it at all.
Secondly, Fatheia's husband was opposed to the idea of having a wife
who earned money. Considering the social position of the Muaddaf family ,
one may assume that a working wife would be shameful to him and to the
family, as it might indicate that he was not able to ful fil his duties towards
her. The Tejer-family, by contrast, has improved its social position
considerably during the generation of Mahmoud and Habiba. Their
economic situation at the beginning of the mariage did first of all not
allow them to take the kind of considerations that was important to the
Muaddaf-family; secondly, their more modest social position may have
made such considerations less imperativ e, as they had less to defend.
Still, Habiba counts as work on ly her sewing - a socially accepted
activity for a woman. Her other work is reduced to "helping my husband".
This might indicate a playing down of the importanee and character of her
assistance, as it would not really be suitable. This explanation may have
some relevance; it can, however, not stand alone. Habiba's part of her
husband's work was a "woman's job" - refining of dairy-products - and
the work was done within the walls of the dar. It could therefore hardly be
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regarded as shameful conduct in itself. The fact that she fully recognizes
her par in the family's general material achievements also suggests that
there must be something more to it.
A plausible explanation is that Habiba experiences the family as such a
fundamental unit, and its maintenance as such a fundamental objective, that
accounting for her separate input of work becomes more or less
meaningless. According to this explanation, Habiba experiences herself as
half of the adult team responsible for the wellbeing of the family, rather
than as a separate individual with a personal occupationallife. Her efforts
have, however, at the same time been restricted by certain social rules for
suitable female practices. It may thus be argued that she understands her
work as the effort of a wife rather than the effort of an individual.
This way of perceiving one's work also seems to be of relevanee for the
men, even if their work is physically and conceptually more clearly
distinguished from the "inside" arena and the "private" sphere, and thus
also from the family-group, than the work of the women. We see that
Hassan appreciates his work because it allows him to provide for his
family, and that Mahmoud finds that it allows him to live a respectable life.
According to traditional North-African moral principles, one should be able
to fulfil one's materialobligations towards one's family in order to be a
respectable man; to do so, one should work. One may assume that also to
the men without higher education is work, social respectability, and family-
obligations are so closely related that it is difficult - and more or less
meaningless - to distinguish them.
The occupationallives of all the informants without higher education are
still practised much according to the traditional North-African principles for
gendered division of labour. This concerns the nature of the tasks the men
and women undertake, and the physical arenas in which they are practised.
Uneducated women of all generations are still occupied "inside", with
family-related tasks, while uneducated men of all generations are still
occupied "outside" , with public-related tasks. The post-colonial physical
opening up of the "outside" to the women has not changed the traditional
functional division of labour between the genders when it comes to the
informants without high er education.
One might expect that a perception of men's and women's lives as
complementary, but equally necessar parts of the collective life of the
family-group logically would imply that the genders will be equally
evaluated. As stated in chapter three, this has not been the case in the
traditional North-African societies. A number of social scientific studies
confirm that North-African women generally are conceived of as inferior
to men (see for instanee Bourdieu 1965 and 1977, Evers Rosander 1991).
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It is therefore a quite remarkable feature that the informants without higher
education all express a significant degree of respect and appreciation for the
work of the opposite gender. None of the informants suggest that the
women are regarded as inferior to the men, or that they themselves have a
more negative self-image than their husbands. The actual basis of the
women's self-image is, however, to be found in their "inside" lives, while
the men's basis is mainly in their "outside" lives.
Accordingly, the women tend to regard themen's living-conditions in
general, and their occupational situation in particular, as little better than
their own - some of them actually state to the contrary. This indicates two
things: First, the traditional North-African concepts of individuals as
fundamentally gendered, and of men and women's roles as defined by the
superior needs of the family-group, are central to these informants'
understanding of themselves, their partners, and their marriages. Secondly,
the actual position of the genders within this traditional conception has
changed, and this has resulted in an increase in the status of women and
their input of labour in the family-group. The elder informants themselves
report that such a change has actually taken place during their life-time; a
change that has improved the living-conditions of the women particularly.
A significant source of this change is, according to the informants, the post-
coloniallegal reforms, particularly the personal code of 1957. As we saw
in chapter two this law abolished polygamy, and introduced a new law of
divorce more favourable to the women.
This "new" traditional concept of men and women' s "complementary
equality" is P aric ul arly clearly expressed in these informants'
understanding of the concept of "equality between the genders". Fatheia
Muaddaf's definition of the concept is a good example of the way in which
it is understood by both the men and the women without higher education:
For me, equality between the genders means that the partners live with
each other, understand each other. They should discuss things, they should
manage their lives together; if something is good, they do it, if something
is bad, they leave it - . And even if the wife is not educated, and works
at home, they should live together, understand each other. That is equality
- that is life.
This concept of equality does not imply equal rights to do equal tasks, but
rather the right to be respected for doing the tasks that are ascribed to one
by gender.
The "new" traditional evaluation of the genders also makes it easier to
understand another rather unexpected feature in the stories of the
uneducated informants. As argued in chapter three, the traditional principles
145
for gendered behaviour reflect the very fundament of the traditional North-
Afrcan moral-system. One should therefore assume that there would be a
considerable resistance towards the new gender-roles that are emerging in
the Tunisian society today, and that are practised mainly by the
academically trained young Tunisians. Still, the informants who live
according to the traditional gender-roles express an overall un-complicated
attitude towards these new and rather deviant ways of organizing family-
life. Some of the informants like it, others do not, but none of them
condemn the new practices as morally reprehensible. Habiba's reflections
on the division of labour in the mariage illustrate that this quite
fundamental change in gendered behaviour is regarded as a practical rather
than moral matter:
I think that it (educated women workingJ is good for the men, too,
because, before, the women used to stay at home. So, they shared the
work. She worked inside, and he worked outside. But now, both of them
work outside. So, for example, the first who comes back home, should do
the housework, and - they should share. And it is good for both of them.
Even if the traditional occupational practices of the uneducated informants
do not seem to have gone through any fundamental changes during the
post-colonial period, their conceptions of possible and acceptable gendered
practices seem to have been revised quite thoroughly. The uneducated
informants' opinions, rather than their actual practices, indicate a change in
the direction of more liberal principles for the occupational careers of both
genders. In order to see this change of principles in practice, we must turn
to the occupationallives of the informants with higher education:
10.3 .2 The informants with hig her education
Both the occupational practices and the occupational concepts of the
academically trained informants are distinctly deviating from those of the
uneducated informants examined above:
As Jalila is still a student, Nora is the only academically trained female
informant who has occupational experience. Her present occupational
situation is, however, typical for young, academically trained women; the
majority of them become teachers like her, and many of them also live
away from their community of origin as a result of their job. Increased
geographical mobility is thus a common consequence of highly educated
women' s professional careers.
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Nora's occupational practices are in all central respects contrar to those
of the uneducated women: While all the housewives live in Bled, she has
moved to another part of the countr as a result of her job. She furtermore
works "outside", in a salaried profession. Unlike the housewives, she is
economically independent. As she has not yet established a family , her
present situation does not give any indications of how she will combine her
future family-related domestie work with her professional job; it is,
however, clear that she is not planning to let a housewife-role interfere with
her teaching. She takes it for granted that her children will atten d a kinder-
garten, and that she will continue her job on a full-time basis. Her plans
correspond with the practices of the majority of Tunisian women in her
position, and are plausible descriptions of her future occupational situation.
While themarred women without higher education first and foremost are
housewives, the academically trained women have an opposite ranking of
wage labour and housework: The professional career comes first.
Jalila's expected occupational career is si mil ar to the one of Nora. She
does not want to become a teaeher, but then neither did Nora at the same
stage in her studies. Teaching is the most common and the most accepted
profession for academically trained women today; a career in a private
company or in public administration is hard to obtain - women are not
popular there. Even if higher education takes the women a long way in the
direction of an equal occupational situation with the men, there are still
clear social restrictions on their careers.
To both of these young women, the professional career constitutes a
fundamental value. They are not at all willing to compromise on this point
- their professional life is their own.
The occupational practices of the academically trained young male
informants in most respects equal those of their female colleagues. Like
them, they all live away from Bled as a result of their work, and like them,
they have "outside" jobs that generate income. They are also employees,
rather than self-employed. Like the women, they tend to regard housework
related to their actual or potential mariages as secondar to the job they
are professionally trained for.
The educated men's perceptions of their occupational lives also have
similarities with those of the young educated women. The profession
constitutes a central par of their self-image, and also an individual value
and an individual right - the men, too, experience their professionallife
as their own.
The educated men's evaluation of the various aspects of their profession
diverge from those of educated women, however. Even if the men regard
the personal development-aspect as essential, they also tend to give more
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importanee to the economic and the social status-related aspects of the
work. As we have seen above, these are the same occupational aspects that
the uneducated male informants found most valuable in relation to their
"traditional" johs.
As stated in chapter sev en, academically trained Tunisians tend to marry
each other. The "student-couples'" family-organization will be one in which
both the adult family-members are engaged in professional careers
"outside". Higher education thus changes the occupational pattern of the
family-group in the direction of a significant increase in the time and labour
invested "outside". This change is evident both in the actual occupational
practices, and the occupational evaluations of the academically trained
informants.
This tendency of a devaluation of the "inside" occupations is also evident
in the academically trained informants' evaluation of the traditional female
occupations - an evaluation that differs markedly from that of all the other
informants. The educated young women recognize the work of their
mothers and uneducated sisters as hard and admirable; still, as they could
never imagine themselves in a similar occupational situation, and as they
evidently are planning to ignore significant parts of the traditional
housewife's work in their own future family-life, they do not give the
housewife-occupation significant importance; their own "outside"
professionallife is much more valuable to them.
The young academically trained men express themselves even more
categorically about this topic: Housework is a "waste of time", states
Mohammed; he pities the occupationallives of his mother and uneducated
sisters. The other men join him in this view; Tarek states that women have
to work "outside" in order to be liberated, while his brother Nejib sees the
traditional housewives as slaves, and as a cardinal example of the
repression of women that characterizes the Tunisian society.
Correspondingly, all the academically trained informants agree that men's
traditionallife is "thousand times better" than women's traditionallife, as
Mohammed puts it, because the men have been allowed to live "outside".
The "outside" life has a value in itself to these young academically trained
people; an occupation "outside" will also be more valuable in itself than an
occupation "inside".
W e see that the concepts of occupational life that correspond with
professional "outside" jobs - jobs that are results of higher education ~
are fundamentally different from the occupational concepts that correspond
with the traditional North-African principles for social organization. The
traditional concepts are characterized by a fundamental group-relatedness,
and an equally fundamental gendered division of labour. This implies that
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the family-group is linked together in an organic way; the adult members
perform different, gender-defined tasks, that are equally necessar for the
maintenance of the group. One may also assume that this occupational
situation will lead to an occupational self..image, or identity, that is
characterized by the individual's group-membership and gender.
The occupational concepts of the academically trained informants are, by
contrast, characterized by an individualization and a "de-genderization" of
the occupationallife. Seen in relation to the organization of the family , this
implies that the group will be linked together in a more mechanic way; the
adult members perform the same tasks in parallel, and independently of
their gender. This makes it reasonable to assume that the educated
informants' occupational self-image, or identity, will be characterized by
the individual's occupational "de-genderized" self-sufficiency.
The educated informants have as a result of their "outside" professions
devaluated the "inside" arena, the "private" sphere, and the work that
belongs there quite drastically. According to them, the significant arena for
both genders is the "outside". This attitude is reflected in these young
people's definition of "equality between the genders": Equality means equal
rights to study, and to work - "outside". It means equallegal rights, and
also equal social rights. According to this definition, which differs radically
from that of the uneducated informants, men and women are equal when
they are able to live similar lives. This definition implies that equality
between the genders, as well as women's emancipation, in practice means
women's occupation within the traditionally male "outside" arena, and
within the traditionally male "public" sphere.
We have seen that higher education tend to change the informants'
occupational practices and perceptions quite radically, and that, as a
consequence, the organization of their entire adult lives deviates markedly
from the one practised by the informants without higher education.
Comparing the occupationallives of the educated of both genders with the
occupationallives of the uneducated of both genders we see, however, that
the changes caused by higher education for men and women are not of the
same nature.
In the previous chapter it was argued that for men, higher education
represents an alternative approach to traditional male functions, rather than
a re-definition of the male role. This is so because academic training
qualifies for "outside" income-generating occupations.
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Higher education qualifies a man for an alternative approach to the
fulfilment of the traditional male role as producer and provider. It implies
a shift from one kind of "outside" occupational situation to another, but not
a shift in the purpose of the male occupational li fe.
The educated men represent occupational competitors to the men without
higher education, in the sense that they fulfil the same duties in another
way. The fact that the academically trained male informants tend to
emphasize the same aspects of their occupational life as the uneducated
men do - income and social status - further supports this argument.
This competitive situation may shed some light on the uneducated male
informants' vague and somewhat contradictory evaluations of higher
education found in the previous chapter. One may assume that the educated
men's new and different means of obtaining traditional male aims appear
as confusing, and even threatening, to the men who have no personal access
to these means. The men without higher education tend to approach this
problem through denying the existence of otheraspects of a man's higher
education than those common to their own occupational situation: They
emphasize that higher education does not necessarly result in a higher
income than their own, and at the same time they refuse to admit that
academic training has other qualities than the income-generating one.
"Culture? What is Culture?" laughs Mahmoud, while Lassad states that his
life has a more pleasant rhythm than the lives of the academically trained
people. This is aquite logical reaction; too strong acceptance of the
existence of superior qualities of the educated men's lives from the part of
the uneducated men could be taken to imply that they themselves were in
an inferior position concerning the fulfilment of their traditional male duties
as providers of the family. They would be in danger of admitting that they
fulfil their obligations less than satisfactory.
The academically trained women, by contrast, stand in a qualitatively
different relation to the uneducated women. In the previous chapter it was
argued that for women, higher education represents a gate to an entirely
new kind of life. The information presented in this chapter indicates the
fundamental nature of the changes introduced to women' s life-course by
higher education.
A main consequence of higher education for women, is the change of
significant occupational arenas. We have seen that it leads the women
permanently out of the "inside" as an occupational arena, and provides
lasting occupationallife-course phases that belong "outside" , and that are
related to "public", rather than "private" functions. The time and energy
spent "inside" with family-related tasks decrease correspondingly for the
higher educated women.
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The academically trained women leave the traditionally defined female
role, in order to lead an occupational life that shares most central
characteristics with that of the men. In a society that has been profoundly
gender-segregated, both physically and functi onally , this is a rather
remarkable change. The female informants themselves tend to perceive the
housewives and the professional women as belonging to two different
categories. On the basis of the above, this actually seems to be a valid
argument: The two kinds of women represent two qualitatively separate
occupational careers. Their occupational practices are performed according
to qualitatively different principles, and also evaluated according to
qualitatively different criteria. As suggested by the information presented
in the previous chapter, these different female careers seem to constitute
mutually exclusive concepts and practices.
This situation may also explain why, in sharp contrast to the uneducated
men, the women without higher education express an astonishing degree of
both acceptance and appreciation of the new kind of women's life. It
clarifies why these women are able to recognize the value of education in
all its respects:
These women's performanee of their traditional duties is not an object of
competition between them and the educated women. As they belong to
different occupational categories, their practices are not comparable; the
uneducated women are not threatened by the new practices of their
educated sisters. One may assume that this situation provides the
uneducated women with a liberty in relation to higher education that the
uneducated men do not possess; this allows them to. acknowledge the
improvement of women's lives that they evidently find higher education to
imply.
Even if the occupationallives of the educated women are similar to the
men's, they have not obtained an equal occupational position as theirs.
None of the informants, not even the educated women themselves, seem to
give the professional women the same economic responsibility as the men.
The uneducated informants see the women's income-generating jobs as
means to "help their husbands" fulfil their economic duties, while the low
importanee given to the economic aspect of their jobs by the professional
women themselves indicates that they as well do not see themselves as
main providers.
The educated women have seemingly not been integrated in the same
occupational categoryas the men as a result of their "male" occupational
practices, but constitute a new and third category adding to the two that
traditionally have existed. The educated women do not seem to represent
a occupational threat to the uneducated men in the way their male
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colleagues do. The general opening up of the "outside" to the women that
has taken place during the post-colonial period mak es their presenee
"outside" acceptable, and diminishes the threat to the family honour that
their "male" behaviour otherwise might have implied. Men without higher
education may therefore allow themselves a tolerant attitude towards these
female "deviants".
The educated women may potentially represent a more significant threat
to their male colleagues and actual or potential husbands. As we have seen,
these men claim to have outgrown the traditional interpretation of the
society, and they see themselves as quite different, more advanced, and
more "modern" than the uneducated men. Their concept of advaneement
implies a different understanding of equality between the genders; to them,
equality means equal rights to similar lives.
Mohammed is the only one of the educated male informants who is
mared and has children, and therefore in a situation where these theories
of equality between the genders should be applied in practice. Discussions
between him and his educated wife during the interview indicate that this
practice does not take place entirely without problems; other information
suggests that in this respect they are quite representative of the majority of
the young educated Tunisian couples. The practice of the principles of
equality and women's emancipation constitutes a major source of conflict
and frustration in the "modern" mariages in Tunisia today. Seen on the
background of the rapid shift in gender-roles these young people have
experienced, this should come as no surprise.
On the basis of the discussion above, one may conclude that academic
training and the kind of occupationallife it qualifies for has a fundamental
impact on both the practices and the conceptions of the informants who
have obtained this level of education. According to the informants' stories,
higher education and the jobs it tends to lead to have another important
consequence: There is a strong connection between academic training and
geographical mobility. Without exception, all the educated informants live
away from Bled; either because of ongoing studies, or because of johs
obtained as a result of completed studies. Among the informants without
higher education, there are only three exceptions from the general tendency
of spending the entire life in Bled: As a representative of the eldest
generation, Fatoma clearly deviates from the rest with her twenty yearS in
the CapitaL. Her grand-daughter Leila has spent a period there because of
her husband's job, but is now back in Bled on a permanent basis, and
Lassad has also been temporarily to Tunis because of his work.
The next chapter will among other topics look into how the informants
experience their different migrational practices themselves; it will examine
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the informants ' relations to their family , their local community, and the
society in general.
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11. Relations to family, local community,
and society
11.1 Family-relations
The stories of the informants show that there has been a change in family-
structure from extended family households toward nuclear-family
households during the last three generations. According to them, this is a
trend that characterizes most households in Bled. This change has
developed gradually; the pace of re-structuring seems, however, to have
been particularly strong during the sixties:
The informants of the eldest generation have all spent most of their
mared life in extended family households. The second generation, by
contrast, has generally started mared life in the household of the
husband's family, and has left to settle on their own after a few years.
Hassan Falleah and his wife had their two first children while they were
living in the house of his father Mustfa, then they built a house of their
own, and moved out. Fatheia Muaddaf also spent the first five years of her
marage with her parents-in-law, be fore she and her husband bought a
house next door to them. Mahmoud and Habiba Tejer had their own house
from the start of their marriage, but Mahmoud' s widowed mother lived
with them until she died.
Turning to the third generation, we see that only Leila is li ving with her
in-laws in a household comprising two adult generations. She had, however,
her own home from the start of her marriage, and the present arangement
is of a temporary charaeter. One thing should be noted concerning the case
of Leila, however: Even though she has problems of getting along with her
mother-in-law, moving in with her parents does not seem to be an
alternative for her. In line with other information, this suggests that in cases
where extended family household is practised today, the traditional rule of
living with the husband's family still seems to be dominating. A maried
woman's return to her parents' house may easily be interpreted as her
leaving her husband.
The other maried informants of the third generation all had their own
households after they got maried; this is the desired and expected situation
also for those who are not yet mared. The informants speak of this change
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in family-structure from extended family households to nuclear-family
households as a general phenomenon; Mahmoud, for instance, says that "all
members of the family used to live together in the same house, but now,
everybody lives separate from the family". There is reason to regard this as
a general trend, at !east in Bled and the surrounding areas.
All the informants who have experienced life in both kinds of household
prefer the new alternative. The fact that most of them find that this
development weakens the family-bonds, does not alter this attitude. Hassan,
who seemingly holds a deviating view, may express a central effect of
separate households on family-relations:
Perhaps the contrary is the case. The way of living now increases the
solidarty. Because before, when they used to live in the same house,
there were usually quarels and problems between the family-members.
But now, when everybody lives separate, one does not have this. One
brother invites the other to his house - all are friends. So I think that this
way of living increases the solidarty in the family.
The splitting-up of the extended family into separate households is strongly
associated with the general improvement of the economic situation after
independence. From the point of view of the informants, the extended
family households thus seem to have been an economic necessity in a time
of limited resources; the ability to leave this situation behind is regarded as
a undisputable sign of progress.
The changes in family-structure that have been experienced by the last
three generations of Beldiyins deserve to be characterized as formidable. In
chapter seven we saw that the average age of marriage for girls has risen
considerably, and in chapter eight that the number of children have
decreased even more considerably. When the splitting-up of the extended
family households into nuclear-families is added to this picture, we face a
change in household-pattern from units consisting of up to thirty individuals
distributed across three to four generations, to today's dominating pattern
of households containing four to six individuals distributed across two
generations. This development is, as mentioned, experienced as overall
positive by the informants.
The above mentioned post-colonial changes in the family-structures is a
phenomenon that has influenced all the informants' conditions of existence.
Turning to other dimensions of family-relations, the situation is less
homogenous. The actual families themselves, their history and different
social positions stand out as central factors behind the differences, as we
shall see:
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11.1.1 The Tejer-family
The Tejer-representatives draw a picture of a haronious group in
describing their family. We have seen earlier that Habiba and Mahmoud
exercise relatively HUle controlover the lives of their children; they have
for instanee no paricular wish of getting involved in the children's choice
of life-companions. Meriem was happy to take the advice of her father
concerning her marage; N ora, by contrast, wanted to make her own
choice, and was allowed to do that. This relative lack of involvement in the
other family-members' affairs is regarded as a virtue by the Tejers;
Mahmoud actually makes a point of stating that he never interferes in his
children's lives unless he is directly asked for help or advice. When that is
the case he is, however, happy to assist them.
Also regarding the elder members of the family the Tejers are fairly
liberal; the case of Aisha indicates this. By her own choice she lives alone,
an unusual situation for a woman of her generation. She does, however,
appreciate the freedom of living by herself; she resists the idea of being
"under a daughter-in-law". Even if her children are not very happy with the
situation, which may easily be interpreted by the surroundings as a
consequence of her children abandoning her, they let her have her way. (As
Aisha is Habiba's mother, she is not the responsibility of Mahmoud; still,
he agrees with and supports his brothers-in-law's practice concerning her.)
At present, there is liule economic dependency between the different
generations of Tejers. Mahmoud helps his youngest daughter, who is still
a student, as he has helped all his academically trained children through
their studies. There are also some distant relatives receiving his regular
economic assistance; except from that, the family-members cope on their
own economically. This present situation does not, however, in any way
rule out material assistance between relatives as a possibility; it is just not
needed at the moment. The Tejers of all generations tind economic
assistanee to family-members in ne ed to be a self-evident duty.
None of the Tejers can actually think of any negative aspects of their
family-membership. Even though they recognize mutual obligations
concerning material and practical assistance, they do not experience this as
a burden. In addition, no unacceptable restretions on individual freedom or
unreasonable expectations in any other way are reported by the family-
members. They do, however, state that this is not the case in all other
families, and they consider themselves lucky because of this relative lack
of control from the family.
The definition of the ideal family held by the majority of Tejers reflects
the actual situation within their family; the weight is put on emotional
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aspects of family-life. Meriem's definition is representative for the general
view of the Tejers:
I think that to have a good family , first of all we should bring up our
children. We should lear them to do good things - not to steal, for
example. Secondly, there should be an understanding between the husband
and wife. No problems in the family.
All the Tejers express concern for the other family-members. The well-
being of the children tend, however, to be particulary important to the elder
women. The quality of Habiba's entire life seems to be determined by the
children's situations:
I think that this period of my life is the best, because now all my children
- all my daughters are maried and live good lives, the y live in
understanding with their husbands.
Aisha expresses a similar attitude, and also for Mahmoud the children' s
lives are of big importance:
It is very important for me to meet them, and I want that they live in a
good situation. (...) I no more think about my own future. I now usually
think about the future of my children.
Still, Mahmoud makes a point of stating that he does not visit his children
- he meets them when they come to see him. This may be seen in
connection with his wish not to interfere in their affairs, but is probably
more closely connected to the traditional gendered division of family-
related functions discussed in chapter three; the maintenance of family-
relations through visits is a par of the women' s "private" culture.
Mahmoud' s behaviour may also be understood in light of the fact that
according to the traditional social code, receiving visitors instead of visiting
is a sign of social reg ard and status (Abu Sahra 1982).
The Tejers liv ing in Bled see each other regularly; the women also
cooperate on several practical household-tasks, as reported e arli er. The
members of the family who live elsewhere are reported to be missed, but
their absenee is accepted; Nora, the young teaeher, does not feel any
pressure to visit Bled. Still, for her own sake, she comes as often as
possible; once a month during the year, and for all the holidays. Her wish
to see her family is the strongest incentive for her visits; friends come
second. Nora feels comfortable with her family; none of the Tejers find
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difference in generation or level of education to be a source of conflict or
obstacle to communication.
In short: According to the dominating concept of the ideal family among
the Tejers, they seem to have one in most respects. The Tejers also tend to
share the evaluation of the general development within the family; each
generation lives better than the previous. Material concerns are important
elements of their evaluation, and also the increased level of education. The
family has be en prospering during the post~colonial period; elements of
"modern society" have made possible the improvement of both their
material and their social status. It is reasonable to see the relative liberal-
mindedness and individual freedom of the family in connection with its
positive experiences with "modern times".
11 .1.2 The cousins
The economic relations within the cousins' family are quite different from
those of the Tejer-family; both Mohammed and Lassad contribute to the
maintenance of their parents on a regular basis. Still, this is not perceived
as a burden. On the contrary, Mohammed says, "I am proud. Because I am
able not to take from my family, but togive to them".
Mohammed' s idea of the ideal family corresponds to a certain ex 
tent
with his cousin Meriem's:
The ideal family for me is to have a mother and a father who makes a
good couple, and children who succeed in their studies. It is only that.
His younger brother Lassad generally agrees, but adds good economy as an
important aspect of an ideal family . They are both satisfied with the
relations between the members of their own family . Lassad thinks that his
parents are totally satisfied with his life; Mohammed finds one source of
conflict only:
Sometimes my mother says that she wants me to visit a certain person in
the family, or that my wife should attend a certain ceremony - we have
a very big family here -. That is the only problem. Except from that,
they are very content with me, and very content with - everything.
Mohammed do es experience conflicts between him and his family because
of varying interest and engagement in the Beldiyin social life. This
divergence in attitudes he finds to be based on unequal educational
backgrounds. Except from this, he does not find any problems of
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communication as a consequence of the different levels of education within
the family:
luse their language. When I speak with my mother, I do not speak like
when I speak with you. My mother has her own language, in line with her
mentality. With unde Mahmoud, you see luse another language, and with
Habiba I use a language - it depends.
Mohammed seems to be quite conscious of the way he deals with the
situation; in any case, he does not flnd it very problematic.
Mohammed and Lassad agree in their evaluation of the family: It
prospers, both economically and educationally. C ert ai n reported incidents
indicate that the experience of individual freedom is somewhat less in the
cousins' family , however; the circumstances around the marriages of the
boys described in chapter seven suggest that this may be the case. Still,
Mohammed's way of dealing with the obstacles to his mariage shows that
his parents' dominance in their children's liv es is negotiable. In short, the
relations within the cousins' family share central characteristìcs with those
of the Tejer-family.
11 .1.3 The M uaddaf-family
The family-relations within the Muaddaf-family differ quite radically from
those of the Tejers. All Muaddaf-informants find considerable burdens
related to their family-membership; while Fatoma and Fatheia, the elder
women, actually seem to be proud of them, the youngest informants flnd
them to be mainly negative. These burdens are closely related to the
family's special social status - I let Leila speak for all of them:
Yes, I feel burdens on me. Because I am the daughter of the Muaddafs.
Before my marage, when I was studying, I could not dare - I had not
the courage to for example stop in the street and speak with a boy, it was
really impossible, because I was the daughter of the Muaddafs. Even now,
there are many things that I want to do, but I cannot, because I should
remember that I am the daughter of my family. For example, if I had
problems with my husband, and wanted to divorce him, it would be
impossible. Because I am a Muaddaf, and my husband is a relative of
mme.
While the young Muaddaf-women tend to flnd their family-membership
positive in sum, the young men think that they would have been better off
without it. None of the young Muaddafs are very occupied with the
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family's special social status; if anything, they seem to be bothered by it.
Nejib expresses ms feelings for his family-membership thus:
There are more negative sides. Because I do not beHeve in my family . I
do not mean my parents, my brother and sisters, but the bigger family. I
have never beHeved in it, and I do not feel honoured to belong to it. (...)
They usually tty to oppress my personal choices, to intervene in my
personal affairs. This is why, in some situations, I find myself obHged to
moderate my desires, in order to calm my family. And I know that I have
no choice.
The social status of the Muaddafs seems to result in a larger exercise of
controlover the family-members' lives: In chapter seven we saw how Leila
was mared to a relative because he had the same family-name. Her sister
Jalila will probably be spared the same experience; still, we have seen
earlier that her father tries to influence her choice of occupation according
to what isconsidered suitable for a Muaddaf-woman. N ejib finds his
family's constant interference in his life intolerable, and also Tarek feels
that ms father is not content with his present situation, and that he tries to
influence ms personal decisions.
The definitions of an ideal family also differs considerably among the
Muaddafs. The younger ones tend to share the Tejer' s opinion; they
emphasize the importanee of openness and a good relationship between the
parents and children. The ideas of Fatoma and Fatheia, by contrast, are
clearly influenced by considerations of the family's position. Fatheia's
definition follows:
The ideal family for me is - as we do in our family - we should not
do bad things, we should not go out whenever we want, we should not
speak with everybody. And even for my children, I hope that they follow
our way. That they do not, for example, get mared to girls that we do
not like, and - they should follow our way, in order to get an ideal
family.
Fatheia finds her present stage in life to be filled with worries, because of
her unmaried sons:
How wil they get mared? I think about the girls they wil get maried
to. Especially because we are of a good family , so it is difficult to find
girls at the same leveL. And in addition they should be good-looking, of
course, and with education. I would like them to work. I worry that they
wil fin d girls that are not good. And some in the family want them to get
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maried the traditional way, others not -- so I am usually tired, more tired
than befare, tired of thinking.
Even if the actual situations of Habiba and Fatheia differs we see that for
both of them, the concern for the children to a large ex tent is decisive for
the quality of their lives as they experience it. It is also clear that Fatheia's
ambitions for her children are influenced by the idea of belonging to a
special family . Her mother' s way of thinking is in all central respects
similar to Fatheia's. None of them find high er education for girls to be an
obstacle to the preservation of the family's position, though; the contrary
seems to be the case. Still, a proper Muaddaf-girl should not go out
whenever she wants, or speak to unsuitable persons - the two ways of life
may appear as somewhat complicated to combine.
Fatoma, the Muaddaf grand-mother, and her husband live with their son,
and are, like Aisha Tejer, totally dependent on economic assistance from
their children. J alila receives help for her studies; between the other
Muaddafs, there are no regular economic relations at the present.
Occasional assistance is given both byehildren and parents, but in general
they cope on their own. Still, all the Muaddafs tind economic assistance to
family-members to be a self-evident principle.
Like the Tejers, the Muaddafs who live in Bled see each other on a
regular basis. Those living elsewhere return to Bled quite of ten. They do,
however, not mention the family as a special reason to come - it is more
a question of breaking the rhythm of their occupational lives. "If I had a
car, perhaps I would go somewhere else ..." says Tarek. Also Nejib goes
to Bled primarily for other reasons than to see his family:
Not really because of the family. My family has never been a ne ed for
me. I could be away from them one, two, three years, without being
bothered. The most important thing for me is my personal integrity. The
fact that I am here in my room makes me at ease; it makes me feel that
I am existing. In the vilage where I work I am non-existent; because I
refuse to live there, there is nothing that ties me to that vilage. What
makes me come here, are my things; my books, my records and cassettes.
Even if I spend all the time here in my room, without going out, it does
not bother me.
The young Muaddafs also seem to have problems of communication with
the other generations of the family - not necessarly because of the
difference in education, though:
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My father and I are on different wavelengths. You know? He has a
special manner of thinking, and I have another one. It is special - bon,
his context is not the same, he was born in the twenties, he has seen the
second world-war, and - we do not have the same context, we have not
the same - it is not the same. Not the same financial situation, too. And
he is a member of a big family. It is not the same for me. (...) I think that
if we have not the same way of thinking, we have no similarities in our
lives, no?
This is par of Tarek's description of his relationship with his father. It is
also representative for Nejib and Jalila's experiences with him.
The Muaddafs' evaluation of the development of their family is
considerably more ambivalent than the Tejers'; actually, there is an
opposite tendency to be found. Fatoma thinks that her parents lived better
than herself; while she married a peasant with a big family to support, they
were well off economically. Tarek, too, finds that his father has probably
had a better life than mm, both concerning economy, and other things. All
the young Muaddafs find great differences in their ways of living as
compared to their parents' lives. Diverging contexts of time, and different
perceptions of life in general are the reasons they see behind these
differences.
There seem to be significant generational differences in the Muaddafs'
experiences oftheir family-memberships. Divergingattitudes to the famIly's
special social status stand out as a core factor behind the differences. The
two eldest generations tend to giv e it great importance, and therefore accept
the personal restrictions they find necessary in order to preserve it. They
seem to find the preservation of the family , s social status to be a main
objective in life. The young Muaddafs, by contrast, seem to find the
family's status to be outdated, in a way, and of little importance, as they
experience the restrictions that it imposes as a negative and even intolerable
element in their lIves.
The Muaddaf-family's status has its base in the traditional social order
of the local community; it dates back to the colonial and pre-colonial
period. The characteristics of the family that created this position - male
literacy and the Imam-status - are values in decline in the modern
Tunisian society. Formal education is no longer an exceptional asset, and
the traditionally highly estimated position as Imam meets considerable
competition from new prestigious positions in the local community.
The elder Muaddafs' dem and that the family-members conform to the
traditional "other-directed" rules of conduct, may be understood as a
strategy to preserve the famIly's social status. As this position has its base
in the traditional social order, they try to maintain it by following the social
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practices of that order. This conservative attitude seems, however, to create
considerable problems and difficulties of communication between the elder
and the younger generations of the family , as the young Muaddafs do not
flnd the family's status to be important enough to deserve what they
experience as a considerable sacriflee of personal integrity. The family's
advantageous "public" social position seems to have significantly less
advantageous effects on the "private" personal relations within the family .
11 .1.4 The F a lleah-family
All the members of the Falleah-family living in Bled have houses in the
same quarter, so even though their households are separate, they spend a
lot of time together. As reported earlier, Mustfa has six sons of quite
different ages. In addition to their economic support of their old father, the
sons have assisted each other a lot in getting starte d with their shops, work-
shops, and the other ways in which they earn their living. This support
between brothers is a source of obligations; because of the economic and
moral debts between them, they do not feel entirely free to do as they wish.
Hassan does flnd that there are burdens related to his family-membership,
considerations towards the family that restrict his personal freedom. These
obligations do not seem to have damaged the good relations within the
family, however; the Falleahs are known to appreciate each other's
company.
Hassan ' s definition of an ideal family reflects this combination of
emotional and material aspects:
I think that before getting mared one should have both the economic and
the emotional side in order. And after getting maried, one should bring
up the children well, and be able to afford their needs. That is how you
get a good family .
Mustfa and Hassan do not find difference in education to constitute a
problem within the family. Mustfa thinks that his parents had better lives
than him, because they were better off economically. At the same time, he
finds that his grand-children, too, have better liv es than him, both
concerning economy and education. In general bothMustfa and his son are
content with the lives of all the family-members, and find the post-colonial
social development to have been generous to the family .
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While all the informants have been similarly affected by the post-colonial
changes in family-structure, the different informant-families have rather
diverging practices concerning maintenance of the family-relations and
control of the family-members' individuallives. The Tejers stand out as the
family whose conduct diverges most from the traditional North-African
principles for social organization, while the Muaddaf-family is the one
whose conduct is most in line with these principles. The implications of
these diverging practices will be examined later.
11.2 Relations to the local community
Turning to the informants' relations to the local community, Bled,
generation and level of education again stand out as main factors behind the
differences. Most of the information on this topic is to be found "between
the lines"; the informants have described their relations to Bled mainly in
indirect terms. There is, however, no lack of statements clearly indicating
the position the local community holds in the different informants' lives.
11 .2.1 The two eldest generations
With the exception of Fatoma Muaddaf, who spent twenty years in the
Capital, all the informants of the two eldest generations have lived in Bled
all their lives. They have only been out of town a few times. Aisha is,
however, the only one of these informants who has not performed the hajj
- the pilgrimage to Mecca. Most of the informants have at least
experienced this longer journey. The travel to Mecca holds a very special
position in the lives of these people, however, and should not be regarded
as an ordinary trp abroad. The fact that Mahmoud Tejer has been to Mecca
three times, and his wife Habiba has been there twice, while they have
otherwise not been abroad, indicates that the reason for these journeys is
not a liking for travels in general, but religious commitment. Actually
Mahmoud loathes going away from Bled; as of ten as possible, he leaves his
occasional business in Tunis to be taken care of by others. His whole
existence is centred around Bled, and he has little curiosity for the world
outside.
The nature and extent of Mahmoud and Habiba's ties to the local
community is indicated by the way they approach problems in their lives;
Habiba's description of the family's handling of an unknown suitor to one
of their daughters is a good illustration:
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At that time we did not know the family of her husband. So, my husband
gave him a period. Re said to him: Give me a week, or two weeks, and
I wil give you my answer. And during that time, he asked many people
who knew him and his family. And after that, when he was sure that
everything was O.K., he agreed.
As the suitor was a Beldiyin, this was an appropriate way of dealing with
the situation. This strategy is, however, clearly not applicable to the case
of Nora, for instance, as her boyfriend originates from a completely
different par of Tunisia. We have seen that tbis concrete problem has been
solved in practice by Mahmoud and Habiba's withdrawal from the decision-
makng. It is, however, worth noting that they do not account for their way
of handling this situation when describing their practices concerning the
children's mariages; one may assume that incidents like this fall outside
the kind of social situations they have standard means to cope with.
The way Mahmoud deals with his participation in the national elections
may serve as another illustration of the same approach: V oting is generally
held to be a typical national-level-activity. Still, Mahmoud makes up his
mind through interaction with his local community. He knows little of the
paries' policies, but asks his acquaintances to tell him which of the
candidates that are good; then he votes on the basis of this information.
The importanee the elder Muaddafs giv e to their family's special social
position also indicates a strong orientation towards the loe al social
community. Their position is of local origin, and it is of little use to them
elsewhere. And because the family's status to a little degree is based on
exceptional material wealth, they are in fact special in Bled' s social
universe only. The fundament of the elder Muaddafs' pride thus seems to
imply a strong local orientation from these members of the family .
The language of the elder informants is another illustration of their
dependency on the local community. Places are usually referred to in terms
of their location in relation to properties of acquaintances; street-names or
formal addresses are not used. Thus, a car-crash happens in front of the
house of the H.-family, or next to B.'s shop, not in Avenue Bourgiba, for
example. The same is the case regarding their perception of time; for them,
a certain thing did not happen in 1982, but in the year when a cousin built
asecond floor on his house, or the year when a daughter had her second
child.
It seems as if the elder informants are tied to their local community in
quite a profound way; if these persons were removed from Bled, they
would loose fundamental cornerstones on which they construet their entire
social existence.
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11 .2 .2 The young generation
All the informants of the young generation seem to have more contact with
the world outside Bled than their elder relatives. The general increase in
geographic mobility mentioned in chapter two may probably account for a
par of this tendency. Level of education does, however, to a considerable
degree decide the extent and nature of the young informants' geographic
mobility. It also seems to influence their relationship to Bled.
Meriem Tejer has lived in Bled all her life. Her husband has spent
periods working in The Middle East and in another Tunisian town; during
these periods, she has stayed in Bled with theehildren. This is a solution
to such situations much practised by people with low education, and it may
be seen as an indicator of a strong sense of belonging to the loe 
al
community.
LeIla Muaddaf spent the first years of her married life in Tunis, but is
now in the proeess of returning to Bled, a fact that she is very pleased with.
Lassad stilllives in Tunis, but also he and his wife have concrete plans of
building a house in Bled and move back as soon as his business allows it.
Generally , all the young informants without higher education express a
strong sense of belonging to Bled, and those who live elsewhere seem to
regard their situation as more or less temporary.
The informants with higher education also report to have positive feelings
for Bled. None of them live there, however, and they seem to be
considerably less eager to return than the others. Most of them actually
express satisfaction with their present situation; their stories suggest that
living away from their local community of origin may be a strategy to
avoid certain problems:
Nora Tejer likes Bled a lot, and appreciates her occasional stays in her
original local community. Still, for several reasons she has no wish for a
permanent return to the town. First of all, she sees a potential problem in
combining her professionallife with her family-relations; it would not be
easy to teach relatives, or to give them just marks in school, she thinks.
Secondly, she and her fiancé want to live away from their families - not
because they do not want them near, but because visiting them then will
present a variation in their lives:
I want to be near my family all the time, but I do not want to live in
Bled, because I think that it wil be routine. A boring life. But if we visit
them from time to time, I feel that there wil be a change in my life.
Nora makes a clear distinetion between her occupational life and her
family- and holiday-life:
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When I come back to my town, I forget all about my work, I leave it in
the town where I work. And I try to live with my family. I separate the
two lives. And when I go back to the town where I work, Ileave the life
with my family.
Mohammed shares Nora's approach to his Bled-existence. He lov es Bled,
but is not planning to return on a permanent basis for a long time:
If I return to Bled, it wil not be as a functionary. Not on salary-work.
Perhaps, in ten years, if I start a project with my frends - why not. A
good hoteL, a good restaurant -. After ten years I wil have a lot of
experience from my job, and a lot of contacts - why not.
Like Nora, Mohammed divides his life into work and holidays:
For me, it is psychologicaL. For me, Tunis means work. And Bled is for
relaxation, for breathing. If I stay in Tunis too long, I am out of balance.
We saw above that Bled represents a resort from the routine of working life
also to Tarek and Nejib. Their sister Jalila has the same attitude, but she
could actually imagine moving back to Bled after her studies, if she got a
job there. The chances are, however, smalL.
Bled seems to represent non-occupational aspects of life for the young
informants with higher education. The idea of combining occupationallife
and life in Bled is rather unattractive to them. A possible permanent return
to their original loe al community tends to be associated with retirement-like
situations; Tarek, for instance, could imagine running a small far there
some time in the far future - areturn now is out of the question.
Bled is thus far from indifferent to these informants; it satisfies a
significant need for relaxation and family-life. The fact that they all return
to Bled for the celebrations of the traditional life-course events -
engagements, marriages, and also their sons' circumcisions, indicates that
they to a significant extent identify with their community of origin. At the
same time this illustrates the importanee of these celebrations as occasions
for families' self-promotion in the social community, as argued in chapter
three and chapter six.
Still, the academically trained informants tend to solve the problem of
combining their occupational life and the practices it requires, and the
practices related to the family-life in a small-scale social community, by
separating them both geographically and mentally. This way none of the
pars of their life suffer; this solution involves a minimum of compromise.
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There is a fundamental change in the academically trained informants'
relations to Bled, as compared to the elder informants, and also to a
considerable extent the young informants without higher education. To the
elder informants, their local community is the fundament of their entire
social existence. Also to the young informants without higher education the
town constitutes a significant base for their sociallife ~ all of their social
life, not just a part of it. Bled is evidently important to the informants with
higher education; it does, however, only constitute a part of their total
sociallife. It seems to be regarded as problematic to combine Bled-life with
the other pars of their life.
The preferred solution to this problem seems to be a geographical and
mental separation of the different dimensions of their sociallife; Bled is for
family-life, holidays and reI ax ation, while the place where they work or
study is for occupationallife and the life-style it requires. This solution
actually seems to work quite well; both for the academically trained
informants themselves, and for their Beldiyin families.
11.3 Relations to society and state
We have seen above that the elder informants tend to have a more
fundamental orientation towards their local community than the young ones.
In relation to this, a clear tendency in their stories stands out as quite
puzzling: At the same time as they are profoundly locally oriented, the
elder informants report both a larger commitment towards the post-colonial
Tunisian regime, and a larger paricipation in institutionalized political
activities than the young informants:
11.3.1 The two eldest generations
All the elder informants regard independence in 1956 as the most important
political happening in their lifetime. It is worth no ting that they generally
associate this happening strongly with the first president, Habib Bourgiba;
some actually refer to it not as "the independence", but as "the day when
Bourgiba returned from France". The reasons given for the independence's
importanee are quite homogenous; Fatheia Muaddaf's evaluation covers
most opinions:
168
The independence was important. When we first heard about it, we were
very happy. Because we would be free. From that time all people could
w ork, all children could go to schooL. Not like under the colonization,
when people who had money could be educated, and poor people could
not.
The countr' s freedom in itself is seen as a significant value. The improved
possibilities of work and material prosperity is also mentioned as a central
positive consequence of the independence, paricularly by the men. Again,
the women tend to emphasize non-material aspects:
The most important things that the independence brought Tunisia, is the
education of our children. And second, the liberation of the women.
This is Habiba Tejer's view, which she shares with all the women. Also the
men recognize the improved situation for women after the independence,
which again is associated with the new personal code that was introduced
in 1957.
A sign of the legitimacy the post-colonial regime enjoys within this
category of informants, is the fact that they with few exceptions vote
regularly. Even Aisha and Fatoma, two illiterate old housewives of "more
than seventy years", participate in every election. Habiba explains her
paricipation thus:
I think that it is one of my rights. Before, women had no right to do that.
But why not? Now we are allowed to do it, so we should do it - we
should vote.
Hassan has the following view on voting:
I think that it is both a duty and a right to vote. Like that I can
participate, and choose the one that I want.
In sum, all the elder informants find that the conditions of existence for
most Tunisians have improved drastically as a consequence of
independence. The situations before and after independence seem to be
experienced as very different; so different that the eldest informants actually
claim that they are not comparable. The rise in economic wealth, the
introduction of compulsory school, and the improved situation for women
- and men - are reported to be the most significant consequences of the
independence. This positive development is to a large extent associated
with one person; the first president Habib Bourgiba. The fact that all the
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elder informants participate in elections on a regular basis indicates a
recognition of the legitimacy of the post-colonial regime. One may assume
that this legitimacy is based mainly on the informants' positive experiences
with the regime during the early post-colonial period. Their attitudes toward
today's concrete political situation support this assumption:
The elder informants report liule interest in present national polities. The
low interest seems to be based on a lack of understand ing of politicallife;
disappointment with the late political development also seems to be of
significance. Some of them tend to associate political interest and
engagement with trouble. Fatheia expresses this idea most clearly:
I am not interested in politics. Many things do not please me, but I do not
intervene. Because I want to live in peace. No polities.
The reg ard for the present politicians is not very high, either; Fatoma
spe aks for most of the elder informants when stating that
Some of them destroy, others repair. And there are more of those who
destroy than those who repair.
At the same time as they express a strong basic support for the post-
colonial regime, and recognize that it has improved their life-conditions
significantly, the elder informants are reserved in their attitude towards the
concrete present political development in Tunisia. An objection held by
several of them, is that the politicians do. not follow the religion. Still, it is
worth noting that none of these informants, who are all sincere Muslims,
have any regard for the Islamic fundamentalists - not as a political
movement, and not as interpreters of the religion. They express a
considerable suspicion towards them; a general ide a is that they dress
according to the Muslim rules, and think that this allows them to behave
as they like. The elder informants represent what one may call a
"traditional" Tunisian way of interpreting Islam. Habiba's view illustrates
this interpretation well:
It is not important. To wear this kind of clothes, and do bad things, for
example - . The more importat for me is to behave - to do good
things. Because - religion and belief are in our hans, not in the kind of
clothes we wear.
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11 .3.2 The young generation
The young informants, who have not personally experienced the
independence, all find "The Seventh of November" - the change of
president in 1987 - to be the most important political event in their
lifetime; that is, among those who find any important political events to
have taken place at alL. The general evaluation of this change three years
after, illustrates the young informants' general feelings towards national
polities, however; disappointment and lack of interest. Nora expresses the
common opinion of her generation:
Of course, when Zin (the new president) to ok the power. Because it was
the first time that this happened. From the beginning, from when I was
born, I lived with the same situation. I knew that Bourgiba was our
president - the same things, nothing new. But with this change, we
hoped that there would be a new life for us. But it is the same. Only the
persons changed.
The young informants without higher education showagenuine lack of
interest. None of them have ever voted; Lassad and Leila - as well as
Jalila - have never received the papers necessary for participation in
elections, and none of them have bothered to make an effort to get them.
To the extent that they find national politics to influence their personallives
at all, they name mainly negative effects, like increase in food-prizes, as
examples. Like the elder informants, none of them have much faith in the
politicians. Leila puts it like this:
Perhaps there are some who tae care of the country, but then there comes
one and takes all the money, and we are back where we stated. So if we
advanee five years, we are put back five years again.
The young informants with higher education to an extent share the attitude
of the others towards polities. Still, their apathy seems to be more
situational; several of them report that the hopelessness of the present
Tunisian politicallife makes them stay away from it. If the country had a
proper political system, they would have reacted differently. Nora says:
If we lived like in other countries, if we had a real politicallife, politics
would have a influential role in our lives. But like this politics - one
party masters all the country - it is not interesting at all. And of course
it has a bad influence, a negative influence, on our lives.
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Some of the academically trained male informants have been politically
active in different oppositional movements earlier; it has caused them
considerable trouble, however, and they have pulled out, in order to protect
themselves. Nejib has the following experiences with Tunisian polities:
I am very interested in politics, but I flnd that it is better for me to stay
away from this activity, because, as I to Id you, my political past could
create difficulties for me. In fact I am not very interested in Tunisian
politics, because politics are disgusting here. Anyway, I think that
Tunisian politics are secondar politics. Compared to what is happening
in the world, politics in Tunisia has never been important, and it can
never be a part of the international politics that change the world. It is the
politics that change the world that interest me, the politics of the
dominating and leading countries.
Mohammed is the only one of the informants with higher education who
votes regularly, and who show genuine interest for Tunisian political life.
He does, however, report to be quite alone with this attitude to national
politics:
Yes, I vote. And I believe in it. Most of my friends do not believe in
voting - I do.
A few of the others have participated in elections once or twice; some are
actually embarrassed to admit it, however, and stress that it is not aregular
habit.
The informants of the young generation seem to identify with the
Tunisian political regime to a much lesser degree than the elder informants.
At the same time, they tend to have a clearer idea of Tunisia as a national
state, independently from the actual regime, than the elder ones.
Mohammed, for instance, complains about elder people' s lack of interest
in the national honour:
The honour in Tunisia is very closely related to the women. The honour
of the nation, the country, means nothing here. (...) One speaks a lot about
honour. But when the Israelis came here and bombed us, nobody in the
familes, not the fathers, not the mothers, spoke about honour.
The informants who have not personally experienced the independence,
seem to have an overall negative perception of the post-colonial political
regime in Tunisia. The elder speak of Bourgiba, the first president, with
affection; to the young Tunisians, he is mainly a favourite object of jokes
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- to them, he is a symbol of corruption, cynicism, and political decay.
Personal experience with the early post-colonial period, as well as the
colonial period, seems to be of importanee for the basic attitude towards the
political regime as such. The difference in voting-behaviour between the
generations should be seen in this connection.
The young informants - paricularly those with higher education - do,
however, seem to have a stronger idea of Tunisia as a national state,
independent from the actual regime in power. This generation's increased
contact with other pars of the country, may have contributed to this
situation. The fact that Tunisia has been an autonomous, independent state
all their lives, and that they therefore have no other image of their country,
is probably also of significance. As important is probably the fact that all
the young informants have been in contact with the institution of formal
education introduced after independence - an institution that, as argued in
chapter nine, has contributed significantly to the integration of the younger
generations of Tunisians in the new, independent national state.
A general feature of all the informants' political attitudes is that they
reg ard present, concrete, national politics with both scepticism and lack of
interest. They seem to expect nothing good from the authorities, and try to
cope with their lives in spite of the national politics, rather than with the
help of it.
11.4 Trends of change in relations to family , local
community, and society
The change in household-structure that has taken place in Bled during the
last three generations deserves to be characterized as remarkable. The
average size of households has decreased significantly as a result of the
decrease in physical reproductivity, and the "nuc1earization" of extended
family-households.
It is reasonable to assume that the splitting up of the extended family
households into smaller units may have resulted in a weakening of the
extended family-relations of mutual support, obligations and control that,
as argued in chapter three, traditionally have been strong in the North-
Afrcan societies. The elder informants, who have experienced both kinds
of household-structure in practice, confirm that such a change has taken
place.
Still, the case of Leila, who in spite of her problems with her mother-in-
law seems unable to move in with her parents, indicates that the traditional
patrilinear principles of family-organization have not yet been through any
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significant quaUtative changes; their importanee seems, however, to have
decreased.
All the informants find this development to have been overall positive.
In addition to the reported decrease of conflicts within the families, the
"nuclearzation" of the households also seems to be experienced as aresult
of material prosperity, and as an increase of comfort in the informants'
lives.
Turning to the nature of the present family-relations within the informant
families, the families' specific histories seem to be of large importance.
According to the traditional North-African principles for social
organization, the Tejer-family is actually in a rather unfavourable situation:
It is small, with few male members, and with no particular traditionally
founded social position in Bled. This originally unfavourable situation
seems, however, to have had a positive effect on the family's present
situation. First of all, their traditionally defined modest social status seems
to have given the eldest Tejer-generations a positive attitude to the post-
colonial social development. Their favourable experiences with the recent
social changes seem to have made them more open also to the "modern"
moral aspects of life. At the same time, the small size of the extended
family leaves the Tejers relatively free to deviate from traditional rules.
These conditions seem to have eased considerably the generational
conflicts that will be unavoidable in a society in rapid change. The Tejers
have been able to preserve good relations within the family , in spite of
individual differences between the members.
As we have seen, the Muaddafs have a very different family-history.
They have a special social status to protect, a position that originates from
the traditional social order in Bled. In addition, the extended Muaddaf-
family is large, with many influential and dominating male relatives, who
exercise a considerable degree of controlon the individual members. Even
if Fatheia and Tahar had wanted to give their children more personal
freedom than they actually have, it would probably have been difficult,
because of the influence of the extended family .
As a result of the post-colonial social changes, the Muaddafs' social
position is in declIne. This development seems to be counteracted by the
elder generations through conformity to the traditional other-directed rules
of conduct. As the youngest generation is a product of the new times, they
seem to experience this behaviour as out-dated. In addition, their own
preferences are so influenced by the values of the new times that they
experience the demands of the family as a major obstacle to a proper life.
Their reactions are of two kinds: Leila seems to have accepted that her
family plays a major role in her life; in any case, her situation as an
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uneducated housewife does not allow her toobject. She needs the support
of her family , without it she would be worse off. For the academically
trained young Muaddafs, withdrawal from the family-scene seems to be the
solution. This is paricularly the case for the boys.
This situation tends to influence the youngeducated Muaddafs' relation
to Bled as a whole. Even though they return to their community of origin
regularly, the boys in particular report that this is mostly because practical
obstacles prevent them from going elsewhere. Nejib explicitly states that his
family-membership has a negative influence on his sociallife in Bled:
In certain situations I am presented as the grand-child of ... or the son of
... This is very common in our society, your name comes second, it is the
family-name that is regarded as important. This is a handicap, and I would
like to leave Bled, in order to tty to protect my integrity.
The informant-families' particular histories seem to be of influence for their
perception of the recent social changes. The connection between the
families' past and present may furthermore be characterized as negative; a
modest position in the traditional social order tend to lead to an ability to
adapt to the "modern times", and vice-versa. In any case, family-belonging
seems to constitutea significant - positive or negative - part of the self-
image of all the informants, regardless of gender, generation, and leve! of
education.
The informants' relation to the local community is connected to their
relation to the family . Level of education has an even more significant
influence on the informants' relation to Bled, however. As argued in
chapter three, low geographic mobility and a conception of one's local
community as the only significant social universe are characteristics of the
traditional North-African social organization. The low mobility of the elder
informants, as well as their way of approaching sociallife in Bled, indicate
that these characteristics are relevant as descriptions of their relations to
their local community of origin.
This approach to Bled is also present among the young uneducated
informants; even if the tendency is somewhat weaker for this generation,
they seem to share the elder informants' perception of Bled as their "real"
social universe.
Higher education seems to change the informants' relation to Bled in a
fundamental way; it introduces a central new dimension in the lives of the
informants - a dimension that neither has any connection to Bled, nor
seems easy to combìne with the Bled-part of their lives. The academically
trained informants handle this problem by separating the two pars of their
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lives, both physically and mentally . This suggests that their professionallife
and their family-life are practised according to different kinds of principles,
which again sugge st that the kind of social and professionallife obtained
through academical training is qualitatively different from the traditional
sociallife in Bled. On this background, one may assume that the Bled-life
is of less fundamental importanee for the self image of the highly educated
informants than for the informants without higher education.
Turning to the informants' relation to national society and state,
generation seems to be a factor of large significance. The two eldest
generations, who have personally experienced the independence, have a
more positive perception of the post-colonial political regime than the
others. The young informants - particularly those with higher education
- seem to have a clearer idea of Tunisia as a national state, independent
from the actual political regime in power.
The post-colonial social changes - some of which were examined in
chapter two - seem to have had a distinet influence on all the informants '
social practices, as well as on their perception of the social world in which
they live. The actual nature of this influence vary significantly between the
informants of the two eldest generations and those of the young generation,
however. The elder informants tend to relate the changes - that they flnd
overall positive - to the independence as their starting point, and to the
post-colonial regime as their cause. The young informants' perceptions
appear more as results of these changes; the principles of the post-colonial
society are toa larger extent internalized in them, and seem to lie behind
their entire idea of the social realIty in which they live.
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12. Identity
A good life consists of obeying your husband, your family, and your
father, and of having good children (Fatoma, i st.gen. Muaddaf.
I think that in order to have a good life, one should usually go for trips,
and - change the atmosphere, not only spend the life between house and
work. One should change, have a vared life, be entertained (Jalia,
3rd.gen. Muaddaf).
In chapter three I argued that the traditional North-African concept of
identity is fundamentally group-related, gender-related, and other-dependent,
and that as aresult, there will be little practical distinetion between the
meaning of the concepts of "identity" and "social identity". Therefore, these
concepts are understood as equivalent in the study, at the same time as the
gender- and family-related aspects of identity have been given attention
when this "traditional identity" has been studied.
As also discussed in chapter three, a main purpose of the study is to
examine a possible change in this "traditional" sense of identity among the
informants, a change in the direction of a more individualized and "de-
genderized" sense of identity - here called "individual identity".
On the basis of this interpretation of the two concepts of identity, the
information about the informants' thoughts and practices presented in the
previous chapters has been seen as indicators of the different kinds of
identities among them. So far, the thoughts and practices have shown a
strong connection between the informants' leve! of education and their way
of understanding themselves. Higher education seems to lead to an
increased individualization of self images.
This tendency can be seen even more clearly in the informants'
interpretations of certain concepts that have a strong bearing on their self-
understanding. This chapter will examine their different interpretations of
"honour" and "individual freedom". In addition, it will present the
informants' very diverging ways of describing themselves.
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12.1 Honour
The informants' definitions of honour are rather diverging - not only
between the uneducated and the educated, as one may expect, but also
within the generations. In order to understand this divergence in definitions,
Tarek Muaddaf' s clarfication of the concept may be useful:
There are perhaps many kinds of honour. Like for example the honour of
the wife, and the honour of the man himself. The honour of the wife in
Tunisia is stil - puh, it is very important.
Tarek's statement corresponds, one should note, with Bourdieu's definition
of the concept of honour presented in chapter three. We shall see how the
male informants speak of male honour, while the women speak of the
female honour; however, they all agree that fundamentally, honour is a
collective family concem.
All the informants of the eldest generation agree that honour is very
important in Tunisia. Fatoma Muaddaf is the one who expresses this view
most categorically:
It is better for one who looses his honour to kil himself. Honour means
everything in Tunisia. It is equal to life. Especìally for those who have a
dose relationship to the religion.
The eldest also agree on what one should do to preserve one's honour -
one should stay away from "bad things". The bad things mentioned vary,
however, between the genders: To Mustfa Falleah, it is drinking. In
addition, he observes, one should say prayers in order to be an honourable
man. He describes men's honour-preserving behaviour particularly. Aisha,
by contrast, points out the fact that "girls should not go with boys" in order
to preserve the honour - and describes women's honourable behaviour. All
the eldest informants agree that an individual's deviance from the code of
honour will harm the entire family as mue h as the individual alone.
The informants of the second generation, too, fin d honour to be one of
the most important elements in life - "An honourless man is worth
nothng here. All people will speak about him", as Hassan Falleah puts it.
The degree to which also the second generation finds individual honour and
family-honour to be intertwined, is illustrated by Mahmoud' s definition of
the concept:
Jf one has good children, who have good jobs and lead good lives, this is
honour. But if someone lives a bad life, without taking in to consideration
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respect for other people, respect for the job, and for the family, this man
has no honour.
At the same time as he links the honour closely to the conduct of the entire
family, it seems clear that Mahmoud, as Mustfa, describes the men's
honour-preserving behaviour.
Like Aisha, Fatheia Muaddaf gives a description of the honour of the
women in particular:
The honour of the family, the honour of the girl is primar. If a girl has
her honour, she can mary the best boy, even if she is not wealthy. And
it is the same for a man.
Fatheia finds the women's preservation of their honour and the family-
honour to be very closely related; in fact, it seems to represent the same
thing for her. This connection is further strengthened by the definitions of
honour held by the informants of the young generation, as we shall see:
Leila and Meriem, the two young housewives, agree that honour is very
important in Tunisia, and that it is related to the girls' behaviour much
more than to the boys'. Leila expresses herself quite clearly about this:
I think that honour is related to women in Tunisia. We cannot speak about
the honour of men, because men can do bad things, can be bad, and -
it is a man, here, we do not do anything with them. But for women, it is
very important. It is difficult, for example, that a woman do bad things,
and that anyone wil accept her afterwards. That any boy wil mary her.
So it is very important for the girls.
Here, "bad things" should be understood mainly as pre-matrimonial sexual
activity. This illustrates a feature that is central to the younger informants'
perceptions of honour in general; more explicitly than the elder they link
it to sexual behaviour, and then paricularly women's sexual behaviour.
Lassad is an exception; he shares the elder men's concept of honour:
I think that honour has a main importance for me. It is not related to
women only, but to men and women alike, to both of them. For me, when
a man or a woman preserves the honour, he can live with confidence in
himself. Re has an importance in the society. But without honour he
cannot live. Re wil have no confidence in himself, and even people, the
point of view of people, wil be against him.
Even if he claims to define the honour for both genders, it seems as if
Lassad, like the elder men, describes primarly men's relation to honour.
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Like Hassan, he implicitly links the question of honour to people's opinion,
and thus its other-related nature.
All the informants without higher education, of all generations and both
genders, agree that honour is not only extremely important in the society,
but also very good. Even Leila, who seems to fin d the demands for
honourable behaviour to be somewhat burdensome, states that the
importanee of honour is a positive thing, "because it limits the bad things
in the society". These informants all seem to find the socia! benefits of
honour to be more significant than the restrictions the principles of honour
impose on their individuallives.
When put together, the uneducated informants' conceptions of honour
correspond with Bourdieu's definition presented in chapter three: The men's
reported honourable behaviour reflects their traditionally defined role,
characterized by "outside" social relations with "others", and by
occupational and religious tasks: An honourable man should not drink, he
should perform his prayers, he should respectother people, take his job
seriously, and respect his family. It thus corresponds with the active kind
of male honour that, according to Bourdieu, is men's contribution to the
collective family-honour.
An honourable girl should, by contrast, put briefly and in Aisha's words,
"not go with boys". A woman should, first and last, not be sexually
promiscuous in any way; if she is, she will ruin her entire family . The
reported content of the women's honour corresponds with the passive
nature it is given in Bourdieu' s definition, as well as with their female
"private", "inside", secluded life in general.
All the se informants' statements that honour is basically a family-matter,
complete the picture of their understanding of honour as a reflection of the
"traditional North-African" notion of honour presented in chapter three.
Fatheia Muaddaf states that honour is as important today as it was before,
because
girls and boys study now, and know a lot about honour. So they
understand the notion of honour, and refuse a man or a woman without
honour.
Fatheia's ideas about what children learn in school does, however,
correspond rather badly with the facts; her youngest son Nejib's
interpretation of honour suggests that she has misunderstood:
Honour. In Tunisia, and in all the Arab- Muslim countries, we speak a lot
about honour. Listen - the word "honour" is usually associated with
sexuality, at least in the Arab-Muslim countries. Even if we do not refer
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to sexuality in the society, honour is stil related to sexuality, indirectly,
through fantasies, etcetera.(...) in most cases we speak of honour as an
element concerning the women's role in the society. I consider it an
idiotic and pro-slavery concept, because it involves the elements of
women's oppression, like prohibiting freedoin of contact, communication
and expression.
Both Fatheia's other educated children share their brother's opinion about
honour, but express themselves rather briefly on the topic: "It has no
meaning to me", says Tarek, while Jalila quite simply states that "it is
nonsense" .
The concept ofhonour does make sense to Mohammed, the Tejer-cousin;
to mm it means something else, however:
The honour in Tunisia is very closely related to the women. The honour
of the nation, the country, means nothing here. There are some exceptions,
but in general, when one talks about honour, it means the women. For me,
that is not honour.
Nora's reflections about the role and function of honour in her society is
a good illustration of the educated informants' problematie and intermediary
position between their own moral preferences and those of their social
surroundings:
Yes, of course (I think a lot about honourJ. Because even if I am
convinced that... Educated people are generally torn between this: The
mentality - the religion, and their education. Even if I was convinced
that I should have, for example, a sexual relationship with the man I agree
with, even before the marage, I cannot have that; because of my family,
and because of the society. (...) In some cases honour is good, and in
some cases it is bad. It is good, because some people do not know how
to use their freedom... you know, it is good to liinit the bad sides of our
society. But if all people were conscious, knew how to use their freedom
- if they had sexual relationships because they agreed with the other
person, loved this person, if they were conscious of that, I think that it
would be good. But what we need is consciousness. People are not - that
is what we need in Tunisia.
As argued in chapter three, the concepts of honour and shame represent the
basic moral principles in the traditional North-African societies - the
principles on which the entire social organization is built. One may
therefore assume that an individual's attitude to honour will reflect to which
degree he or she identifies with the social system it represents.
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Once again, we see that level of education stands out as a more
significant factor for change than gender and generation. All the informants
without higher education recognizes not only that honour is important in
their society, but also that it should be so ~ honour represents a
fundamental value in their lives.
The academically trained informants, by contrast, all distanee themselves
from the concept; they recognize its social importance, but see it as a
problem - particularly for the women. They report that the demand that
they adapt to the moral code of honour represents an obstacle to their
ability to lead the lIves they personally find right. Honour is thus defined
as a negative force, and also as a hindranee to their individual freedom,
that, as we shall see in the next section, is experienced as a very important
- but rather problematic - value in their lives.
12.2 Individual freedom
Since "honour" represents a main element in a moral-system that requires
the individual's subjection to the family-group, "individual freedom" may
be seen as its logical opposite. We shall see that it is to a considerable
degree experienced this way by the informants - particularly by the
women.
All the men of the two eldest generations share a common and clear
perception of individual freedom. Their interpretation has certain
similarties with the classic, negative definition of the concept; I let Hassan
Falleah speak for them all:
Individual freedom means that nobody bothers you, that nobody
intervenes in your affairs, and that you do not intervene in other people's
affairs.
All the elder men find individual freedom to be rather important; relating
their interpretation of the concept to the traditional North-African maleTole,
it is understandable why this is. The image of the man as an independent,
honourable actor interacting with other men of equal social status on the
"outside" arena, does not encourage relations of submission and domination
between men. The importanee the men give to individual freedom as they
understand it is not inconsistent with their male notion of honour, but rather
a logical par of it.
When turning to the women of the two eldest generations, their
perceptions of individual freedom are less homogenous, and also less clear.
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Habiba and Fatoma have the same ide a of what it means to be free; it is
to be allowed to do good things~ Habiba speaks:
I think that individual freedom means that if I want to do something -
a good thing, for example, nobody wil be against me, against my
freedom. But if I want to do a bad thing, of course my family, my
husband, wil be against me. And when I want to do something, I should
take into consideration the reaction of the family, the reaction of my
hus band.
These two women express rather modest demands for individual freedom;
their perception is not inconsistent with their traditionally defined female
roles, as it in fact .only implies a freedom to do what women are supposed
to do in any case.
Aisha, the Tejer grand-mother, has her own, concrete way of
understanding individual freedom; according to her definition she has it, as
she has been living alone since her husband died:
In my own house I am free. When I want to go out, I go out; when I
want to eat, I eat - and I prep are what I like. I do not want to be under
a daughter-in-law.
Aisha is very fond of this freedom of hers, and is constantly turning down
all suggestions from her children to give it up, and move in with them
instead.
Fatheia Muaddaf is the only one of the elder women whose interpretation
of individual freedom approximates the one of the elder men; her
interpretation thereby also implies that freedom is something she has not -
a fact that she is aware of:
Freedom means that one can do what one wants, can make decisions
without involving anybody. For me it is impossible to do that. I cannot
make decisions alone. I feel that I have someone dominating me. I cannot
do anything my husband dislikes.
Her perception of individual freedom is in contradietion with her
traditionally defined female role, a contradiction she acknowledges - and
solves, by accepting that she cannot be free.
Fatheia's housewife-daughter Leila shares her mother's interpretation of
individual freedom. Like her, she also recognizes that she is not free:
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It is difficult to say that I am free. I never felt that I was free. (...) It is
important, but it is difficult - I say it again. There are only rare cases of
girls who live freely.
Meriem Tejer, the other young housewife, tend to share her mother and
Fatoma's understanding of the concept, rather than the one of Leila and
Fatheia:
I think that individual freedom means that one is free to do what one
wants, but within limits. Limited freedom - not to be free to do bad
things.
Lassad, the young man without higher education, shares the elder men' s
opinion about individual freedom, as he shares their opinions about most
things: Freedom is the right to be left alone with one's private decisions,
and with life in general.
Concerning individual freedom, the informants without higher education
share the framework of meaning within which they understand the concept.
Their definitions are, however, clearly diverging, according to gender. TheIr
gendered conceptions of freedom are not inconsistent, but rather
complementary - except for the cases of Fatheia and Leila. These women
have solved the conflict between their understanding of freedom and their
traditional female fole by accepting that individual freedom is not for them;
they have given up this value in favour of their submission to their family-
group and the society.
With only one exception, the young, academically trained informants
support the negative definition of individual freedom held by the
uneducated men. The fact that half of the educated informants supporting
this definition are women, as well as the fact that they do not suggest that
this is a value they are not entitled to because of their gender, make their
interpretations rather remarkable. It is reasonable to see these women's
demands for individual freedom in connection with the previously presented
argument that they, because of their education, have come to constitute a
new category of women in the society.
Nejib Muaddaf is the one who distances himself from the other
academically trained informants' definition of individual freedom; it does
not contain enough freedom for him:
I am totaly against this notion of freedom. I believe in the absolute
freedom, since freedom is not an excluded element. It is a catalyst that
should enrich the individual's personality. This is how the individual can
be able to choose his situation, and his own autonomous life. (...) So,
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freedom consists of trying to conceive the world in your own way, and to
be completely free to see the world the way you like. When I say world,
I mean the society, individuals, etcetera.
The academically trained informants value their freedom highly. Still, in
their society they have to struggle to defend it. Mohammed is, however,
optimistic concerning the long-term conditions of this value:
In my opinion, the individual freedom is a mentality. And it wil come
with time in Tunisia. Because - for example, my generation, the young
people. What we have done, is the contrar of OUT fathers. Personally, I
have no problems with my father, but most young people have. My
frends want to go out at night - their fathers say no. But later - I wil
let my son go out. O.K? It wil come with the time. This wil become a
part of the individual freedom of my son.
We have seen that the young, academically trained informants all tend to
reject honour as a concept of any value or positive connotation. At the
same time, they emphasize the importanee of individual freedom. They
abandon the hallmark of the moral-system of their society, and praise its
logical, and, as we have seen, also its practical opposite. This indicates
rather strongly the existence of a distinet individual identity among them;
an identity that at the same time seems to be relatively gender-neutral.
The informants without high er education, by contrast, see honour as a
main value in their lives, and the women are ready to sacrifice their
personal freedom if it contradicts the traditional principles of honourable
conduct. The fact that the uneducated men all find individual freedom to
be a rather important aspect of their life, does, as argued above, not
contradict their even larger fondness of honour, as a degree of individual
independence is a characteristic of men's traditionally defined code of
honour. The thorough division of the uneducated informants' interpretations
of the two concepts according to gender strengthens the argument that
among these informants, a sense of identity characterized by the
individuals' gender and belonging to a family-group is dominant.
12.3 "Who are you?"
The existence of two fundamentally different concepts of identity among
the informants is even more clearly expressed in their descriptions of
themselves, of who they are. The question appeared to be rather hard to
understand for the informants without higher education; some of them were
not able to answer it until they were told to present themselves, as to a
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stranger. Those who presented themselves and those who described
themselves did it in similar ways, however; the additional question did not
seem to contain a different meaning. The fact that the uneducated
informants in general had difficulties in understanding the question, while
all the educated informants understood it easily, and in anentirely different
way, is a rather interesting feature in itself.
With minor variations, all the men without higher education describe
themselves by their name, their fathers name, their profession, and their
place of origin. Let us start with the eldest informant, Mustfa:
I am Mustfa ben15 Mohammed ben Falleah. (a person present: Hajj
Mustfa?) No. I should not call myself that, because it is a duty. It should
not be mentioned with the name.
His son, Hassan, is rather more informative:
I am Hassan Falleah. I was born in 1940. I am Tunisian, and I was bom
in Bled. And I am a shopkeeper.
Mahmoud had big problems of understanding the question, even when he
was asked to present himself:
I am Mahmoud Tejer, son of Ahmed. (his son: and how do you present
yourself when you meet new people at the hajj?) My name is
Mohammed, I come from Tunisia. What more should I say? I have no
education, no profession, so that is all.
Mahmoud' s nephew Lassad did not initially understand the question, either:
I would give him my name, and my profession. And if he was from Bled,
and knew the families, I would tell him that I am the son of my family.
The women without higher education tend to understand the question in the
same way as the men, but they give importanee to other aspects in their
descriptions of themselves; to them, only their family-relations to men seem
to be of significance for who they are. Fatoma Muaddaf understands the
question immediately:
I am flen/6 the daughter of flen, and the wife of flen. That is all.
15 "ben" means "son of' in Arabie.
16 "£len" means "N.N." in Arabie.
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Her daughter, Fatheia, needs some help before she is able to answer. When
she does, it is in the exact same way as her mother:
I would say that I am - my name, the wife of - my husband, and the
daughter of - my father.
Habiba Tejer answers in her own way:
I am Habiba bent Najjar.17 Tejer.
She smiles while doing so; I believe she is leaving something out - on
purpose.
Her daughter Meriem, by contrast, does not leave out anything when
asked to present herself:
I am Meriem, the wife of Nasser Schili. if they do not know Nasser, I
say that he is the son of Mohammed Schili, who worked as a carenter.
And if they do not know, I say that I am the daughter of Mahmoud Tejer,
who has a shop there and there. That is how I present myself.
Leila Muaddaf is the only one of the women without higher education who
deviates somewhat from the way in which the others describe themselves;
she seems to understand the question a bit like the educated informants do,
even if she prefers to get the additional question before she answers:
I would say that I am a girl from Bled, and that I live in Bled. I am
maried, I have two girls; I used to live in Tunis, for two years. I am now
building my house. Of course I have faced problems in my life ....
she says, and smiles.
Gender rather than generation is what distinguishes the uneducated
informants' approach to the question of who they are; the differences
caused by gender are corresponding to their gendered social positions
defined by the patrilinear principles of the traditional social organisation.
The academically trained informants all understand the question in a
fundamentally different way. One of them escape the task of answering;
J al il a Muaddaf chooses the easy way out witha quick "I do not know. I am
searching". Also her brother Tarek after some reflection finds that he is not
certain about the answer:
17 Her mai den family-name, not her father's first name.
187
I do not know. Who am I? It is a very difficult question. Y ou see,
perhaps, now I am not very - how can I say it - even me, I do not
know exactly who I am. I am looking for someone. I am looking to
concretize my principles, my opinions - I am looking for this - who I
am. I think - until now, perhaps, I am not mature.
His brother Nejib seems to be rather aware of who he is; on the basis of ms
answer, one may assume that his self-understanding makes life difficult for
him:
Who am i. It depends. I would not like to fall in the pit of narcissism, and
neither in the one of paranoia. (...) I want to be independent, sovereign of
myself; to commend myself by myself, to decide myself by myself. I
know very well that it is a paranoiac trait, but I do not mind, because it
plays an importat role in my life, and I try to safeguard this personality.
But as a definition, I am a citizen of a society whose people, and
mentality, are not mine.
Nora has been given the last word in this presentation; her description of
her life sums up its main point:
Perhaps I can divide my life in two parts - life before university, and
after university. Of course, before university, I studied in primary and
secondary school; I knew nothing but to study, and - at home. Of course
I had my entertainment, I played volleyball, for example, and - I had
some entertainment.
But after that, at university, even my - how can I say it - even my
thinking changed. Because I had many experiences, at the university -
I met many people from different countries, - I lived another, different
life. So, at university I changed, and after that, of course I try to have my
own ideas, to look at life differently....
The informants conceive themselves in fundamentally diverging ways.
While the uneducated express self-images that reflect the traditional North-
African principles of social and moral organization, academic training
seems to have led to a new sense of identity among the educated
informants, characterized by individualization and "de-genderization".
New educational practices, made available by the post-colonial structural
changes, and chosen as strategies of action by the academically trained
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informants, seem to have led not only to new ways of thinking, but also to
new ways of understanding oneself.
As we have seen in the previous chapters, all the educated informants
find that their living-conditions have improved as a result of their academic
training. This does not, however, imply that their lives have become less
problematic than they otherwise would have been; the educated informants
find themselves in a difficult and intermediary situation. The divergence
between their personal preferences and the expectations of the social
surroundings is a constant source of frustration; "I am a citizen of a society
whose people, and mentality, are not mine", says Nejib.
The post-colonial structural changes have also influenced the liv es of the
uneducated informants. Even if their actual practices have remained quite
similar, their way of perceiving their situation seems to have become more
reflective, as a result of the new basis of comparison provided by their
educated relatives. The "new" practices have made the traditional,
"invisible" habitus more visible, also 10 those who lead lives in accordance
with it. Their social reality is therefore no longer a "traditional society", as
the term was understood in chapter three: They no longer live in a stable,
homogenous society, that constitute the only social reality imaginable. The
uneducated informants are also in an intermediary situation as a result of
the post-colonial changes; their position "in-between" is, however, of a
different nature than that experienced by the academically trained
informants.
The informants are living under rather complicated conditions; the fact
that their different intermediary positions imply different kinds of problems,
make it all the more difficult. Their ability to cope with these conditions -
in relation to themselves, and in relation to each other - is impressive.
Some are more successful than others; still, they all reveal remarkable skills
in finding strategies through which they can negotiate social situations that
allow for a required minimum of room for different practices, thoughts, and
senses of identity.
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13. Conclusion: Negotiating the "in~
between"
Tunisia has undergone tremendous social change since independence in
1956. A sketch of the social point of departure of this post-colonial change
was drawn in chapter three: North-African societies have traditionally been
characterized by agendered, collective, and other-directed kind of small-
scale social organization.
The post-colonial structural changes have contributed to a development
deparing from these traditional North-African principles of social
organization. The introduction of a compulsory-school system, a thorough
change in the preconditions for control of human reproductivity, and
significant changes in cIvil legislation are changes that have been given
particular emphasis in this study.
This is the historical and social background for the main objective of the
study; an analysis of post-colonial structural change as it appearS to
Tunisians who experience it in their daily lives.
We have seen that the structural changes have had significant effects on
the conditions of existence of all the individuals figuring as informants in
this study. However, the actual nature of these effects var significantly.
The informants' gender seem to influence the nature of their experiences;
their age at the time of independence stands out as a main generationalline
of division.
The informants of the two eldest generations, who were all adults at the
time of independence, report to have experienced the general economic
growth, the "nuclearization" of the household-units, and - particularly for
the women - the general opening up of the "outside" to women's physical
presence, as some of the more central changes in objective strctures that
have influenced their personal post-colonial conditions of existence. The
elder informants have furthermore experienced these changes as being
overall positive.
The elder generations have, however, had to relate to a number of other
structural changes; changes that, because of the age factor, have had limited
relevanee for their personal life-courses, while having significant
consequences for the life-courses of the young informants. The elders have
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had to cope with the fact that the practices of their children or grand-
ehildren have become markedly different from their own, as a res ult of new
social strctures that have not affected them personally .
The social changes that the elder informants have experienced as
remarkable have been relevant to the young informants as "fait accomplis".
One may therefore assume that the different post-colonial structural
changes have different meanings for the different generations of informants,
as well as different consequences for their actual practices.
A central structural change that has been of personal relevanee to the
young generation alone, was the introduction of a compulsory-school
system, including access to education at university-level. The large increase
in the availability of contraceptives, together with the decrease in child-
mortality has provided the post-colonial generations of Tunisians with a
possibility to choose other reproductive practices than the elder generations.
For the young women, the introduction of an legallower age of marriage
in paricular, and the significant rise in the average age of mariage for girls
in general, have clearly influenced their life-courses. The increase in
geographical mobility furthermore seems to have affected mainly the young
generation.
The post-colonial changes in social structures have provided the young
Tunisians with new alternative practices, and with a potential ability to
change the nature of central phases of their life-courses. The informants '
approaches to these alternatives show, however, that the actual ways in
which they are evaluated, and thus practised, vary considerably also within
the young generation. The changes in objective structures seem to affect the
young informants' co gnitive and motivating structures in different ways.
All the young informants have practices that deviate from those of the elder
informants, but the nature of the deviations vary. Level of education has
been identified as a main factor of influence on the different practices
within the younger generation:
The young informants without higher education show a general tendency
of choosing between available alternatives practices that to a significant
degree correspond with the principles of the traditional North-African social
organization. We have seen that a low leve! of formal education tends to
lead to later occupations that in most respects reflect the traditional, gender-
defined division of labour: The women become full-time married
housewives; they spend the majority of their adult liv es "inside", taking
care of "private" tasks. The men, by contrast, lead "outside" , income-
generating occupationallives - within traditional occupational branches.
The occupational lives of the young informants without higher education
reflect the traditional complementary nature of the gendered division of
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labour, and the organic way in which the family-group traditionally is
composed.
The general post-colonial change in age of marriage for girls seems to
have least effect on the liv es of the young women without education. They
mary mue h later than their mothers and grand-mothers, but significantly
much earlier than the young women with a higher education. Accordingly,
the reproductive practices of the uneducated young couples deviate from
those of their elder relatives, but not as significantly as they deviate from
the reproductive practices of the academically trained informants. We have
also seen that the young, uneducated informants have a higher geographical
mobility than the elder generations, but their mobility is rather lower than
that of the informants with a higher education.
All informants, regardless of gender and generation, recognize that a
higher education leads to significant changes in individual social conditions
of existence. The women do, however, tend to value formal education
higher than the men. The educated informants find their living-situations to
deviate most markedly from those of the others, and in a positive direction.
In any case, the practices of the educated informants are remarkably
different from those of the others. They are characterized by a general
tendency of "de-genderization" and individualization, and they deviate in
a fundamental way from the traditional principles for social organization:
The educated young women tend to marry later than any of the other
female informants; they also take a more active role in the planning of their
own marrage than the other women. Both the men and women with higher
education have chosen, or expect to choose, their partners on their own -
a practice that clearly deviates from that of the other informants. In
addition, they tend' to practice a different kind of celebration of their
mariages than the others; their "new" marage-celebrations break with the
traditionally important position of such life-course events as promoters of
the family-group in the local social community. Their mared life is
practised is an individualized way, as compared to the collective family-
approach to the marriage as life-course phase by the other informants.
The "student-couples" tend to postpone the birth of their first child once
they are maried - contrary to the other informants, who proved their
reproductive abilities as early as possible in their mariage. The educated
informants want to have less children than the others, and the woman's
professional career is presented as a main reason for this, as well as for
their later mariages. Studies and the following professional life of the
educated informants also tend to increase their geographical mobility
considerably, as compared to the other informants.
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These deviant practices of the educated informants indicate that high 
er
education leads to a kind of life that is qualitatively different from that of
the uneducated young informants. The young informants' thoughts show
even better than their practices that higher education constitutes a
fundamental line of division concerning the way in wbich life is conceived:
Even if the actual practices of the young, uneducated informants deviate
from the practices of the elder generations, the considerations behind their
practices, as well as their perceptions of life in general, show that they
understand themselves and the society in which they live in a similar way
as their elder relatives. Even if the "traditional" practices of 
the uneducated
informants have changed during the three generations of informants, they
still deserve the name, as they appear as results of cognitive and motivating
structures based on the traditional prindples of sodal organization.
The informants with higher education, by contrast, express conceptions
and ideas of life that deviate even more from the traditional principles than
their practices. Their practices should be seen as functions of compromises
between their own individualized ideas of life, and the restrictions on their
ability to realize these ideas, represented by their families and social
environment. Their actual freedom to realize their ideas is heavily
dependent on the attitudes of their individual families, that in the first place
have to allow them to study. This dependency on the traditionally most
significant gro up , s willingness to allow its members' life-courses to take a
direction that would distance them from the group and weaken its control
over them, is a common feature of the lives ofall the educated informants.
It seems, however, to be particularly strong for the young women.
Even if the influence of the family is a factor that should be taken into
consideration by the educated informants in their adult lives, the family's
decision to let a member study tends to alter its expectations and demands
of tbis individual's future practices. There seem to exist different standards
for the expected life-courses of the youth without higher education and the
highly educated ones. This is paricularly the case for the educated women;
I have argued that they have come to constitute a new sodal category of
women as a consequence oftheir academic training, supplementing the two
gendered categories which have their roots in the traditional social
organization.
The stories of the two main informant-families indicate that the attitudes
to the post-colonial changes tend to depend on the families' particular
histories; a high sodal position in the traditional social order of Bled seems
to have a negative influence on the family's adaptability to the social
changes, and vice-versa. This suggests that the post-colonial social changes
introduce principles that are qualitatively different from that characteristic
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for the traditional social organization, and that they in theory will tend to
be mutually exclusive.
The informants ' ability to cope with their family-situations within this web
of generational and educational differences is impressive. These Tunisians
all possess remarkable skills in combining the theoretically incompatible
principles of the "old" and the "new".
Even if the educated informants apparently stand out as those who most
consciously and actively negotiate a social reality in which they can
combine a maximum of their own individual preferences with a minimum
of required considerations towards their families and social surroundings,
the two eldest generations are actually those who have experienced the
more thorough structural change - and correspondingly thorough changes
in perceptions - during their life-time. The fact that several of the changes
have had no direct effects on the direction of their personal life-courses,
have made their situation all the more difficult. Still, they show an
astonishing ability to cope with the changes that take place around them.
This ability to adjust to the new times is especially required for the elder
informants' relations to their younger family-members; they are facing a
development demanding that they give up significant parts of the elders'
traditional control and power over the younger. As we have seen, this
proeess. is not taking place without problems; still, the elders' acceptance
of their new and reduced position in relation to their children's lives are
remarkable, particularly when the practices they themselves were exposed
to in their childhood are taken into consideration.
The young generation of informants on their part have to accept the
restrictions the elder relatives impose on their lives, restrictions that may
constitute significant obstacles to the realization of the kind of life they
prefer. These restrictions are clearly experienced as more burdensome by
the educated young informants, as their preferred practices deviate so
markedly from those accepted by the elders. While the young informants
without a higher education may feel more at ease with the demands from
the family , they have to accept that their brothers and sisters as a result of
studies live in ways that are significantly different, and, in the opinion of
some of them, also significantly better than their own.
The informants are thus engaged in constant proeesses of compromises,
negotiations, and re-definitions in relation to each other. These proeesses
go on within a cultural context where the family-group still constitutes a
fundamental unit, as well as a fundamental value. The maintenance of
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communication between family-members of different generations, gender
and educational levels represent both a significant value and a social
necessity to all implied pars, the academically trained ones included.
The informants' stories sugge st that a varety of strategies fitted to the
task of managing this situation have been consciously or unconsciously
developed among them. Some of these strategi es have been examined: We
have seen that the elder women approach their children's formal education
in their own particular way, and give it their own paricular meaning,
through including the important exams in their repertoire of celebrated life-
course events. We have also seen that when children's marriage-practices
come to deviate so markedly from the traditional practices so that the elder
informants are unable to relate to them through their own perceptions of the
socially possible, the problem may be solved by the parents' withdrawal
from decisions concerning the mariage-process. This is, however, one of
the generational conflicts most difficult to overcome, one of the situations
where strong and diverging interests are exposed most clearly.
The educated informants of the young generation have their own
particular strategies, developed to deal with their situation as citizens of two
different worlds of thought and practice: They separate the two worlds
from each other, both mentally, and physically. In cases where this solution
is of no help, as in the marriage-celebrations, they may draw on these
celebrations' traditional functions in order to mediate their own,
untraditional message. We have seen that they tend to insist on celebrating
their mariages in the "new" way, in spite of considerable resistance from
the family and the social surroundings. One may assume that the educated
informants use the mariage-celebrations' traditional informational function
as a means to proclaim their intentions to lead an un-traditionallife.
The informants of different categories develop different strategies in
order to cope with the different intermediary situations they are in as a
consequence of their different experiences with the post-colonial structural
changes. I have argued that the differences in experiences with these
changes are of such a fundamental character that they affect not only the
individuals' practices, but also their way of understanding themselves -
for themselves, and in relation to the society. The experiences have
influenced the informants' identity.
The uneducated informants of all generations have perceptions and
thoughts that in most central respects are similar and correspond with the
traditional North-African conception of individuals as gendered, collective,
and other-directed.
The academically trained informants, by contrast, have a way of thinking
that diverge fundamentally from that of the others, reflecting an
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understanding of themselves as autonomous individuals, rather than as
gendered parts of a family-group.
It is thus higher education, rather than generation or gender, that stands
out as the main factor for change in the informants' practices, thoughts,
and senses of identity. The post-colonial structural change has influenced
the conditions of existence of all the informants; it has furthermore
influenced the social reality in which they live, to the extent that it has lost
central characteristics of "traditional society". Depending on their individual
experiences with the social changes, all the informants therefore live in
different "in-between" situations.
It is, however, the academically trained informants who seem to find
their intermediary situation most problematic, and who at the same time are
most conscious of having developed strategi es by which they can negotiate
acceptable social conditions. I have argued that more than their new
practices, this ability of the educated informants to relate to themselves and
the social surroundings as separate entities indicates that their self-
perception is distinctly more individualized than that of their uneducated
relatives. I giv e the last word to Mohammed, bank-manager and cousin of
the Tejers; he describes this intermediary position better than me:
I am an Arabic boy, who is educated, but who sometimes finds
contradictions between his origin and his education (...) Sometimes, when
something shows up, you do not know where it wil end. An Arabic
origin, the up-bringing provided by the family - this has also an
influence. We say that it has not, but that is wrong. I try to change - I
pretend to be cultivated, but I know that there are holes in my cultivation,
and that on the bottom I am an Arab, pretending.
13.1 Concluding remarks
Parts of this study of Tunisian post-colonial change in practice, thought,
and identity could evidently have been done differently. A weakness of the
theoretical approach to the theme is perhaps that little importanee has been
given to the considerable number of theories existing on the nature of
traditional patrilinear kinship-relations. One may assume that such an
approach to the data-material could have shed additional light on the
information it contains.
I did, however, not find that a thorough analysis of the patrilinear
kinship-group as it us ed to exist in a traditional social con text could defend
any central position in the thesis, which main focus has been on the change
away from these principles. In short, I tind that my theoretical approach
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provides alimited, but sufficient basis for an empirical analysis of Tunisian
post-colonial change in practice, thought, and identity.
Still, an evident methodological weakness of the study should be seen in
relation to my choice to minimize the discussion of these elements in the
theoretical approach: I have treated as close relatives people who, according
to the mentioned theories, do not formally stand in such relations to each
other. Both the eldest female informants are maternal grand-mothers to the
families presented here, and therefore, according to the patrilinear principles
for family-organization, not formally members of these family-groups. One
should therefore leave open the possibility that an examination of families
with paternal grand-mothers could have changed the picture of generational
family-relations. Relating this methodological weakness to the theme of the
thesis, and to the fact that in practice, the members of the informant-
families are actually closely related to each other, I cannot see that it
constitutes a major problem of validity. The considerable advantages of my
particular sample of informants discussed in chapter four justify in my
opinion this somewhat problematic methodological manoeuvre.
When I first started working on this study, one of my main ambitions
was to present equally the practices and thoughts of both genders. I found
the idea of analyzing change in family-relations in a society where the
family-group traditionally constitutes an organic unit through an
examination of only one gender quite meaningless. Still, in retrospect, a
certain imbalance in the presentation of the two genders in favour of the
women is undeniable. There is probably several reasons for this: As a
foreign woman in a gender-divided society, it generally proved harder to
obtain contact with the men than with the women. The fact that the topics
dealt with in the interviews to a considerable extent were of a kind that, as
argued in chapter three, traditionally is regarded as belonging to the
"private" culture of the women, probably added to the problems of
obtaining good interviews with men. Given these preconditions for the data-
collection, I actually find the res ult rather acceptable.
My approach to the theme of this study is rather narow, a fact that
implies certain limitations: As argued in chapter three, "Bled" is hardlya
representative - in the sense of "average" - Tunisian town. As argued in
chapter four, the middle-class Beldiyins cannot unproblematically be treated
as representativ es of the entire Beldiyin population. Even if the study
clearly presents Tunisians' experiences with the country's post-colonial
structural changes, the result can therefore not be claimed to represent the
way in which Tunisians in general have experienced these changes. The
tendencies described in this thesis may serve as indicators of possibly
general tendencies in post-colonial Tunisia only. A broader approach to the
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theme could have constituted an interesting alternative to that presented
here.
Yet another problem related to my choice of approach should be
mentioned: In this study, a clear connection between higher education and
individuality in a "Western" sense has been established. The recent Islamist
revival among Tunisian students suggests rather strongly that this
connection is not necessarly a universal one. Islamic fundamentalism is a
fascinating, but vast phenomenon; I have chosen to leave it entirely out of
this thesis. A study of fundamentalism's consequences for practices,
thoughts and senses of identity in Tunisia would, however, be an interesting
project for the future.
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